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Abstract
This thesis gives a rigorous development of sentential logic
and first-order logic as mathematical models of humanity’s de-
ductive thought processes. Important properties of each of these
models are stated and proved including Compactness results
(the ability to prove a statement from a finite set of assump-
tions), Soundness results (a proof given a set of assumptions will
always be true given that set of assumptions), and Complete-
ness results (a statement that is true given a set of assumptions
must have a proof from that set of assumptions). Mathematical
theories and axiomatizations or theories are discussed in a first-
order logical setting. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to state
and prove Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem for number theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Statements that are true yet unprovable? Such a notion seems to be
self-contradictory and yet that is exactly what Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theo-
rem asserts.
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem Given a decidable set of first-order sen-
tences that are true in number theory, then there is a statement true in number
theory that is not provable from our decidable set.
Of course there are terms in this statement that have as yet to be
defined, but this statement gives the reader a first sense of the result that this
thesis seeks to prove. Think of the set of sentences that the theorem mentions
as the center of a circle in the plane. Think of the radius of that circle being
associated with the extent of what can be proven from those sentences. Finally
think of the entire plane representing the totality of all statements true of
number theory. Then what Go¨del’s Theorem says is that the radius of the
circle must be less than infinity.
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It is clear that Kurt Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem states not only
a mathematical result but also touches on meta-mathematics. It raises deep
philosophical questions. How do we know mathematical truth? How do we
know that we can prove true statements? Is mathematics realism or formalism?
Kurt Go¨del went to university in Europe in the interim period between
World Wars I and II. The philosophical air of logical positivism, whose foun-
dational axiom is “Man is the measure of all things,” abounded in Europe
during this period. Hence, it is no surprise that mathematicians themselves
were mostly formalists who believed that all of mathematics can be reduced
to rule following. There is no objective reality of mathematical objects. There
is no need to appeal to intuition.
David Hilbert was one of formalism’s most vocal proponents in mathe-
matics, and his desire was to spur his colleagues to the systematic formalizing
of all mathematical branches. Among his 10 problems that he submitted to the
mathematical community in 1900 was the goal of proving arithmetic consis-
tent. This proof would basically demonstrate that arithmetic could be treated
as a self-contained formal system without reference to anything else. Kurt
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem destroyed Hilbert’s dream.
Go¨del himself did not share the mathematical mainstream view. In-
stead Kurt Go¨del was a Platonist believing that mathematical objects exist in
reality with the mathematical project a project of discovery and not a mean-
ingless exercise in reasoning and rule following. Go¨del first announced that
he had a proof of a version of the Incompleteness Theorem in 1930 in a con-
ference in Ko¨nigsberg (a conference at which Hilbert was present). Many at
the conference paid no heed to the meek Go¨del’s understated announcement.
One person of interest who did take a great deal of notice was John von Neu-
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mann, one of the patriarchs of computability theory. Von Neumann saw the
application of Go¨del’s Theorem quite quickly.
Although one of the corollaries to the Incompleteness Theorem says
that the consistency of arithmetic cannot be proved within arithmetic, solving
in the negative one of Hilbert’s problems and smashing the formalist enterprise,
many took very little heed. In a strange twist, the logical positivists and post-
modernists usurped Go¨del’s result as supporting their positions of relative
knowledge and meaning. This conception continues to this day. Go¨del believed
that his work supported just the opposite view: that objective mathematical
truth exists. (Note the author obtained much of the historical information
given above from Incompleteness–the Proof and Paradox of Kurt Go¨del by
Rebecca Goldstein.)
Many have cited astonishing philosophical consequences of Go¨del’s The-
orem including an intriguing argument that the mind must be more than a
computer. To fully understand what Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem says
and to judge the soundness of such claims we proceed on a journey through
mathematical logic to prove this weighty theorem.
Go¨del’s Theorem is a statement about the mathematical model of logic
called “first-order logic.” In this thesis, we seek to establish a rigorous mathe-
matical development of sentential and first-order logic as models of humanity’s
deductive thought processes.
As we proceed through the development of these two mathematical
models of logic, we will state, prove, and discuss several important results,
important not only for Go¨del’s Theorem but also powerful results in their own
right. Among these results are soundness, completeness, and compactness
results for both models.
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After developing the model of first-order logic, we will discuss what
formal theories are and what the formal axiomatization of a theory means.
We will give concrete examples of these concepts with familiar mathematical
structures on our journey to prove Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
Finally, as the main goal of this thesis, we will give a proof of Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem, discussing the concepts of Go¨del numbering and rep-
resentability within number theory which are necessary to prove the theorem.
The development of this thesis closely follows that of Herbert Enderton in
A Mathematical Introduction to Logic. Because this is the case, citation is
suppressed for ease in reading.
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Chapter 2
Sentential Logic: The Language
and Truth Values
In our journey to prove Go¨del’s famous theorem, we must rigorously
establish the mathematical system, first-order logic, in which it is proved.
As a prototype to first-order logic, in this chapter we rigorously develop the
mathematical system of sentential logic.
2.1 Intuition Behind the Sentential Language
Our goal behind creating a formal language is to create a model for
humanity’s deductive thought processes. In the real world, as reasoners, we
may put forward the following arguments:
If Socrates is a man, then he is mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
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If Gertrude is a purple oliphant, then it eats grapes.
Gertrude is a purple oliphant.
Therefore Gertrude eats grapes.
If it is not the case that you are reading this sentence and you are confused,
then you should re-read it.
I am confused and I am no longer reading the former sentence.
Therefore, I should re-read the first sentence.
Now, as reasoners we can see that the first two arguments make sense
regardless of whether men exist, Socrates, or purple oliphants named Gertrude.
What makes the first two arguments understandable is the inherent structure
of the propositions. In a very real way, what it means to be Socrates, a man,
or a purple oliphant named Gertrude are inconsequential and merely cloud our
thinking when we attempt to decide whether the argument is reasonable. Thus,
it would be handy to have a formal system, with all the rigor of mathematics,
that can capture the essential structure of arguments that we may make.
For instance {(A→ B),A}  B captures the essential structure of
the first two arguments where we accept the two expressions in the set as
“true” and where “” has an intended meaning of “therefore.” So, we can
interpret the symbolism to say that given the statements (A→ B) and A
the conclusionB follows. Whether we translate “Socrates is a man” and ”Man
is mortal” as A and B respectively or whether we translate “Gertrude is a
purple oliphant” and “Gertrude eats grapes” as A and B respectively, we
have captured in just a few symbols the inherent structure in both arguments
above.
6
In addition to capturing the essential structure of human reasoning with
no frills, such a formal language to model human deductive thought processes
also avoids the ambiguities of natural languages (languages spoken by humans
to express thought). In the third argument, understanding the first premise is
the key to knowing whether the argument makes sense. We need to know the
conditions for re-reading the first sentence, and the stated condition is it not
being the case that you are reading the first sentence and you are confused.
Now, the problem is, there is ambiguity in the sentence. Does the “not” refer
to both reading the first sentence and being confused or does the “not” refer
to just reading the first sentence. Given how the sentence is written in our
natural language (English in this case)–and in a perfectly acceptable way–it
could be read with either emphasis. In the first case, either not reading the
sentence or not being confused would be a sufficient condition for re-reading
the sentence. In the second case, only by not reading the sentence and being
confused will be sufficient for re-reading the sentence. Whether we take the
intended meaning to be one or the other, the argument still makes sense, since
the second premise was that I was no longer reading the sentence, and I was
confused, and this premise will be sufficient for both cases. (So, since you,
the reader, are no longer reading the first sentence in that argument–you are
reading this one!–and you are probably still confused, you should go re-read
the first sentence!) The point is that this ambiguity in the natural language
clouds the analysis of whether the argument was reasonable.
Now, if we translate “you are reading this sentence” as S and “you
are confused” as C, and if we have “¬” represent the idea of “not” and “∧”
represent the idea of “and”, then the ambiguity we have described above is
whether “it is not the case that you are reading this sentence and you are
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confused” should be translated as (¬(S ∧ C)) or as ((¬S) ∧ C). Having
even the power to describe the ambiguity with just these few symbols indicates
in and of itself the ability to also avoid such ambiguity if we use such a formal
language to model deduction.
How would we analyze the reasonableness of arguments if we have such
a nice formal language with which to work? The reader is probably already
familiar with symbology we have already used and also the notion of truth
tables. I can substitute values of true or false in for each symbol, and for all
values that cause the premise expressions to be true, the conclusion expression
should also be true. The truth table for the first two arguments above would
be
A B (A→ B)
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
The only line in the truth table for which both premisesA and (A→ B)
are true is the first, and we see that the conclusion, B, is also true in this case.
So, we would say that our argument is reasonable. All of the foregoing should
be familiar to the reader from a mathematical foundations course.
2.2 The Need for Formalizing the Intuition
Since we will want to use the mathematical structure of our formal lan-
guage to prove mathematical results about logic (ultimately, Go¨del’s Incom-
pleteness Theorem), we need to develop the intuitive, foundations level ideas
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in a mathematically rigorous way. Above, we have simply thrown around sym-
bols and ideas without any justification whatsoever. However, to establish our
intuitive ideas rigorously, we may ask questions like, “What constitutes a valid
formula in our language?”, “How do we know that our valid formulas may be
read unambiguously?”, and “Do we (or will we) have sufficient structure in our
language to express any proposition?”. We will answer these and other such
questions in the next couple of chapters. Note that throughout this thesis, to
denote formal language symbols we put all such symbols in a bold typeface.
2.3 Valid Formulas
We begin by establishing the language of sentential logic and precisely
describing what a valid formula or grammatically correct statement in that
language will be. Note that we assume knowledge of basic set theory which
we will use extensively in developing the language.
First, we assume that we are given a countably infinite number (car-
dinality ℵ0) of symbols to use in the alphabet of our formal language. These
symbols are listed in the following table.
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Symbol Type Intended Meaning
( Logical Grouping Symbol
) Logical Grouping Symbol
¬ Logical Connective “not”
∧ Logical Connective “and”
∨ Logical Connective “or”
→ Logical Connective “implies”
↔ Logical Connective “is equivalent to”
Ai for each i ∈ N Sentence Symbol
We assume that none of these symbols is a finite sequence of the others e.g.
A1989 6= ¬)(∧∨.
Definition 2.1 An expression in the sentential language is a finite sequence
of symbols from the sentential alphabet.
Example 2.2 Any symbol from the sentential alphabet is an expression. Each
of the following are sentential expressions
→))))A1989,
→)))↔ (((¬, and
((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4)))
Of course, in our language we only want to consider expressions that
have the appropriate structure to translate our natural language propositions.
So, for instance,→))))A1989 cannot translate any meaningful English propo-
sition whereas (¬(A1 ∧A2)) can meaningfully translate the proposition “It
is not the case that I am both reading this sentence and am confused,” if we let
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A1 translate the statement “I am reading this sentence,” and let A2 translate
the statement “I am confused.” So, in our language we want to be able to
identify “grammatically correct” expressions (ones that can meaningful trans-
late a natural language proposition). We will call these grammatically correct
expressions well-formed formulas or wffs for short. There are two primary
ways to define wffs.
We start with a top-down approach. Let S be the family of all sets S of
expressions in the sentential language that fulfill the following properties: (i):
every sentence symbol is in S, and (ii): if expressions α and β are in S, then so
are the expressions (¬α), (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β), (α→ β), and (α↔ β) ∈ S.
Definition 2.3 An expression is a well-formed formula (wff) if it is an
expression in the set
⋂
S∈S
S
Example 2.4 ((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))) is a wff under this definition.
Since all of the sentence symbols are in every S (by property (i) of the family),
this means that (¬A1) and (A3 ∨A4) are also in every S (by property (ii)).
Thus, (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4)) is also in every S, and so
((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))) is in every S, hence in the intersection, hence
a wff under the definition.
The idea with this definition is that we should include all expressions
that take the form that we think our wffs should have, either a stand alone
sentence symbol or one of the five other forms mentioned above, each of which
uses one of our logical connective symbols. But, by including any set of ex-
pressions with these properties, we have more expressions than we want. For
instance, if → A1¬ happens to be in one such S that has the two proper-
ties mentioned above, then we get infinitely many garbage expressions like
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(A2∧ → A1¬). We can eliminate such garbage expressions by using the in-
tersection over all such sets to whiddle down to the smallest set that will have
the two properties of each set in the family (that the intersection has the two
properties of the family may be quickly verified by the reader).
Now for a bottom-up approach. Let E designate the set of all ex-
pressions using the sentential alphabet. We define several formula building
operations on E and on E×E as follows (note that the bolded parentheses are
part of the definition):
F¬(α) = (¬α)
F∧(α,β) = (α ∧ β)
F∨(α,β) = (α ∨ β)
F→(α,β) = (α→ β)
F↔(α,β) = (α↔ β)
Definition 2.5 An expression is a wff if there is a finite sequence of expres-
sions
〈α0,α1, . . . ,αn〉
where each αi is a sentence symbol, αi = F¬(αj) for j < i, or αi = F](αj ,αk)
for j ≤ k < i and ] ∈ {¬,∧,∨,→,↔}.
Example 2.6 ((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))) is a wff under this definition.
F¬(A1) = (¬A1) and F∨(A3,A4) = (A3 ∨A4). Also,
F∧(A2, (A3 ∨A4)) = (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4)), and
F→((¬A1), (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))) = ((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))).
12
So we see that we can apply the formula building operations finitely many times,
to three sentence symbols to build the formula under consideration. Thus, it
must be a wff.
It turns out that both Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.5 are equivalent,
as we should wish them to be. To prove the equivalence, we work with some
more general notions from which we can prove the equivalence.
2.3.1 Induction
In a general setting we may be dealing with a set U and a set of op-
erations (they could be binary, 3-ary, etc.) on U, F, and we want to find the
smallest subset of U containing some set B of initial elements of U that is
closed under the operations in F. Think of the set B of initial elements as a
basis, and the set we are trying to find is the set generated from the elements
in B by the operations in F. In the context of wffs, E would be U, the formula
building operations the operations in F, and B would be the set of sentence
symbols.
Now, we will simplify the generic situation for ease in grasping the key
concepts involved by letting F contain only two operations f : U × U −→ U
and g : U −→ U; however, the results that follow apply to any finite set of
operations (and even beyond) as will be readily seen.
Definition 2.7 A subset S of U is closed under f and g if whenever
x, y ∈ S, then f(x, y), g(x) ∈ S.
Definition 2.8 A subset S of U is inductive if B ⊆ S and S is closed under
f and g.
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Example 2.9 If S is inductive and a, b ∈ B, then b, f(a, b), f(b, b), g(a),
f(g(a), b), g(f(a, b)), f(g(f(b, b)), f(a, g(b))), etc. are in S.
Let S = {S ∈ P(U) : S is inductive } and let C∗ =
⋂
S∈S
S. In the context of
wffs this C∗ will be the set of wffs under Definition 2.3.
Theorem 2.10 C∗ is the smallest inductive subset of U.
Proof: If S is inductive, then C∗ ⊆ S by the very definition of C∗.
So if C∗ is inductive, it is in fact the smallest such inductive set. Since B ⊆ S
for every S ∈ S, B ⊆ C∗ by properties of intersection. Let x, y ∈ C∗, then
x, y ∈ S for every S ∈ S by the definition of intersection and C∗. Since each
S ∈ S is inductive and hence closed under f and g, f(x, y), g(x) ∈ S for every
S ∈ S. Hence, f(x, y), g(x) ∈ C∗ by definition and thus, C∗ is closed under
f and g since the choice for x, y ∈ C∗ was arbitrary. Thus, C∗ is inductive
by definition and is the smallest inductive subset of U by the first couple of
remarks.
This theorem indicates that C∗ will be precisely the elements of U that
can be generated from the elements of B. This method gives the top-down
approach to finding the smallest subset of U generated by f and g from the
elements in B. For the bottom-up approach, we define the following.
Definition 2.11 A construction sequence is a finite sequence 〈x0, . . . , xn〉
of elements of U such that for each i ≤ n we have at least one of
xi ∈ B,
xi = f(xj, xk) for some j < i, k < i,
xi = g(xj) for some j < i.
14
The idea behind this definition is that each element in the sequence either
came from our set of initial elements or was formed by using f or g from
some previous element or elements in the sequence. The final element in the
sequence is the terminal element from the construction process.
Example 2.12 For a, b ∈ B, 〈a〉, 〈a, b, g(a), g(b), f(a, b)〉,
〈b, b, f(b, b), a, f(a, f(b, b)), g(f(a, f(b, b))〉 are construction sequences for
a, f(a, b), and g(f(a, f(b, b)) respectively (note that these construction se-
quences are not unique).
Now let C∗ be the set of all points x such that there is a construction
sequence of some length n ∈ N ending with element x. Also, let Cn be the
set of points x such that there is some construction sequence of length n that
ends with x.
Theorem 2.13 B = C1 ⊆ C2 ⊆ C3 ⊆ · · · , and C∗ =
⋃
n∈N
Cn.
Proof: This theorem follows from the definitions involved and a
simple induction argument.
Note that we can extend the above arguments for just two operations
to any finite number or even countably many operations with little to no
difficulty.
Example 2.14 Assuming a, b ∈ B, then
〈b, b, f(b, b), a, f(a, f(b, b)), g(f(a, f(b, b))〉
is a construction sequence of length 6 for g(f(a, f(b, b)). Hence,
g(f(a, f(b, b)) ∈ C6 ⊆ C∗.
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Example 2.15 Taking U to be the set of all expressions in the sentential
language, B to be the set of all sentence symbols in the sentential language, and
F to be the class of the formula building operations F¬, F∧, F∨, F→, and F↔,
then C∗ will be the set of wffs under Definition 2.5.
Theorem 2.16 C∗ = C∗
If we prove this general result, then we will also have proven that each
of our definitions for the set of wffs in the sentential language are equivalent
as a specific case of this more generic result. Again, we prove this result for
a single unary operation and a single binary operation, but the extension to
finitely many or even countably infinitely many operations is clear.
Proof: We first show that C∗ is inductive. Clearly, B ⊆ C∗ as was
mentioned above. Let x, y ∈ C∗. Then by definition we have construction
sequences 〈x0, . . . , xn, x〉 and 〈y0, . . . , yk, y〉. Then
〈x0, . . . , xn, x, y0, . . . , yk, y, f(x, y)〉
〈x0, . . . , xn, x, g(x)〉
are all construction sequences by definition. So, f(x, y), g(x) ∈ C∗ by defini-
tion. Thus, C∗ is closed under f and g and is thus inductive by definition.
Hence C∗ ⊆ C∗ since C∗ is one of the sets in the intersection used to define
C∗.
Now let x ∈ C∗, by definition then, there is a construction sequence
〈x0, . . . , xn = x〉 Note that x0 must be in B by how we defined construction
sequences. So, x0 ∈ C∗ since B ⊆ C∗. Suppose that x0, . . . xi ∈ C∗ for i < n.
Now, xi+1 ∈ B ⊆ C∗ or xi+1 = f(xj, xk) for j ≤ k < i or xi+1 = g(xj) for j < i.
Since C∗ is inductive and thus closed under f and g and since xj, xk ∈ C∗ by
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assumption, we must have xi+1 = f(xj, xk) ∈ C∗ or xi+1 = g(xj) ∈ C∗. This
shows then that xn = x ∈ C∗ by the Principle of Mathematical Induction.
Since our choice of x ∈ C∗ was arbitrary, C∗ ⊆ C∗. Therefore, C∗ = C∗.
Since C∗ = C∗ we can unambiguously speak of the set C = C∗ = C∗ as
being generated from B by the operations in the class F.
Before leaving our discussion of induction we present a powerful prin-
ciple that will aid us greatly in many of the proofs we will present.
Theorem 2.17 (The Induction Principle) Assume that C is the set gen-
erated from B by the operations in F. If B ⊆ S ⊆ C and S is closed under
the operations in F, then S = C.
Proof: S is inductive by assumption, so C = C∗ ⊆ S. Since we are
given that S ⊆ C, then S = C.
We will use this theorem often to show that if we have a set of wffs that
contains the sentence symbols such that every element of that set fulfills some
property P and if that set is closed under the formula building operations,
then the entire set of wffs must have property P . However, we present the
following example to show how this principle is a generalized form of a very
familiar principle in mathematics.
Example 2.18 Let U = R and B = {0} and let the class F contain only
the successor function S(x) = x + 1. The elements in C∗ = C will take
the form 0 or Sn(0) = S(S(S · · · (S(0)) · · · )) where in the expression on the
right, S is applied n times. That is, Sn(0) = n (the natural number n), and
so C = N in this case i.e. the natural numbers are generated from the set
{0} by the successor function. The Induction Principle in this case says that
if A ⊆ N and 0 ∈ A and A is closed under the successor function S, (i.e.
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n ∈ A⇒ (n+1) ∈ A), then A = N. In this case then, our Induction Principle
is our old friend the Principle of Mathematical Induction.
2.4 Unique Readability of Wffs
We have rigorously developed satisfactory and equivalent definitions
for what the set of wffs is in our sentential language (we will denote this set as
W). But how do we know that each wff can only be read in one way? How do
we know that with our formal language we do not have ambiguity problems
like we had with the English sentence “If it is not the case that you are reading
this sentence and you are confused, then you should re-read it.”? Ultimately,
guaranteeing the unique readability for our wffs will guarantee that we obtain
only one possible truth value of a wff given a truth assignment for the sentence
symbols involved in the wff.
Given an n-ary function the symbol f
∣∣
Sn
is the function f whose domain
has been restricted to Sn
Definition 2.19 C is freely generated from B by the n-ary operation f
and k-ary operation g if in addition to the requirements for being generated,
in the sense discussed in the section above, we have
1. f
∣∣
Cn
and g
∣∣
Ck
are one-to-one, and
2. Im(f
∣∣
Cn
), Im(g
∣∣
Ck
), and B are pairwise disjoint. We can define free
generation in a similar way when there are any finite number or countably
infinitely many operations involved.
The one-to-one properties of the restrictions of f and g to C provide
for the uniqueness of the construction of an element in C generated from f
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or g. In other words, if an element was constructed via f then there is only
one way that it could have been constructed via f and thus we can reverse
engineer the construction to get back to the input (i.e. f−1(a) is unambiguous
for a ∈ Im(f ∣∣
Cn
)). I cannot generate the same element in C from two different
inputs into f .
Property 2 guarantees that an expression in C cannot be generated by
both f and g. Neither can a initial element in B be generated by either f or
g. If either of these things were possible, then we would have ambiguity in
reading an element in C.
Example 2.20 Suppose B = {a, b, c}. The element f(f(a, g(b)), c) will be an
element generated by f and g in U. However, if g(b) = g(a) (i.e. g fails
property 1 of the definition above or if f(a, g(b)) = c (i.e. f fails property 2
from the definition above), then we have
f(f(a, g(b)), c) = f(f(a, g(a)), c) = f(c, c).
Thus, the structure of f(f(a, g(b)), c) cannot be uniquely described using f and
g and elements in B.
We can do this example in our particular setting. Suppose
B = {A1,A2,A3}. The element
F∧(F∧(A1,F¬(A2)),A3) = ((A1 ∧ (¬A2)) ∧A3)
will be an element generated by F¬ and F∧ in E. However, if
F¬(A2) = F¬(A1)
(i.e. F¬ fails property 1 of the definition above or if
F∧(A1, F¬(A2)) = A3
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(i.e. F∧ fails property 2 from the definition above), then we have
F∧(F∧(A1,F¬(A2)),A3) = F∧(F∧(A1,F¬(A1)),A3)
= F∧(A3,A3) = A3 ∧A3.
If this were the case, the structure of ((A1 ∧ (¬A2)) ∧A3) could not be
uniquely described using F¬ and F∧ and elements in B.
Theorem 2.21 (The Unique Readability Theorem) The set of wffs is
freely generated from the set of sentence symbols.
To position ourselves to prove this theorem, we need a couple prelimi-
nary results.
Definition 2.22 An expression is balanced if it has the same number of left
and right parentheses. If an expression has more left parentheses than right
parentheses, we will say that the expression is left-heavy.
Lemma 2.4.1 Every wff is balanced.
Proof: Note that the set of balanced wffs is a subset of the set of wffs
that contains the set of all sentence symbols since each sentence symbol Ai is
balanced having no left or right parentheses. Let α and β be balanced wffs.
Then
F¬(α) = (¬α),
F∧(α,β) = (α ∧ β),
F∨(α,β) = (α ∨ β),
F→(α,β) = (α→ β), and
F↔(α,β) = (α↔ β)
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are all balanced wffs. They are wffs by definition since they are each gen-
erated from a formula building operation, and they are each balanced since
parentheses are added in balance to already balanced wffs. Thus, the set of
balanced wffs is closed under the five formula building operations. Hence, by
the Induction Principle, the set of balanced wffs is exactly the set of wffs.
Recall that an expression in the sentential language is a finite sequence
of symbols in the sentential alphabet.
Example 2.23 Formally,
((¬A1)→ (A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4)))
= 〈(,¬,A1, ),→, (,A2,∧, (,A3,∨,A4, ), ), )〉
Definition 2.24 An initial segment of the finite sequence 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 is a
finite sequence 〈x1, x2, . . . , xm〉, where m ≤ n. This initial segment is proper
if m < n.
Recall that a wff is a finite sequence of symbols from the alphabet.
Lemma 2.4.2 Any proper initial segment of a wff is a left-heavy expression.
Thus, no proper initial segment of a wff can itself be a wff.
Proof: Let S be the following set of wffs:
{α ∈ W : every proper initial segment of α is left-heavy}.
We will show that S is inductive. Each sentence symbol (being part of the
alphabet) is indecomposable and hence has no proper initial segment. Thus,
the statement “If α0 is a proper initial segment of a sentence symbol, then α0
is left-heavy,” is vacuously true since the antecedent is always false. So, each
sentence symbol is in S.
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We now seek to verify that S is closed under the formula building
operations. We have essentially two types of formula building operations F¬
and F] where ] ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}. Let α ∈ S. Consider the proper initial
segments of F¬(α) = (¬α) listed below:
1. (
2. (¬
3. (¬α0 where α0 is any proper initial segment of α
4. (¬α
In cases 1 and 2, we clearly have more left parentheses than right parentheses.
In case 3, by assumption α ∈ S and any proper initial segment α0 of α has
more left parentheses than right parentheses. Tacking on (¬ onto the front
just adds to the unbalance and thus (¬α0 is left-heavy for any proper initial
segmentα0 ofα. In case 4, α is balanced, so tacking on (¬ gives the expression
one more left parentheses than right parentheses, and the expression is thus
left heavy. S is thus closed under F¬. We now consider proper initial segments
of F](α,β) = (α]β).
1. (
2. (α0 where α0 is a proper initial segment of α
3. (α
4. (α]
5. (α]β0 where β0 is a proper initial segment of β
6. (α]β
The first expression is clearly left-heavy. By assumption α,β ∈ S so initial
segments α0 and β0 will be left-heavy. Tacking on a left parentheses to α0
will only add to the unbalance and so (α0 will be left-heavy. For case three, α
will be balanced so (α has one more left parentheses than the number of right
parentheses. A similar statement holds for (α] since α] has the same number
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of left and right parentheses. Also, since α] is a balanced expression, α]β0
will be left-heavy since β0 is an initial segment of β and is thus left-heavy by
assumption. Hence, (α]β0 will also be left-heavy since we have added another
left parentheses to an already left-heavy expression. Finally, each of α and
β are balanced being wffs. Thus α]β will also be balanced. Clearly then,
(α]β will be left-heavy. So, S is closed under F] where ] ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔},
and hence S is closed under all of the formula building operations. Since S
contains B, S is inductive, thus by the Induction Principle, S is exactly the
set of all wffs. This means that any initial segment of any wff is left-heavy
and thus cannot itself be a wff by the previous lemma.
We are now in a position to prove the Unique Readability Theorem for
the set of wffs. Again, this theorem states that the set of all wffs is freely
generated from the set of sentence symbols. To show this result, we must
show that the the formula-building operations restricted to the set of wffs
within the set of expressions are each one-to-one, and we must also show that
F](Wn) ∩ F[(Wk) = ∅ (for n, k ∈ {1, 2}) when ] 6= [ for
], [ ∈ {¬,∧,∨,→,↔}
and F](Wn)∩S = ∅ where ] ∈ {¬,∧,∨,→,↔} and where S is the set of sen-
tence symbols. To show how each of these could fail when the formula-building
operations are not restricted to Wn, we present the following examples.
Example 2.25 Let α = A1, β = A2 ∨A3 ∧A4, γ = A1 ∧A2 ∨A3, and
δ = A4. Then,
F∧(α,β) = (α ∧ β)
= (A1 ∧A2 ∨A3 ∧A4)
= (γ ∧ δ)
= F∧(γ, δ)
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Hence, F∧ is not one-to-one since α 6= β and γ 6= δ. Notice that α is an
initial segment of γ.
Example 2.26 Let α = A1, β = A2 ∨A3, γ = A1 → A2, and
δ = A3. Then, F→(α,β) = (A1 → A2 ∨A3) = F∨(γ, δ). Thus,
Im(F→) ∩ Im(F∨) 6= ∅. Notice that again α is an initial segment of γ.
These examples illustrate the huge role that parentheses play in wffs to
make them work the way we want them to. We make two quick notes before
proving the theorem: (1) No sentence symbol begins with (, and (2) no wff
starts with the logical symbol ¬.
Proof: (of the Unique Readability Theorem) We first show that
the images of the operations F]
∣∣
W2 for ] ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔} are pairwise disjoint.
Assume
F]
∣∣
W2(α,β) = (α]β) = (γ[δ) = F[
∣∣
W2(γ, δ)
for ], [ ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}. By definition, we may write (α]β) as a finite
sequence
〈(,a1,a2, . . . ,an, ], b1, b2, . . . , bk, )〉
where α = 〈a1,a2, . . . ,an〉 and β = 〈b1, b2, . . . bk〉 and the ai’s and bi’s are
indecomposable symbols from our alphabet. Similarly
(γ[δ) = 〈(, g1, g2, . . . , gm, [,d1,d2, . . .dr, )〉.
Without loss of generality n ≥ m. Suppose n > m. Then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
ai = gi, and am+1 = [. So, 〈a1,a2, . . . ,am〉 = γ, a wff. However, since
〈a1,a2, . . . ,am〉 is a proper initial segment of α, a wff, it must be left-heavy
by the preceding lemma, and cannot be a wff, a contradiction. Hence, m = n
(α = γ), implying that ] = [. Since the lengths of the wffs we assumed to
24
be equal must be the same we must have β = δ. We have not only shown
that the images of F] and F[ must be pairwise disjoint, but also (if we replace
[ with ] in our initial assumption of equality), that F] is one-to-one for each
] ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔}. It is clear that F¬ will also be one-to-one.
Suppose that F]
∣∣
W2(α,β) = F¬
∣∣
W(γ) where ] is as above. Then we
have (α]β) = (¬γ). Thus, α]β) = ¬γ). This cannot happen by the sec-
ond of the two notes we made before the start of the proof. In fact then,
F]
∣∣
W2(α,β) 6= F¬
∣∣
W(γ) for any (α,β) ∈ W ×W and γ ∈ W .
By the first note before the start of the proof, the images of the formula-
building operations together with the set of sentence symbols are all pair-
wise disjoint since a formula-building operation always adds a left parenthesis.
Hence we have shown that W is freely generated from the set of sentence
symbols by the five formula-building operations.
Essentially the wffs being freely generated from the set of sentence
symbols by the five formula building operations says that given a wff, it can
be uniquely deconstructed back into its constituent wffs i.e. there is one and
only one way to build that particular wff using the formula-building operations.
This result will be crucial in developing the notion of truth assignments, which
we now do.
2.5 Truth Assignments
Now that we have developed our alphabet, defined what grammatically
correct statements in the sentential language are, and shown that there is
no ambiguity in reading these statements, we want to talk about how one
wff will follow logically from another wff. Remember that with sentential
logic, we’re modeling deductive thought. If we think of a wff as providing the
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structure into which we can translate an English statement or proposition, we
want to be able to model what a deduction in English would look like in our
language. A deduction in English happens when given a statement, if we know
the statement is true, it must also be true that another statement is true. We
deduce the second statement from the first. So, in our formal language, we
may think of one wff being deducible from another if when the first wff is
true, the second wff must also be true. For example, if the wff (A1 ∧A2)
is a translation from English into our formal sentential language of a true
proposition, we should be able to deduce A1 from our initial wff. Notice that
what proposition we are translating into the wff (A1 ∧A2) is inconsequential
but merely the truth value of that proposition.
In a mathematics foundations course, we are taught to assign truth val-
ues (usually symbolized with T or F ) to each of the sentence symbols involved
in the wffs at hand and then calculate the truth values of the constituent wffs
that make up the wff or wffs under consideration. This process can be achieved
by filling out a row in a truth table, and we may fill out such a row for each
possible combination of truth values for the sentence symbols involved. We
then say that wff α implies wff β if whenever there is a row in the truth table
where α is true, in the same row the wff β is also true. Since we are attempt-
ing to mathematically model deductive thought, we must rigorously develop
these notions. First, we need to mathematically develop how to assign truth
values to wffs, formalizing our more intuitive foundations notions. To do this,
we develop more general notions of recursive functions.
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2.5.1 Recursion
Our idea of assigning truth values to our wffs is a recursive idea. To
figure out the truth value of the current wff under consideration, we need to
look at the truth value of the wff last in line. In a more general setting we
have a set U (like the set of all expressions), a subset B of U (like the set of all
sentence symbols) and two functions f : U× U −→ U and g : U −→ U where
C ⊆ U is the set generated from B by f and g (C would correspond to the set
of all wffs). Our goal is to define a function on C recursively, that is we want
a function h with domain C such that
1. We have rules for computing h(x) for x ∈ B
2a. We have rules for computing h(f(x, y)) based on h(x) and h(y)
2b. We have rules for computing h(g(x)) based on h(x).
These will be our only three cases we need to explore since C is gener-
ated from B and thus elements in C take the form, x ∈ B, f(x, y) for x, y ∈ C,
or g(x) for x ∈ C. The idea is that given some c ∈ C and if we desire to com-
pute h(c), then we merely need to see how c is generated by f and g and reverse
engineer that construction until we eventually reach the “bottom” where we
see what h does to the elements of B from which c is generated.
Example 2.27 Let U = R, B = {0}, S(x) = x + 1, and C = N as discussed
above. Now define
h(0) = 0
h(S(x)) = S(x) + h(x)
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So,
h(4) = h(S(3))
= S(3) + h(3)
= 4 + h(S(2))
= 4 + (S(2) + h(2))
= 4 + 3 + h(S(1))
= 4 + 3 + S(1) + h(1)
= 4 + 3 + 2 + S(0) + h(0)
= 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 0
So, h(x) =
x(x+ 1)
2
The question arises as to whether such a function always exists that
fulfils the rules given? It does not.
Example 2.28 Let U = R, B = {0}, f(x, y) = x · y, and g(x) = x+ 1. Then
C = N. We attempt to define h as a function as follows:
1. h(0) = 0
2a. h(f(x, y)) = f(h(x), h(y))
2b. h(g(x)) = h(x) + 2
On one hand
h(1) = h(f(g(0), g(0)))
= f(h(g(0)), h(g(0)))
= f(h(0) + 2, h(0) + 2)
= f(2, 2) = 4
On the other hand h(1) = h(g(0)) = h(0) + 2 = 2. Thus, h cannot be a
function. The main problem here is that 1 is not uniquely generated from f
and g since Im(g) ∩ Im(f) 6= ∅.
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Since it will not always be the case that such a recursive function exists,
we seek to establish conditions for when such a recursive function will exist.
These conditions are given by the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.29 (The Recursion Theorem) Assume that the subset C of
U is freely generated from B by f and g, where
f : U× U −→ U g : U −→ U.
Further assume that V is a set and that F , G, and h are functions such that
h : B −→ V F : V × V −→ V G : V −→ V.
Then there is a unique function
h : C −→ V
such that
(i) For x ∈ B, h(x) = h(x).
(ii) For x, y ∈ C,
h(f(x, y)) = F (h(x), h(y)) h(g(x)) = G(h(x)).
Viewed algebraically, the conclusion of this theorem says that any map
h of B into V can be extended to a homomorphism h from C (with operations
f and g) into V (with operations F and G). The idea behind the theorem
is that we can assign values from a new set V to our basis elements in B
and then compute the value of my input into h using operations on the new
set V following the same structure for how my input into h was uniquely
constructed in C. For us, the h function will be a truth assignment for the
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sentence symbols, and then h will give us the ability to calculate the truth
value of any sentential wff given this truth assignment.
Proof: We will call a function v acceptable if the following statements
hold for v:
1. Dom(v) ⊆ C and Im(v) ⊆ V .
2. x ∈ B ∩Dom(v) implies that v(x) = h(x)
3. f(x, y), g(x) ∈ Dom(v) implies that x, y ∈ Dom(v) and
v(f(x, y)) = F (v(x), v(y)) and v(g(x)) = G(v(x))
Let K be the set of all acceptable functions. We must first show that K is
non-empty. Consider h : B −→ V . Property (1) is certainly fulfilled as is (2).
Since C is freely generated from B, B, Im(f
∣∣
C2
), and Im(g
∣∣
C
) are pairwise
disjoint. Thus, no element of B can take the form f(x, y) or g(x) where
x, y ∈ C. Hence, (3) is vacuously true. Hence, h is an acceptable function,
and hence, K 6= ∅.
Now let h =
⋃
v∈K
v. So (x, y) ∈ h if and only if v(x) = y for some v ∈ K.
We seek to verify that h is acceptable. First we must show that it is indeed
a function. Certainly we may say that it is a relation, that is h ⊆ C × V .
Let S = {x ∈ C : For at most one y, (x, y) ∈ h}. We seek to show that S
is inductive. Let x ∈ B. Suppose (x, y) ∈ h. Then there is v ∈ K such that
v(x) = y. Since x ∈ B and v is acceptable, y = h(x). Thus, there is at most
one y such that (x, y) ∈ h for x ∈ B. Thus, B ⊆ S. Now let x1, x2 in S
Suppose (f(x1, x2), y) ∈ h. Then there exists v ∈ K such that
v(f(x1, x2)) = y. Since v is acceptable it fulfils (2) above. Thus we have
y = v(f(x1, x2)) = F (v(x1), v(x2)).
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So, x1, x2 ∈ Dom(v) i.e. there exist y1, y2 ∈ V such that v(x1) = y1 and
v(x2) = y2. Thus (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ h and since x1, x2 ∈ S, y1 and y2 are
the only values paired with x1 and x2 respectively. Now if v
′ ∈ K such that
v′(f(x1, x2)) = y′ (in which case (f(x1, x2), y′) ∈ h), we have
F (v(x1), v(x2)) = y
′
which implies that F (y1, y2) = y = y
′ since F is assumed to be a function.
Thus, for at most one y we have (f(x1, x2), y) ∈ h. Hence, f(x1, x2) ∈ S.
Similarly for g(x1). So, S is closed under f and g, and by the Induction
Principle, we must have S = C. Since Dom(h) ⊆ C, we may say that for
every x ∈ Dom(h) there exists a unique y such that (x, y) ∈ h. Thus, h is by
definition, a function.
We next, seek to show that h is acceptable. Property (1) certainly
holds. For property (2), let x ∈ Dom(h)∩B. Then (x, y) ∈ h for some unique
y ∈ V . By the definition of h, there exists v ∈ K such that (x, y) ∈ v. Since
x ∈ Dom(v) ∩B and v is acceptable, y = v(x) = h(x). Thus, h(x) = h(x) for
x ∈ Dom(h) ∩B, and property (2) holds.
For property (3), let f(x1, x2) ∈ Dom(h) for x1, x2 ∈ C. Thus, there is a
unique y ∈ V such that (f(x1, x2), y) ∈ h, and by definition of h, there is v ∈ K
such that v(f(x1, x2)) = y. Since v is acceptable, x1, x2 ∈ Dom(v) ⊆ Dom(h),
and
v(f(x1, x2)) = F (v(x1), v(x2)) = y.
So (x1, v(x1)), (x2, v(x2)) ∈ v ⊆ h. Hence h(x1) = v(x1) and h(x2) = v(x2).
Thus h(f(x1, x2)) = y = v(f(x1, x2)) = F (v(x1), v(x2)) = F (h(x1), h(x2)).
Similarly, if g(x1) ∈ Dom(h) for x1 ∈ C, then x1 ∈ Dom(h) and
h(g(x1)) = G(h(x1)). So, property (3) holds, and h is acceptable.
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Now we show that Dom(h) is C. To do this, we show that Dom(h) is
inductive. As shown earlier, h is acceptable with B = Dom(h) ⊆ Dom(h).
Now let x1, x2 ∈ Dom(h). Our goal is to demonstrate that both f(x1, x2)
and g(x1) are in Dom(h). We do this by creating a new function that has
f(x1, x2) in its domain and then show that this new function is a subset of the
old function.
Let h
′
= h ∪ {(f(x1, x2), F (h(x1), h(x2))}. We show that h′ is an ac-
ceptable function. It will be a function since h is a function and by Property
(3) applied to h. Property (1) of acceptable functions clearly holds for h
′
as
does property (2) since Im(f
∣∣
C2
) ∩ B = ∅, so that f(x1, x2) /∈ B. Hence,
h
′
(x) = h(x) = h(x) for x ∈ B. It is also clear that property (3) of acceptable
functions holds for h
′
since the property holds for all (x, y) ∈ h ⊆ h′ and
h
′
(f(x1, x2)) = F (h
′
(x1), h
′
(x2)).
Hence, h
′
is acceptable, and is in K. But then, h
′ ⊆ h, and we have
f(x1, x2) ∈ Dom(h). Similarly, g(x1) ∈ Dom(h). Thus, by the Induction
Principle, Dom(h) = C.
At this point we have shown that we have a function h : C −→ V that
is an acceptable function. We now must show that this function is unique.
Suppose we have h
′
: C −→ V that is also acceptable. Let S be the set on
which h and h
′
agree. B ⊆ S since for all x ∈ B, h = h(x) = h′. Let x1, x2 ∈ S,
then f(x1, x2) ∈ C = Dom(h) = Dom(h′), and
h(f(x1, x2)) = F (h(x1), h(x2)) = F (h
′
(x1), h
′
(x2)) = h
′
(f(x1, x2))
since h(xi) = h
′
(xi) for i = 1, 2 by assumption. Hence f(x1, x2) ∈ S. Similarly,
g(x1) ∈ S. Thus, by the Induction Principle S = C, and hence h = h′. Thus,
we have proved the Recursion Theorem.
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We have proved the Recursion Theorem for free generation by two
functions f and g, but of course the results may be extended to free generation
by any finite number of functions. To get a sense of what the Recursion
Theorem gives us, we consider the following examples.
Example 2.30 Recall that N is generated from {0} by the successor function
S. Since S is one-to-one and Im(S) ∩ {0} = ∅, then we may say that N is
freely generated from {0} by S. So, by the Recursion Theorem, for any set V,
any a ∈ V , and any F : V −→ V with h(0) = a, there will exist a unique h
such that h(0) = a and for n ∈ N, h(S(n)) = F (h(n))
As a specific case, take V to be the set of prime numbers, and let
h(0) = p0 = 2.
Let F (pi) = pi+1 (pi is the ith prime number). Then,
h(4) = h(S(3)) = F (h(3)) = F (F (F (F (h(0))))) = F (F (F (F (2)))) = p5 = 11.
Example 2.31 The wffs are freely generated from the set of sentence symbols
by the five formula building operations. Let S denote the set of sentence sym-
bols, W the set of wffs, and V = Z+. Let h : S −→ Z+ defined by h(A) = 1 for
A ∈ S. Let G¬ : Z+ −→ Z+ G] : Z+×Z+ −→ Z+ be defined by G¬(n) = 3+n
and G](n,m) = 3 + n + m for ] ∈ {∨,∧,→,↔}. The Recursion Theorem
then states that there exists a unique h : W −→ Z+ such that h(A) = 1
for each A ∈ S and h((¬α)) = h(F¬(α)) = G¬(h(α)) = 3 + h(α) and
h((α]β)) = h(F](α,β)) = G](h(α), h(β)) = 3 + h(α) + h(β). h simply gives
the length of each wff, finding the length by “peeling” off and counting symbols
until it reaches the sentence symbols.
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Having now established some general recursion results, we now return
to our primary discussion of formalizing the notion of truth assignments for
wffs in the sentential language.
We will consider the set {T, F} where T is thought of as truth and F
is thought of as falsity. We could just as easily think of this set as {1, 0}, the
way a computer “thinks” of truth and falsity. Let S be the set of sentence
symbols, and suppose we are given v : S −→ {T, F}. Such a function will
be what we mean when we use the term truth assignment. We of course
have the set of wffs W being freely generated by the five formula building
operations: F¬,F] where ] ∈ {∨,∧,→,↔}. Let G¬ : {T, F} −→ {T, F} and
G] : {T, F} × {T, F} −→ {T, F} for ] ∈ {∨,∧,→,↔} where
G¬(V ) =
 T if V = FF if V = T
G∨(V1, V2) =
 F if V1 = F and V2 = FT otherwise
G∧(V1, V2) =
 T if V1 = T and V2 = TF otherwise
G→(V1, V2) =
 F if V1 = T and V2 = FT otherwise
G↔(V1, V2) =
 T if V1 = V2F otherwise
These are the natural truth value operations for “not”, “and”, etc.
Applying the Recursion Theorem, we are guaranteed the existence of unique
v :W −→ {T, F} where v(A) = v(A) for A ∈ S, and where
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v(F¬(α)) = G¬(v(α)) and v(F](α,β)) = G](v(α), v(β)) for ] ∈ {∨,∧,→,↔}.
Equivalently, v((¬α)) = G¬(v(α)) and v((α]β)) = G](v(α), v(β)).
The moral of the story is that given a wff, and a given assignment
of truth and falsity to each of the sentence symbols involved in the wff, we
can compute a unique truth value of the wff by looking at the truth value
of its pieces. The existence of a unique truth value for any wff given truth
assignments for each of its sentence symbols comes as a consequence of the wffs
being freely generated from the sentence symbols i.e. the Unique Readability
Theorem. We can only read each wff in one way and so when we assign truth
values to each of its sentence symbols, we can only obtain one truth value for
the wff.
Example 2.32 Consider the wff (A1 ∧A2) and let v : S −→ {T, F} where
v(A1) = T , v(A2) = F , and v(Ai) = T for i > 2. By the Recursion Theorem,
we have v :W −→ {T, F}, and
v((A1 ∧A2)) = G∧(v(A1), v(A2)) = G∧(v(A1), v(A2)) = G∧(T, F ) = F
Example 2.33 Consider the wff
(((¬(A1 ∧A2))→ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)))↔ (((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))→
(¬(A1 ∧A2))))
We use the same v as in the previous example. To speed computation, instead
of writing, say G¬(T ) = F or G∧(T, F ) = F we will write (¬T ) = F and
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(T ∧ F ) = F . So with the wff at hand
v((((¬(A1 ∧A2))→ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)))↔ (((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))→
(¬(A1 ∧A2)))))
= (((¬(T ∧ F ))→ ((¬T ) ∨ (¬F )))↔ (((¬T ) ∨ (¬F ))→
(¬(T ∧ F ))))
= (((¬F )→ (F ∨ T ))↔ ((F ∨ T )→ (¬F )))
= ((T → T )↔ (T → T ))
= (T ↔ T )
= T
Given these examples we see at once that each row of a truth table
represents a truth assignment from the sentence symbols to the set {T, F}.
Example 2.34 The following table lists all possible truth assignments for the
wff in the bottom column.
A1 A2 (¬A1) (¬A2) (A1 ∧A2) (¬(A1 ∧A2)) ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))
T F F T F T T
T T F F T F F
F F T T F T T
F T T F F T T
((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))
T
T
T
T
Each row corresponds to a truth assignment from S to {T, F} with the values
in the first two columns giving the assignment on the sentence symbols of
interest. As we move from left to right in this particular truth table, we are
computing the truth value of larger and larger constituent pieces of the wff in
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the top row of the bottom column. Row 1 corresponds to v in the previous two
examples, and our computations from columns 3 to 6 are via v given to us by
the Recursion Theorem.
Of course, the truth table above indicates that no matter what truth
assignment we make for the sentence symbols in the wff
((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)),
the wff will always be true. Analyzing the truth value of wffs given a truth
assignments for the sentence symbols involved is at the heart of our design of
modeling human deductive thought processes. We have characterized a de-
duction as occurring when the truth of one statement guarantees the truth of
another statement. The deduction comes from the inherent structure of the
statement. Thus, in the case above, no matter what natural language (En-
glish) statements the sentence symbols A1 and A2 are intended to translate,
the wff ((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)) will always be a truism. Truth
assignments give us the tool for modeling and analyzing the raw logical struc-
ture in statements and hence the deducibility of one statement from another.
We now formalize the notion of deducibility within our sentential language.
2.6 Tautological Implication
We begin with some definitions which will aid our discussion.
Definition 2.35 We say that v : S −→ {T, F} satisfies wff ϕ if v(ϕ) = T .
Definition 2.36 The set of wffs Σ tautologically implies the wff τ and
we write Σ  τ if every truth assignment on the set of sentence symbols that
satisfies every wff in Σ also satisfies the wff τ .
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Notice, as we have implicitly done in the truth table in Example 2.37, we
need only consider what a particular truth assignment will do to the sentence
symbols in the wffs in question. There will of course be infinitely many truth
assignments on the set of all sentence symbols such that v(A1) = T and
v(A2) = T , but we only really care about what these truth assignments will
do to the sentence symbols A1 and A2. More formally, we could define an
equivalence relation between truth assignments. Let K denote the set of all
sentence symbols in Σ and τ . Then say that truth assignments v1 and v2
are equivalent (v1 ∼ v2) if and only if v1
∣∣
K = v2
∣∣
K. This will clearly be an
equivalence relation. We see then that if we take a representative from each
equivalence class and compute the truth value for each wff in Σ ∪ {τ} with
each representative truth assignment, we will have computed the truth value
of each wff in question for all truth assignments.
So in our truth table above, although we really only computed the truth
value of ((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)) under finitely many truth as-
signments, this is sufficient since the truth assignments chosen and represented
in the table are each representatives of the equivalence classes under the equiv-
alence relation discussed above.
Tautological implication in sentential logic is our model for a logical
deduction. It models our intuitive idea that if the premises (the set Σ) of a
valid implication are true, then the conclusion of the implication we are trying
to establish (τ ) cannot fail to be true.
Example 2.37 Consider Σ = {A1, (A1 → A2)} and τ = A2.
We see here that only for row 1 in the truth table are all of the elements
in Σ satisfied, and we have that τ is also satisfied. We never have a situa-
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A1 A2 (A1 → A2)
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
tion where the elements of Σ are true but τ is false. Thus, we may say that
{A1, (A1 → A2)}  A2. This is the logical rule “modus ponens.”
Example 2.38 Consider Σ = {(¬A1), (A1 → A2)} and τ = (¬A2).
A1 A2 (¬A1) (¬A2) (A1 → A2)
T T F F T
T F F T F
F T T F T
F F T T T
Now we have two rows where the elements of Σ are satisfied, rows 3 and 4. No-
tice however that (¬A2) is not satisfied in row 3. So Σ does not tautologically
imply τ in this case. This represents the fallacy of denying the consequent.
Example 2.39 Consider Σ = {(¬A2), (A1 → A2)} and τ = (¬A1).
A1 A2 (¬A1) (¬A2) (A1 → A2)
T T F F T
T F F T F
F T T F T
F F T T T
Row 4 is the only row of the truth table for which the elements of Σ are satisfied.
For this row, (¬A1) is also satisfied and so
{(¬A2), (A1 → A2)}  (¬A1).
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This is contraposition.
Having given a few examples that give a sense of what tautological im-
plication is, we now consider a few special cases.
Case 1: What if Σ is empty? It is then a vacuously true statement to say
that every truth assignment v satisfies every member of Σ (i.e the implication
“If ϕ ∈ Σ, then v satisfies ϕ” can never be false since the antecedent is false,
and thus the statement holds true for any truth assignment v). So, we may
say “∅  τ” if and only if every truth assignment satisfies τ since every truth
assignment satisfies the elements of ∅. In this case we write  τ and say that
τ is a tautology, a statement that is always true.
Example 2.40 ((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)) is a tautology since it
is always true, no matter what truth assignment we use i.e. no matter what row
of the truth table (see Example 2.34) we are considering. Of course this is one
of DeMorgan’s Laws. We may verify all of the standard tautologies presented
in a mathematics foundations course in a similar fashion using truth tables.
Case 2: What if the wffs in Σ cannot be satisfied? If this is the case, then
any wff τ is tautologically implied by Σ. This is so because of our definition
of tautological implication. For τ to be tautologically implied by Σ, if a truth
assignment v satisfies every wff in Σ, then v must also satisfy τ . So if a truth
assignment cannot satisfy all the elements of Σ it is vacuously true that τ is
tautologically implied by Σ.
Example 2.41 {A1, (¬A1)}  A2 since no truth assignment can satisfy both
(¬A1) and A1. Therefore, every truth assignment which satisfies all the ele-
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ments of {A1, (¬A1)} (there are none) will also satisfy A2. The idea is that
any statement follows from a contradiction.
Case 3: What if Σ is a singleton i.e. Σ = {σ}? Instead of writing {σ}  τ ,
we write σ  τ . If σ  τ and τ  σ we say that σ and τ are tautologically
equivalent, and we write σ|==|τ . For sentential logic, this gives us our notion
of logical equivalence.
Example 2.42 From Example 2.34, it is clear that
((¬(A1 ∧A2))  ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2)) and
((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))  ((¬(A1 ∧A2)).
Thus, ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))|==|((¬(A1 ∧A2)).
We also saw in Example 2.40 that
((¬(A1 ∧A2))↔ ((¬A1) ∨ (¬A2))
was a tautology. Our examples with one of DeMorgan’s Laws suggest the
following results.
Theorem 2.43 α  β iff  (α→ β)
Proof:
α  β iff v(α) = T implies v(β) = T
iff v(α) = T and v(β) = F cannot both happen.
iff v((α→ β)) = T for every truth assignment.
iff  (α→ β)
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Corollary 2.43.1 α|==|β iff  (α↔ β)
Proof:
α|==|β iff α  β and β  α
iff  (α→ β) and  (β → α)
iff neither v(α) = T and v(β) = F nor v(β) = T and v(α) = F
iff v(α) = v(β) for every truth assignment.
iff  (α↔ β)
Theorem 2.44 Σ ∪ {α}  β iff Σ  (α→ β)
Proof: Since this proof should follow easily from the appropriate
definitions, it is left to the reader.
The interesting thing about these theorems and their proofs is the per-
spective they yield about talking in a logical mathematical way about the
mathematical topic of logic. In Theorem 2.43.1, the statement on the left is a
statement about the sentential model of logical equivalence existing between α
and β in the formal language, but this statement exists outside of the formal
sentential language. However, the statement on the right gives a statement
about it always being true that α and β are equivalent within the formal lan-
guage. (The intended meaning of↔ being logical equivalence). The theorem
thus indicates that logical equivalence (in the sentential model) between two
statements in the formal sentential language, can be translated into the formal
language itself where the logical symbol↔ is the formal language symbol for
equivalence.
Perhaps even more of a mind-bender is the fact that this theorem it-
self which is a statement about logical equivalence can be translated into
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the formal language. We will let A1 translate the statement “There are two
wffs α and β that are tautologically equivalent” (i.e. “α|==|β”). Now we
will let A2 translate the statement “The wff (α↔ β) is a tautology” (i.e.
“ (α↔ β)”). The theorem above says that A1  A2 and A2  A1 (or
the same thing A1|==|A2). But then the theorem says that this is logically
equivalent to  (A1 ↔ A2). So our theorem can be modeled in the formal
sentential language. At this point the infinite “hall of mirrors” effect is begin-
ning to set in. To combat the disorientation, we must recognize that we are
operating at two levels, a meta-level and the formal level. When we say, “The
theorem above says A1|==|A2,” we are thinking at the formal level within our
sentential model. Any formal satisfaction of the wff A1 will also formally sat-
isfy the wff A2. When we say “But then the theorem says that this is logically
equivalent to  (A1 ↔ A2),” we are stepping outside of the formal model of
sentential logic to the meta-level of us being rational beings who understand
logical equivalence and what that means. In this case, we understand that
the statement “A1|==|A2” is logically equivalent (this equivalence is at the
meta-level) to the statement “ (A1 ↔ A2)” given the theorem we proved.
At the meta-level, we are deducing things about our model of deduction (in
this case, sentential logic). At the formal level, we are modeling within a for-
mal language the deduction about our model of deduction. We as the readers
and mathematicians stand in the real world making real deductions about the
models of our real deductions.
This self-reference is the sort that comes about from studying logic
mathematically when mathematics itself is based on logic. It is also just this
sort of self-reference that is the very key to proving Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorem.
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We have established the basics of sentential logic as a model for hu-
manity’s deductive thought processes. We are now in a position to explore
some of the properties of this model.
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Chapter 3
Properties of Sentential Logic
Having developed sentential logic as a model of humanity’s deductive
thought processes, we are in a position to ask about what nice properties
sentential logic has. Recall that our goal is to develop mathematically rigorous
models of deduction, and like other mathematical constructs, we would like to
ask what nice properties a particular model has and what properties it lacks.
Really, what we are asking is how well does sentential logic model humanity’s
deductive thought processes?
3.1 The Compactness Theorem
We recall first that saying “Σ  τ” is our model for saying “If the
hypotheses of the statements (wffs) in Σ are satisfied, then the statement
(wff) τ must also be satisfied.” Now, nothing was said about the cardinality
of the set Σ. By assumption, we have a countable alphabet of logical symbols
and sentence symbols, and expressions are finite sequences of indecomposable
alphabet symbols. Hence there are countably many possible wffs, and the set
Σ of wffs is countable.
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The question becomes, if it is the case that Σ  τ where Σ is countably
infinite, is it possible to give a proof that Σ  τ?
It is instructive at this point to consider what we mean by the term
proof. Remember that at our current sentential level, we are thinking of
“Σ  τ” as a model for saying that the statements or premises of Σ logically
imply the statement τ . To give a proof of “Σ  τ”, we use the properties
of sentential logic that we have developed as part of it being a mathematical
structure to fulfill the definition for what it means to say “Σ  τ .” Here, our
proof consists of finitely many statements at the meta-level discussed at the
end of Chapter 2. What we are doing as reasoners in the real world (the
meta-level) is examining a statement in a mathematical structure (sentential
logic) and giving sufficient meta-reasons to be able to say “Σ  τ” in our
mathematical structure. This is no different than if we were working in number
theory seeking to establish a proof of the statement “There are infinitely many
prime numbers.” Our proof of “Σ  τ” is not a statement within the formal
sentential logic structure, just as our proof of there being infinitely many prime
numbers does not take place in the formal system of number theory itself. We
only use the structure of number theory to carry out a reasonable proof.
The question then arises, if we carry out proofs as part of our deduc-
tive thought processes as humans, can we model our proofs in the sentential
structure itself? What is characteristic about a proof is a demonstration of
how the truth of finitely many premises guarantees the truth of a conclusion.
At the sentential logic level we can handle the truth of finitely many premises
guaranteeing the truth of a conclusion. This structure we can express in the
sentential model of deduction as “Σf  τ” where Σf = {σ0,σ1, . . . ,σn} (a
finite set of wffs that translates our finitely many premises as σ0 through σn).
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We may even express our tautological implication in the symbolism of the sen-
tential language as (σ0 → (σ1 → (. . .→ σn)) . . .)→ τ since this wff will
be a tautology using Theorem 2.44 finitely many times.
This representation of a proof is the best we can do with sentential
logic. Given the meaning we have intended for the symbols involved, the
above wff definitely models the guarantee of the truth of the statement τ
given the truth of the premises of Σf . Analysing the wff via truth table will
show that given any truth assignment v, v will always return an output of T
given the wff as an input. Or from the computer science perspective, if we
program a computer to return F for an always false wff, T for an always true
wff, or “inconclusive” for a sometimes true and sometimes false wff, given our
wff (σ0 → (σ1 → (. . .→ σn)) . . .)→ τ as an input into the computer, the
computer would return T .
We now measure against our intuitions whether our model for a proof
in the sentential realm is a good one. Our model seems limited. A proof should
clearly demonstrate the how and the why behind the guarantees of truth. In
other words the ultimate “why” behind writing → in (α→ β) where this
wff is a tautology. Any hints as to this “why” within the formal language
itself must come from the very structure of the symbolism being used and
interaction of truth values of the wffs. So, perhaps at the most rudimentary
level, our model for a proof in sentential approaches what a proof actually is,
but it seems unsatisfying.
However, at this point we recall that sentential logic is a model for the
deductive process that human beings use. Of course any mathematical model
will have limitations since it is just that: a model. It is an approximation to
the real world where we compress the real world’s complexities into something
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simpler and easier to think about. The properties we then derive from the
model may give us some useful information to use in the real world. We also
recall that sentential logic, is only our first model for humanity’s deductive
thought processes. We see that refinements of the model may be in order. We
now return to our original discussion.
Again, the question is, if it is the case that “Σ  τ” where can we
always give a proof (at the real world level) of this fact? The interesting case
occurs when Σ is countably infinite. Our main tool at this point for estab-
lishing a statement of this kind is to use the definition; i.e. if an arbitrary
truth assignment satisfies the wffs in Σ, then it must also satisfy the wff τ .
Proving this statement becomes a problem if Σ is infinite for then we necessar-
ily have infinitely many sentence symbols Ai and thus infinitely many truth
assignments to check (or equivalently, infinitely many rows in our truth table).
Thus, if Σ is infinite, we can never prove Σ  τ directly from the definition+.
We need other results which we now develop.
First, recall that we say that truth assignment v : S −→ {T, F} satisfies
wff ϕ if and only if v(ϕ) = T .
Definition 3.1 A set Σ of wffs is satisfiable if there is a truth assignment
which satisfies every member of Σ.
Lemma 3.1.1 If every finite subset of a set of wffs Σ is satisfiable, then the
same is true of at least one of the sets Σ ∪ {α} and Σ ∪ {(¬α)} for any wff
α.
Proof: If either α or (¬α) is in Σ, the result holds trivially. We
assume then that neither α nor (¬α) are in Σ, and thus (¬α) /∈ Σ∪{α} and
α /∈ Σ∪{(¬α)}. Suppose, by way of contradiction that there are finite sets F1
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and F2 with F1 ⊆ Σ∪{α} and F2 ⊆ Σ∪{(¬α)} such that no truth assignments
satisfy either F1 or F2. Note that since F1 and F2 are finite, F1 ∪ F2 will also
be finite as will F1∪F2−{α, (¬α)}. This set is a subset of Σ. Since Σ has the
property that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable, there is a truth assignment
v satisfying every member of F1 ∪ F2 − {α, (¬α)}. In particular, v satisfies
every member of F1−{α, (¬α)} and of F2−{α, (¬α)} which are each subsets
of F1∪F2−{α, (¬α)}. Since (¬α) /∈ F1 ⊆ Σ∪{α} and α /∈ F2 ⊆ Σ∪{(¬α)},
F1 − {α, (¬α)} = F1 − {α}, and F2 − {α, (¬α)} = F2 − {(¬α)}.
Now, either v(α) = T or v(α) = F . In the first case, F1 would have to
be satisfiable since (F1 − {α}) ∪ {α} = F1. This contradicts our assumption
of F1 not being satisfiable, and we conclude that v(α) = F . But by properties
of v established in Chapter 2, this must mean that v((¬α)) = T . In this case
F2 must be satisfiable by similar reasoning to that in the previous case. But
this is another contradiction to what we have assumed. We thus conclude that
what we have supposed is false and every finite subset is satisfiable for at least
one of Σ ∪ {α} and Σ ∪ {(¬α)}.
We need one more lemma before we prove a result that will help us to
answer our question under consideration.
Lemma 3.1.2 Let ∆ be a set of wffs such that (i) every finite subset of ∆
is satisfiable, and (ii) for every wff α, either α ∈ ∆ or (¬α) ∈ ∆ (this will
be an exclusive “or” since {α, (¬α)} would not be a satisfiable subset of ∆).
Define the truth assignment v by
v(A) =
 T if A ∈ ∆F if A /∈ ∆
for each sentence symbol A. Then for every wff ϕ, v(ϕ) = T iff ϕ ∈ ∆.
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Proof: Recall that for sentential logic, we let S denote the set of
sentence symbols and W denote the set of wffs. Let
I = {ϕ ∈ W|ϕ ∈ ∆ iff v(ϕ) = T}
(v is the truth assignment defined above). We wish to use induction, that is,
the Induction Principle, to prove that I =W .
Note that S ⊆ I since for every sentence symbol A, v(A) = v(A) = T
if and only if A ∈ ∆ by how v was defined. If we can demonstrate that
I is closed under the formula building operations, we will have fulfilled the
Induction Principle.
Let α,β ∈ I. Note that this means that v(α) = T iff α ∈ ∆ and
v(β) = T iff β ∈ ∆. We show that (¬α) ∈ I. We know from our results
using the Recursion Theorem with truth assignments that v((¬α)) = T iff
v(α) = F iff α /∈ ∆. We show that α /∈ ∆ iff (¬α) ∈ ∆. By property (ii)
of ∆, we have that α /∈ ∆ implies that (¬α) ∈ ∆. Conversely, if (¬α) ∈ ∆,
then α /∈ ∆. Thus, we have that (¬α) ∈ ∆ iff α /∈ ∆. So, we have that
v((¬α)) = T iff α /∈ ∆ iff (¬α) ∈ ∆. Hence (¬α) ∈ I by definition, and I
is closed under F¬.
The same reasoning used here to show that I is closed under F¬ may be
used in the remaining cases of the formula building operations. The demon-
stration of all of these cases is very tedious. We will illustrate the proofs for the
remaining formula building operations with one two-variable formula building
operation, and then we leave it to the reader to establish the remaining cases.
We seek to demonstrate that (α ∨ β) ∈ I. By the Recursion Theorem,
we note that v((α ∨ β)) = T iff v(α) ∨ v(β) = T iff v(α) = T or v(β) = T
iff α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆, since α,β ∈ I. The following piece of a truth table will
be helpful in establishing the claim that α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆ iff (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆.
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α β (¬α) (¬β) (α ∨ β) (¬(α ∨ β))
T T F F T F
T F F T T F
F T T F T F
F F T T F T
We see from the Recursion Theorem that all possibilities for the truth
values for the key wffs α and β have been exhausted under any truth assign-
ment. We see immediately from the truth table that the finite sets
{α, (¬(α ∨ β))} and {β, (¬(α ∨ β))}
are each not satisfiable under any possible truth assignment since the sets’
two wffs never have the value of truth under the same truth assignment. If
we assume that either α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆, then we must conclude by property
(i) of ∆ that (¬(α ∨ β)) /∈ ∆, otherwise one of the above sets would be
satisfiable. So, by property (ii) of ∆, (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆. Conversely, if we suppose
that (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆, then we note that {(¬α), (¬β), (α ∨ β)} is not satisfiable
as seen by the truth table above. Since we are assuming that (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆, by
property (i), we have that either (¬α) /∈ ∆ (in which case α ∈ ∆ by property
(ii)) or (¬β) /∈ ∆ (in which case β ∈ ∆ by property (ii)). So (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆
implies that α ∈ ∆ or that β ∈ ∆. Thus, (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆ iff α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆.
So, we conclude that v((α ∨ β)) = T iff α ∈ ∆ or β ∈ ∆ iff (α ∨ β) ∈ ∆.
Hence, (α ∨ β) ∈ I by definition and I is closed under F∨. The cases with
the other formula building operations are similar and are left to the reader.
Since I contains S and is closed under the formula building operations,
we conclude by the Induction Principle that I = W . So, for any wff ϕ,
v(ϕ) = T iff ϕ ∈ ∆. We thus accept this lemma as proved.
We are now in position to prove the result that will answer our question
at hand.
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Theorem 3.2 (The Compactness Theorem for Sentential Logic)
A set of wffs is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset is satisfiable.
Proof: Let Σ be a set of wffs. If Σ is satisfiable, then of course, every
finite subset will be satisfiable. Just take the truth assignment that satisfies Σ
and this will satisfy all of Σ’s subsets, finite or not. Conversely, suppose that
every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable. If Σ is itself finite, we are done since
Σ is a subset of itself, and being finite, is satisfiable by assumption. So, we
suppose that Σ is infinite and that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable. The
idea is to construct a maximal set of wffs which contains Σ and define a truth
assignment which satisfies every member of this maximal set. Such a truth
assignment will of course satisfy Σ as well. We proceed.
Let α1, α2, α3, . . . be an enumeration of the wffs (the set of wffs is
countable). Define the following:
∆0 = Σ
∆n+1 =
 ∆n ∪ {αn+1} if every finite subset of this set is satisfiable∆n ∪ {(¬αn+1)} otherwise
Using a simple induction argument and the Lemma 3.1.1, we know that
every finite subset of ∆n for each natural number n is satisfiable. Every finite
subset of ∆0 = Σ is satisfiable by assumption. If every finite subset of ∆n−1 for
n ≥ 1 is satisfiable, then the same holds true for at least one of ∆n−1 ∪ {αn}
and ∆n−1 ∪ {(¬αn)} by the lemma. Let ∆ =
∞⋃
n=0
∆n. First, it is clear that
Σ = ∆0 ⊆ ∆. Let F be a finite subset of ∆. Now, F ⊆ ∆n for some n ∈ N.
Since every finite subset of ∆n is satisfiable, then F is satisfiable. Since our
choice for F as a finite subset of ∆ was arbitrary, then we know that every
finite subset of ∆ is satisfiable.
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Now let ϕ be a wff. By our enumeration of the set of wffs, ϕ = αi for
some natural number i. By construction either ϕ = αi ∈ ∆i or
(¬ϕ) = (¬αi) ∈ ∆i. In either case, we have that either ϕ ∈ ∆ or (¬ϕ) ∈ ∆.
Since our choice for ϕ was arbitrary, this is true for any wff ϕ. We define the
truth assignment v as in Lemma 3.1.2, and using the lemma we find that for
any wff ϕ, v(ϕ) = T if and only if ϕ ∈ ∆. Since for every wff ϕ ∈ Σ, ϕ ∈ ∆,
we see that v(ϕ) = T for every ϕ ∈ Σ. Hence, the truth assignment v satisfies
Σ by definition. Therefore, the assertion of the Compactness Theorem holds.
Note that there are two alternative proofs to the Compactness Theo-
rem to the one given above that may be of interest to the reader. The first
uses Zorn’s Lemma (equivalent to the Axiom of Choice), and in this case the
Compactness Theorem can be shown to hold for an uncountable alphabet of
sentential symbols. The second alternative uses general topological concepts.
The compactness theorem asserts the compactness of a particular topologi-
cal space called a Stone Space. The interested reader may wish to do some
research on this line.
Corollary 3.2.1 If Σ  τ , then there is a finite Σf ⊆ Σ such that Σf  τ .
Proof: Assume that Σ  τ . A moment’s reflection shows that Σ  τ
if and only if Σ ∪ {(¬τ )} is unsatisfiable. Suppose by way of contradiction
that for every finite Σf ⊆ Σ it is not the case that Σf  τ . By our first
observation then Σf ∪{(¬τ )} is satisfiable for every finite Σf ⊆ Σ. Note that
a finite subset of Σ ∪ {(¬τ )} will either be of the form Σf or Σf ∪ {(¬τ )}
for finite Σf ⊆ Σ. Since Σf ∪ {(¬τ )} is satisfiable for any finite Σf ⊆ Σ and
Σf ⊆ Σf ∪{(¬τ )}, we see that every finite subset of Σ∪{(¬τ )} is satisfiable.
By the Compactness Theorem then, Σ ∪ {(¬τ )} is itself satisfiable. But, by
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our initial observation, this is so if and only if it is not the case that Σ  τ ,
a contradiction. So, in fact it must be the case that Σf  τ for some finite
Σf ⊆ Σ.
Thus, we are guaranteed that if Σ  τ , we should be able to find finite
Σf ⊆ Σ to establish Σf  τ . Hence, we are always able to establish Σ  τ
using our truth table method in the meta-realm. Since Σ  τ is our model
in the sentential language for the truth of the statements of Σ guaranteeing
the statements of τ , the above theorem also guarantees that we need only
finitely many premises (Σf ) to make this guarantee. That is, this corollary to
the Compactness Theorem guarantees that our intuitive notion that a proof
of a true statement should be finite in length (and thus physically doable) is
matched in the sentential model for deductive thought. Hence our sentential
does a decent job at mirroring our intuitive notions of proof construction. We
now ponder another desirable property.
3.2 Expressibility in Sentential Logic
Another question we wish to ask about our model for humanity’s de-
ductive thought processes is “How do we know that we can’t enrich the senten-
tial language by adding more connectives?” Have we included enough senten-
tial connectives (our current connective symbols are ¬, ∨, ∧, →, and ↔) to
express all possible logical constructions that could occur given our intended
meanings for our connectives?
An example clarifies exactly what we mean by this question. Suppose
we enrich our sentential language with a connective symbol ∇. That is, we
have a new ternary formula building operation F∇ which we define on the set
of expressions in the enriched sentential language by F∇(α,β,γ) = (∇αβγ).
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So in our new language, (∇αβγ) is now an expression for expressions α,
β, and γ. Now, we also must have an intended meaning for ∇ as we do
with our original connectives (i.e. the intended meaning for ∧ is “and”, the
intended meaning for → is “implies”, etc.). We will call ∇ the “too good
to be true” operator. To understand our intended meaning, let us define
G∇{T, F}3 −→ {T, F} as follows:
G∇(V1, V2, V2) =
 F if Vi = Vj = T where i 6= jT if Vi = Vj = F where i 6= j
(This function is well defined since the truth value of two of the inputs must
match.) So, for instance (∇TTT ) = (∇TTF ) = F (too good to be true), and
(∇TFF ) = (∇FFF ) = T (we could also call this the “pessimist function”).
So, using the Recursion Theorem, for a truth assignment v,
v((∇α1α2α3)) =
 F if v(αi) = v(αj) = T where i 6= jT if v(αi) = v(αj) = F where i 6= j
So, having enriched our original sentential language with the “too good
to be true” symbol, can we express more logical structure now in our new
language than we could before?
First, we need to make the notion of “expressing more logical struc-
ture” more precise. Recall that two wffs σ and τ are said to be tautologically
equivalent if and only if σ|==|τ . We will declare that if any wff in an extended
language (extended in the sense just exemplified) is tautologically equivalent
(in the extended language) to a wff in the original language, then our extended
language can express precisely the same logical structure as can the original
language and so we have gained nothing by our extension.
Example 3.3 (∇αβγ)|==|(¬(((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)) ∨ (β ∧ γ))).
The reader can check this assertion via a truth table.
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The former example indicates that our “too good to be true” connective
does nothing significant to improve the expressibility of our language since
there is a tautologically equivalent wff in the original language. However,
we would like to see a language (hopefully the sentential language we have
developed!) for which any extension by any connective symbol will result in
no improvement of expressibility. The sentential language in fact fits the bill
(in fact a much smaller language than the sentential language would suffice),
but we need to shift our focus to a new tool to be able to prove this fact.
Definition 3.4 A function Bk : {T, F}k −→ {T, F} with k ≥ 1 is a k-place
Boolean function. A Boolean function is a k-place Boolean function for
some k ≥ 1.
Example 3.5 The following catalog is a list of Boolean functions.
Iki (V1, V2, . . . , Vi, . . . , Vk) = Vi
N(T ) = F N(F ) = T
A(T, T ) = T A(V, F ) = F
O(F, F ) = F O(V, T ) = T
C(T, F ) = F C(F, V ) = C(V, T ) = T
E(V1, V2) = T E(V1, V2) = F
if V1 = V2 if V1 6= V2
The use of Boolean functions becomes apparent in the following truth
table.
A1 A2 (A1 ∧A2) A(v(A1), v(A2))
T T T T
T F F F
F T F F
F F F F
56
We see that the 2-place Boolean function A evaluated at the truth values of
the sentence symbols involved in the wff (A1 ∧A2) gives the same output
in every case that v((A1 ∧A2)) does. The Boolean function A expresses
the same intended logical structure as ∧ does. It becomes readily apparent
that any wff realizes a Boolean function. Given a wff α, α involves a fi-
nite number of sentence symbols A1,A2, . . . ,Ak. There will be 2
k possible
distinct truth assignments, v for these sentence symbols, but we may define
Bkα : {T, F}k −→ {T, F} as follows: Bkα(v(A1), v(A2), . . . , v(Ak)) = v(α) for
every truth assignment v (this will exhaust all possible inputs into our defined
function since |{T, F}k| = 2k). So, given any wff α we may define a Boolean
function whose output exactly matches that of v for every truth assignment
v. So, the entire structure represented in our formal sentential language can
be completely expressed with Boolean functions.
Example 3.6 We readily see the following:
Iki = B
k
Ai
N = B1(¬A1)
A = B2(A1∧A2)
O = B2(A1∨A2)
C = B2(A2→A2)
E = B2(A2↔A2)
Even better than saying that each wff α realizes a Boolean function Bkα,
we may say that our Boolean function is some composition of the 6 functions
above (as long as α is in the sentential language developed in Chapter 2). To
see this, we recall our development of truth assignments in which we used the
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Recursion Theorem back in Chapter 2. We used the following functions:
G¬(V ) =
 T if V = FF if V = T
G∨(V1, V2) =
 F if V1 = F and V2 = FT otherwise
G∧(V1, V2) =
 T if V1 = T and V2 = TF otherwise
G→(V1, V2) =
 F if V1 = T and V2 = FT otherwise
G↔(V1, V2) =
 T if V1 = V2F otherwise
These are precisely the Boolean functions N, A, O, C, and E. The
Recursion Theorem told us the following:
v(α) =

v(α) if α = Ai for some i
G¬(v(β)) if α = F¬(β)
G](v(β), v(γ)) where α = F](β,γ) and ] ∈ {∨,∧,←,↔}
SinceBkα(I
k
1 (
−→
V ), Ik2 (
−→
V ), . . . , Ikk (
−→
V )) = v(α) where
−→
V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vk)
and where Vi = v(Ai) for the truth assignment v, and since G] = B where
B ∈ {N,A,O,C,E}, we may rewrite the statement given to us by the Recur-
sion Theorem as follows:
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Bkα(I
k
1 (
−→
V ), Ik2 (
−→
V ), . . . , Ikk (
−→
V )) =

Iki (
−→
V ) if α = Ai for some i
N(v(β)) if α = F¬(β)
B(v(β), v(γ)) where α = F](β,γ) and
] ∈ {∧,∨,←,↔} and
where B ∈ {A,O,C,E}
The Recursion Theorem applied here tells us how to write each boolean
function determined by the wff α as a composition of the five boolean functions
N, A, O, C, E.
Example 3.7 B2((¬A1)↔A2)(V1, V2) = E(N(I
2
1 (V1, V2)), I
2
2 (V1, V2))
The Boolean functions have changed nothing. They just give a clearer
perspective on the essential structure of the intended meaning of the logical
connectives used in the sentential language. How do Boolean functions help us
answer our primary question? It would make sense that wffs which realize the
same Boolean function should be equivalent in every meaningful sense since
they are able to express the same logical structure. We could easily create
an equivalence relation such that wffs α and β are equivalent if and only if
Bkα = B
k
β. Now, a Boolean function is able to express any logical structure
that we might dream up. If we are able to say that given a Boolean function,
we can find a wff α in some enriched language such that this α realizes our
Boolean function, and if we are able to say that for any wff β in any enriched
language that there is a wff α in our original language such that α and β
are equivalent (Bkα = B
k
β), then we would seem to have achieved our goal.
However, we must first ask whether this notion of equivalence coincides with
the notion of tautological equivalence, for that is how we originally stated our
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aim. We now prove that the two notions of equivalence in fact coincide with
each other.
We put an ordering on {T, F} by declaring that F < T (this is com-
pletely natural if we think of F as 0 and T as 1). We first prove a lemma that
will aid us in the next theorem.
Lemma 3.2.1
{T, F}k = {(v(Am+1), v(Am+2), . . . , v(Am+k)) : v is a truth assignment}
for any m ≥ 0 where the Am+i’s are sentence symbols.
Proof: Certainly the right set is a subset of the left since
v(Ai) ∈ {T, F} for each m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ k. An element in {T, F}k takes the
form (V1, V2, . . . , Vk) where Vi ∈ {T, F}. Let v : S −→ {T, F} be defined as
follows:
v(Ai) =
 Vi−m if m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ kT otherwise
Then (V1, V2, . . . , Vk) = (v(Am+1), v(Am+2), . . . , v(Am+k)) and hence
(V1, V2, . . . , Vk) ∈ {(v(Am+1), . . . , v(Am+k)) : v is a truth assignment}.
Thus, the sets are the same.
Theorem 3.8 Let α and β be wffs whose sentence symbols are among
A1, . . . ,Ak. Then
(i) α  β if and only if for all −→V ∈ {T, F}k, Bkα(
−→
V ) ≤ Bkβ(
−→
V ) (this follows
the imposed ordering of T < F .
(ii) α|==|β if and only if Bkα = Bkβ.
(iii)  α if and only if Im(Bkα) = {T}.
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We can see that this theorem (part (ii)) provides the equivalence of our
two notions of equivalence of expressibility of wffs.
Proof: (i) By definition α  β if and only if for all truth assignments
v, whenever v(α) = T , then v(β) = T . Notice that v(α) ≤ v(β) if v(α) = F
no matter the value of v(β), and we are guaranteed by the above statement
that (assuming α  β) v(α) ≤ v(β) when v(α) is true. On the other hand,
if we know that v(α) ≤ v(β) for all truth assignments v, then we know that
if v(α) = T , that v(β) 6= F , that is, v(β) = T otherwise the inequality would
not hold. So α  β if and only if v(α) ≤ v(β) for all truth assignments v.
Using Lemma 3.2.1 and the fact that Bkτ (
−→
V ) = v(τ ) where
−→
V corresponds to
the truth assignment v at the end of the above lemma, we can say that this
statement is equivalent to Bkα(
−→
V ) ≤ Bkβ(
−→
V ) for all
−→
V ∈ {T, F}k.
(ii) By definition α|==|β if and only if α  β and β  α. Using
part(i), we can say that that the former statement is true if and only if for
all
−→
V ∈ {T, F}k, Bkα(
−→
V ) ≤ Bβ(−→V ) and Bkβ(
−→
V ) ≤ Bα(−→V ). This is of course
equivalent to saying Bkα = B
k
β.
(iii) ∅  α if and only if for every truth assignment v, v(α) = T . Using
Lemma 3.2.1, this is true if and only if Bkα(
−→
V ) = T for all
−→
V ∈ {T, F}k i.e. if
Im(Bkα) = {T}.
Example 3.9 Since (∇αβγ)|==|(¬(((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)) ∨ (β ∧ γ))).
B(∇αβγ) = B(¬(((α∧β)∨(α∧γ))∨(β∧γ))).
We can thus say that wffs α and β are tautologically equivalent if
and only if they realize equivalent Boolean functions. To attain our goal, it
remains to be shown that any logical structure that can be captured by a
Boolean function can be expressed by a wff in the sentential language that we
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developed in Chapter 2 i.e. we would like to show that each Boolean function
is realizable by some wff in that language.
Theorem 3.10 Let Bk be a k-place Boolean function where k ≥ 1. Then there
exists α, a wff in the sentential language which uses ¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔ as
logical connective symbols (with their normally intended meanings) such that
Bk = Bkα (i.e. such that α realizes B
k).
Before proving the Theorem, we illustrate our proof with the following
example. Suppose we are given the Boolean function B3 defined by the fol-
lowing maps (we have suppressed commas and parentheses):
TTT 7−→ T TTF 7−→ F
TFT 7−→ T FTT 7−→ T
FFT 7−→ T FTF 7−→ F
TFF 7−→ F FFF 7−→ T
Our goal is to find a wff α such that α realizes Bk. Note that B3 returns
the value T only for the inputs
−→
V 1 = (T, T, T )
−→
V 2 = (T, F, T )
−→
V 3 = (F, F, T )
−→
V 4 = (F, T, T )
−→
V 5 = (F, F, F )
First, we wish to design wffs that will be true precisely when the sen-
tence symbols A1,A2,A3 take on the truth values of the input triples that
cause the Boolean function to give an output of true. Using ∧ and ¬ will serve
62
our purpose as demonstrated below (note that we suppress some of the usage
of parentheses for ease of reading using the fact that ∧ and ∨ are associative
when thought of as operations).
γ1 = A1 ∧A2 ∧A3
γ2 = A1 ∧ (¬A2) ∧A3
γ3 = (¬A1) ∧ (¬A2) ∧A3
γ4 = (¬A1) ∧A2 ∧A3
γ5 = (¬A1) ∧ (¬A2) ∧ (¬A3)
So, γi is true for the corresponding unique element of {T, F}3 and false
for the remaining 8− 1 = 7 triples. Hence, if we let
α = γ1 ∨ γ2 ∨ γ3 ∨ γ4 ∨ γ5,
it is clear that v(α) will be true if and only if v(γi) = T for a unique index i
since the γi’s are all distinct wffs and cannot be satisfied with the same truth
assignment. So, v(α) = T for exactly five distict truth assignments v for the
sentence symbols involved, and each distinct truth assignment will correspond
to exactly one of the five triples for which B3 returns an output of true. This
means that v(α) will return false exactly when B3 returns false. So, we must
have that B3α = B
3.
Proof: (Note: we again suppress some usage of parentheses for ease
of reading, noting that ∨ and ∧ are associate when considered as operations.)
Case 1: If Im(Bk) = {F}, we let α = (A1 ∧ (¬A1)) ∧A2 ∧ · · · ∧Ak.
v(α) = F for every truth assignment v, so that Bkα(
−→
V ) = F = Bk(
−→
V ) for all
−→
V ∈ {T, F}k and hence Bk = Bkα.
Case 2: If Im(Bk) 6= {F}, then there exists n and −→Vi = (Vi1, Vi2, . . . , Vik) such
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that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Bk(−→Vi ) = T . Now we let
βij =
 Aj if Vij = T(¬Aj) if Vij = F
γi = βi1 ∧ βi2 ∧ · · · ∧ βik
α = γ1 ∨ γ2 ∨ · · · ∨ γn.
By construction, it is clear that Bkα(
−→
V ) = T if and only if
−→
V =
−→
Vi for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n (refer back to the example above to see how this plays out).
Note that the wff α in the above theorem need not be unique; any
tautological equivalent β to α will also realize Bk by Theorem 3.8.
Example 3.11 Suppose we enrich the Chapter 2 sentential language with ∇
as a logical connective symbol as discussed at the beginning of this section, and
suppose we have the wff in the extended language
ϕ = ((∇A1A2A3) ∧ ((¬A2)→ A3)).
We have the following truth table for this wff.
A1 A2 A3 (¬A2) (∇A1A2A3) ((¬A2)→ A3) ((∇A1A2A3) ∧ ((¬A2)→ A3))
T T T F F T F
T T F F F T F
T F T T F T F
T F F T T F F
F T T F F T F
F T F F T T T
F F T T T T T
F F F T T F F
ϕ realizes the boolean function B3ϕ where
TTT 7−→ F
TTF 7−→ F
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TFT 7−→ F
TFF 7−→ F
FTT 7−→ F
FTF 7−→ T
FFT 7−→ T
FFF 7−→ F
Using the construction in Theorem 3.10 we have
γ1 = (¬A1) ∧A2 ∧ (¬A3)
γ2 = (¬A1) ∧ (¬A2) ∧A3
So, letting
α = γ1 ∨ γ2 = (¬A1) ∧A2 ∧ (¬A3) ∨ (¬A1) ∧ (¬A2) ∧A3
α will realize B3α = B
3
ϕ, or equivalently, α|==|ϕ in the extended language.
We have achieved our goal. For suppose that we enrich the sentential
language developed in Chapter 2 with a (or many) new logical connective
symbols. We have shown that any wff ϕ in this new language will realize a
Boolean function Bkϕ. But, by the theorem we have just proved B
k
ϕ = B
k
α
where α, by construction, uses only the logical connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬. By
results we proved above, we know that it must then be the case that ϕ and
α are tautologically equivalent in our enriched language. Thus, our enriched
language is able to express just as much logical structure as the old language.
We give this property of expressing as much logical structure as we need a
name.
Definition 3.12 A set of logical connectives in a sentential language is com-
plete if every k-place Boolean function for k ≥ 1 is realizable by a wff which
uses only the logical connectives contained within the set.
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Example 3.13 {¬,∧,∨,→,↔} is complete as shown by Theorem 3.10.
Example 3.14 Any k-place Boolean function with k ≥ 1 was shown to be
realizable by a wff α using only the symbols ¬,∨, and ∧. Thus, {¬,∧,∨} is
complete.
Example 3.15 (A1 → A2) realizes the Boolean function
G→(V1, V2) =
 F if V1 = T and V2 = FT otherwise .
In this case,
TT 7−→ T
FT 7−→ T
FF 7−→ T
Our construction in the theorem thus shows that (A1 → A2) is tautologically
equivalent to (((A1 ∧A2) ∨ ((¬A1) ∧A2)) ∨ ((¬A1) ∧ (¬A2))). There
may of course be shorter wffs to which (A1 ∧A2) is tautologically equivalent,
but this is the one the theorem constructs for us. Similarly, (A1 ↔ A2) is
tautologically equivalent to ((A1 ∧A2) ∨ ((¬A1) ∧ (¬A2))).
Example 3.16 {¬,∧}, {¬,∨}, and {¬,→} are each complete.
We do not prove these propositions because they are not terribly en-
lightening. Essentially, we would use DeMorgan’s laws ((α ∨ β)|==|(¬((¬α) ∧ (¬β)))
and (α ∧ β)|==|(¬((¬α) ∨ (¬β)))), the fact that (α→ β)|==|((¬α) ∨ β).
We have developed this idea of completeness at length, but to truly
get a feel for what this completeness is, we will demonstrate a set that is not
complete.
Theorem 3.17 The set {∧,→} is not complete.
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Notice that if only one sentence symbol is involved, say A1, a truth
assignment that assigns A1 a value of T will assign the wffs (A1 ∧A1) and
(A1 → A1) the value of true. What is key is that neither one of these wffs
can yield the value of false for an assignment of true for A1 which (¬A1) can.
Proof: Suppose {∧,→} is complete. Then every k-place Boolean
function with k ≥ 1 is realizable by a wff which uses the connectives in the
complete set. This statement must also hold true for the Boolean function
N where N(T ) = F and N(F ) = T . So, there is a wff ϕ using only logical
connectives from the set {∧,→} such that B1ϕ = N (ϕ only involves one
sentence symbol).
Let A be an arbitrary sentence symbol. We wish now to establish the
claim that A  α for any wff α that uses only the sentence symbol A in
the sentential language under consideration. We will do this by an induction
argument. Note: all wffs are wffs in the restricted language under consider-
ation. Let I = {α : If α involves only the sentence symbol A, then A  α}.
The sentence symbols are a subset of I since it is trivially true to say A  A,
and for any other sentence symbol B, since B does not involve the sentence
symbol A, it is a vacuously true statement so say “If B involves only the
sentence symbol A, then A  B.” Let α,β ∈ I. So, A  α and A  β.
Suppose v is a truth assignment such that v(A) = v(A) = T . Since A  α
and A  β, by definition, we know that v(α) = v(β) = T . So, we must also
have v((α ∧ β)) = T = v((α→ β)) by the Recursion Theorem. By defini-
tion then, A  (α ∧ β) and A  (α→ β). Thus, (α ∧ β), (α→ β) ∈ I,
and by the Induction Principle, the set I must be exactly the set of wffs. This
statement holds for any sentence symbol A since the choice for the sentence
A was arbitrary to begin with. Therefore, our claim is established.
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Now, above we established that there is a wff ϕ in this restricted lan-
guage such that B1ϕ = N . Since ϕ involves only one sentence symbol, say A1,
we know by what we just showed that A1  ϕ. By results established earlier,
B1A1(V ) ≤ B1ϕ(V ) = N for all V ∈ {T, F}. If V = T , then this statement
says that T ≤ F , a contradiction under our ordering of {T, F}. Thus, what
we supposed initially is false, and {∧,→} is not complete.
This particular theorem helps to show what completeness means in
this context. A complete set of logical connectives will guarantee that we have
sufficient structure in our sentential language to express any logical structure
that we wish, a nice property to have in a model of humanity’s deductive
thought processes.
3.3 Effectiveness in the Sentential Language
Earlier, we established that if Σ  τ for the set Σ ∪ {τ} of wffs,
then we only need finite Σf ⊆ Σ to establish Σf  τ . So, if a statement τ
is a consequence of the statements of Σ, even if Σ is infinite, we can find a
finite number of statements that guarantee τ . This fact encourages us in our
endeavor to find proofs (for which “Σf  τ” serves as a model in the sentential
language) for facts that are true without us yet knowing that they are true.
Yet, in the project of mathematics, we would like to know not just
that we can prove true facts but also that certain statements do not follow
from other statements. In other words, we would like not only to be able to
demonstrate that “Σ  τ” if this is a true statement, but would also like to be
able to say “Σ  τ” is a false statement when this is so. If we are guaranteed
the ability to do the latter as well as the former, then with every statement and
with every set of premises, we are guaranteed the ability of being able to decide
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whether our statement follows from the set of premises or not. That is, given
a set of premises (perhaps a set of axioms) and given a sentential statement,
we would be able to definitely determine whether the statement did or did not
follow from the set of premises. We now discuss effective procedures and how
they relate to our discussion of these ideas.
To remind the reader that the definitions, results, and questions here
posed are of an informal character, we term our “definitions” as proclamations
and our “theorems” as propositions.
Proclamation 3.17.1 We will say a procedure is effective if it meets the
following (informal) criteria:
1. There must be a finite list of exact instructions with each instruction
being a finite string of symbols, explaining how to execute the procedure.
These instructions should demand no cleverness on the part of the person
(or machine) following them.
2. The procedure must avoid random devices (such as the flipping of a coin),
or any such device which can, in practice, only be approximated.
3. In the case of a decision procedure, the procedure must be such that after
a finite number of steps the procedure produces a “yes” or “no” answer.
Intuitively, an effective procedure is one that can be carried out as
a computer program. Note: our “definition” for an effective procedure is not
mathematically rigorous, but questions of whether certain effective procedures
exist are in fact central to the main result that this thesis wishes to discuss,
namely, Go¨del’s Incompleteness theorem. We will discuss effective procedures
here in an informal way, but will define an “effective procedure” in a mathe-
matically rigorous way in a later chapter. In particular, it is easy enough to
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say that a procedure is effective given our informal definition above, but it
is difficult to say when a procedure would not be effective with our informal
definition. Later, when we rigorously develop these intuitive notions, we will
be able to solve this problem.
Proclamation 3.17.2 A set of expressions Σ (within the sentential language)
is decidable if there is an effective procedure such that for each expression ε
the procedure yields the statement “ε ∈ Σ” or “ε /∈ Σ.”
Proposition 3.17.1 The set of wffs, W, in the sentential language is decide-
able.
Proof: We outline the procedure (we assume the operator employing
the procedure can recognize distinct expressions):
Step 1. If the expression is of the form (α]β) or (¬α) where
] ∈ {∧,∨,→,↔} and where α and β are expressions, proceed to Step 2.
Otherwise, stop and report that ε /∈ W
Step 2. If ε = (α]β) and α = Ai and β = Aj for some i and j, stop
and report that ε ∈ W . Otherwise, repeat Step 1 with α and β. If ε = (¬α)
and α = Ai for some i, stop and report ε ∈ W . Otherwise, repeat Step 1 with
α.
The procedure outlined clearly fulfills the three criteria for an effective proce-
dure. The procedure instructions are finite, there is no guess work involved
in the procedure outlined, and given the discussion in Chapter 2 of how wffs
are constructed, the procedure outlined above must eventually cease and give
a “yes, it is in the set of wffs” or “no, it is not in the set of wffs” response.
The above fact, gives a flavor of what we mean by decidable set and
also how we can show that a effective procedure exists for doing such-and-
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such a task. Essentially, we try to outline an algorithm that could be run by a
computer which when the algorithm is run will accomplish the task we desire.
Proposition 3.17.2 Every finite set of expressions is decidable.
Proof: This statement is obvious.
Proposition 3.17.3 Not every set of expressions is decidable.
Proof: There are countably many (ℵ0) expressions as was shown
earlier in the chapter, thus there are 2ℵ0 (the cardinality of the power set
of expressions) sets of expressions. On the other hand, since each effective
procedure has a finite list of instructions which characterizes that procedure,
and since we put no limit on how long that list of instructions is, the set of all
effective procedures will have a cardinality of ℵ0. Since 2ℵ0 > ℵ0, we see that
we have more sets of expressions than we have effective procedures that could
be used to show that a particular set is decidable.
Of course, the above results are to familiarize us with effective pro-
cedures and their limitations. Our interest is in results that will shed light
on our search for mathematical deductions i.e. our search for mathematical
knowledge. Our question is, given a set of wffs (premises), Σ, and another
wff (statement), τ , can we always demonstrate that Σ  τ if this is true or
demonstrate that Σ 2 τ if this is true.
At this point, we again take a moment to think about just exactly
what we are doing. Sentential Logic is a mathematical model of humanity’s
deductive thought processes. Within this model. Σ  τ is our model for
a deduction or proof. Thus, if we can answer the above question about our
model, we can shed some meta-light on our endeavor as mathematicians: Given
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any set of premises, do we know we can always disprove or prove any other
statement from our given set of premises? We now address this question.
Proposition 3.17.4 Given any finite set Σ ∪ {τ} there is an effective proce-
dure to decide whether or not Σ  τ .
Proof: Step 1. Create a truth table for all the wffs in Σ∪{τ}. [Since
Σ ∪ {τ} is finite, this step is doable in finitely many operations.]
Step 2. Find all rows of the truth table which correspond to truth
assignments which satisfy all wffs in the set Σ. If there are none, return
“Σ  τ” (this corresponds to our second main case for tautological implications
described in Chapter 2). [Since there are finitely many cells in our truth table
created in Step 1 this step is doable in finitely many operations.]
Step 3. For each of the rows in Step 2, look at the cell corresponding
to τ . If for any row, τ has a value of F , return Σ 2 τ . Otherwise, if for every
row τ has a value of T , return Σ  τ . [This step is doable in finitely many
operations.]
There is no guesswork or cleverness in the steps outlined above, and
since the instructions are finite and the process produces a “yes/no” response,
the procedure outlined is effective.
Corollary 3.17.1 For a finite set of wffs Σ, the set of tautological conse-
quences, {τ ∈ W|Σ  τ}, is decidable.
The above tells us that given finitely many premises, and any other
statement, we can definitively prove whether or not that statement is a con-
sequence of the premises. In particular, in axiomatic mathematics, we begin
with a set of statements that we assume to be true, and the theory of those
axioms (e.g. group theory, field theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, etc.) is
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all statements that we can prove assuming the truth of those axioms, includ-
ing statements that say that certain things do not follow from the axioms.
If we have finitely many axioms, then our results about the sentential logic
model indicate that we can completely decide which statements follow from
our axioms and which do not. There are no undecidable statements in a theory
with finitely many axioms. However, many of our most beloved and familiar
axiomatic systems implicitly involve infinitely many axioms.
For example, one of the axioms of Peano arithmetic states: “If n ∈ N,
then S(n) ∈ N” where S is the successor function. As seasoned mathemati-
cians, our concept of this statement is that it asserts one thing, one of the
foundational properties that defines the set N. Now, we could translated this
statement into our sentential language as the sentence symbol, say, A1. The
problem is that if we wish to express the structure of Peano arithmetic with our
sentential language, then such a translation is unhelpful. This unhelpfulness
comes from the fact that our sentence symbols are our most basic propositions
with no inherent meaning behind the symbol. We never look at the meaning
of what the sentence symbol is intended to translate. The power in the above
axiom of Peano arithmetic comes in the “if/then” structure. By translating
the whole statement as one sentence symbol, we have lost the deducing power
of the axiom.
We can go to the other extreme and intend for A0 to translate “0 ∈ N,
A1 to translate “1 ∈ N, etc. So, (A0 → A1) could be used to support the
statement “If 0 ∈ N, then S(0) ∈ N,” and similarly for all other natural
numbers. Thus, if we wish to support the structure of Peano arithmetic using
sentential logic, we could include the infinitely many wffs (Ai → Ai+1) to
support the statement “The successor of every natural number is a natural
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number.”
Thus, if we are attempting to represent the proof of a statement that
follows from the axioms of Peano arithmetic in the sentential language, we
would do so by stating that “Σ  τ” where Σ is the set of all Peano axioms
translated into the sentential language, including the wffs (Ai → Ai+1) for
each i ∈ N, and where τ is the statement we are proving, i.e, a statement of the
theory of Peano arithmetic. This goes to show that as far as Sentential Logic is
concerned we may wish to include the possibility of infinitely many axioms for
the theory under consideration. Thus, if our desire is, given the axioms which
determine a theory, to be able to decide exactly which statements follow from
those axioms and which do not, it is insufficient to say that {τ ∈ W|Σ  τ}
is decidable for Σ finite. We should also consider cases where Σ is infinite as
with the axioms of Peano arithmetic.
We already know from the discussion above that some infinite sets
must be undecidable. In fact, Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem will show
us that, in general, the set of tautological consequences of an infinite set Σ
(for example the axioms of Peano arithmetic) will be undecidable. So, our
goal of decidability for every particular theory in mathematics is unattainable.
However, “half” of decidability is attainable in the following sense.
Proclamation 3.17.3 We will say that a set of expressions Σ within the
sentential language is effectively enumerable if and only if there is an effective
procedure that will list in order the elements of Σ.
If Σ is infinite, then the process which lists the elements of Σ will never
finish, but for any element in Σ, the process must eventually (given a sufficient
finite amount of time) output the element as an element from Σ.
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We present the next proposition in order to discuss the difference be-
tween effective enumerability and decidability.
Proposition 3.17.5 A set Σ of expressions is effectively enumerable if and
only if there is an effective procedure which, given any expression ε produces
the answer “Yes” if and only if ε ∈ Σ.
The last piece of our proposition bears some remark before proceeding
to the proof. Saying, “Yes” if and only if ε ∈ Σ does not mean that the
procedure will answer “No” if ε /∈ Σ. It may, or the process may give no
answer but enter an infinite loop instead. The only stipulation is that the
procedure cannot answer “Yes” if ε /∈ Σ.
Proof: If we are given the expression ε, we will use our given effective
procedure for listing the elements of Σ. Our procedure will give a return of
“Yes” if ε is encountered. If ε is not in Σ, our procedure will continue to
list elements of Σ forever (we are of course assuming that Σ is an infinite set)
never answering “Yes.”
If now we are given the effective procedure that will answer “Yes” if
and only if expression ε ∈ Σ, we design the following procedure to list the
elements of Σ. Note that our effective procedure must give an answer of “Yes”
when fed ε, but may take a time of k minutes or less to report this answer.
So, in the following procedure we re-test expressions for greater and greater
amounts of time to ensure that they end up in our listing.
Step 1. Examine all 1-tuples which use symbols from the following
subset of the Sentential alphabet: {(, ),¬,∨,∧,→,↔,A1}. Test each 1-
tuple expression under the effective procedure for 1 minute. If the procedure
yields an answer of “Yes”, add that expression to the list of Σ.[Since there are
only finitely many 1-tuples using these symbols, this will take a finite amount
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of time.]
Step 2. Examine all 1-tuples and 2-tuples which use symbols from
the following subset of the Sentential alphabet: {(, ),¬,∨,∧,→,↔,A1,A2}.
Test each 1-tuple expression and 2 tuple expression under the effective pro-
cedure for 2 minutes. If the procedure yields an answer of “Yes”, add that
expression to the list of Σ.[Since there are only finitely many 1-tuples and
2-tuples using these symbols, this will take a finite amount of time.]
...
Step i. Examine all 1-tuples, 2-tuples,. . . , and i-tuples which use sym-
bols from the following subset of the Sentential alphabet:
{(, ),¬,∨,∧,→,↔,A1,A2, . . . ,Ai}.
Test each 1-tuple expression, 2-tuple expression,. . . , and i-tuple expression
under the effective procedure for i-minutes. If the procedure yields an answer
of “Yes”, add that expression to the list of Σ.[Since there are only finitely
many 1-tuples, 2-tuples,. . . , and i-tuples using these symbols, this will take a
finite amount of time.]
This procedure consists of finite instructions which could easily be car-
ried out by a computer program, and is thus effective. Given any expression
ε in Σ, this expression is some n-tuple and thus involves only finitely many
symbols from our sentential alphabet. It will come under examination at all
steps subsequent to and including Step n. Our effective procedure must give
an answer of “Yes” when fed ε, but may take a time of k minutes or less to
report this answer. So, this expression will be added to the list of elements of
Σ for some (and possibly all) steps from Step n to Step k (if k ≥ n). Also, each
step will terminate in finite time since we only have the procedure checking
each expression finitely long (although that time for each expression increases
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as the step number increases). Thus, we avoid an infinite loop if the effective
procedure given to us enters an infinite loop when ε /∈ Σ. Thus, the effective
procedure given above will list each element of Σ (in fact each element of Σ
will be listed infinitely many times, but the algorithm could be adjusted to
fix this fact if it is deemed to be undesirable), and therefore, Σ is effectively
enumerable. The proposition holds.
This proposition highlights the difference between decidability and ef-
fective enumerability. With decidability, our effective procedure reports “Yes”
when the expression ε ∈ Σ and also “No” when ε /∈ Σ. We are able to decide
exactly what is and what is not in Σ. But with effective enumerability, our
procedure only definitely reports “Yes” if ε ∈ Σ, but not necessarily “No” if
ε /∈ Σ. With an effectively enumerable set, and a particular ε under consider-
ation, if our effective procedure has taken 1,000,000 years and has not given us
an answer of “Yes”, we still cannot say that ε is not in our set, for perhaps in
the next iteration the procedure will answer “Yes.” So, in this sense effective
enumerability is half of decidability. It is in this sense that our goal is “half”
attainable. We use our result to address our question of provability within the
sentential model.
Proclamation 3.17.4 If Σ is a decidable set of wffs, the set of tautological
consequences of Σ is effectively enumerable.
Proof: We have an effective procedure to list all of the elements of Σ
as σ1,σ2,σ3, . . . Let τ be an arbitrarily given wff.
Step 1. Confirm or deny ∅  τ using an appropriate truth table. [This
is an effective procedure since ∅ is a finite set.] If the statement is true report
“Yes.”
Step 2. Confirm or deny σ1  τ using an appropriate truth table. If
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the statement is true, report “Yes.”
...
Step i. Confirm or deny {σ1,σ2, . . . ,σi}  τ using an appropriate
truth table. If the statement is true, report “Yes.”[This is an effective proce-
dure since {σ1,σ2, . . . ,σi} is a finite set.]
Eventually this procedure, which is effective, containing finite instruc-
tions and involving no guesswork, must report “Yes” if and only if τ is a
tautological consequence of Σ by the corollary to the Compactness Theorem.
For if Σ  τ , then there exists finite Σf ⊆ Σ such that Σf  τ , and all
members of Σf must eventually be represented in one of the steps above. By
Proposition 3.17.5, the set of tautological consequences of Σ must be effectively
enumerable.
Such a result encourages our endeavor in mathematics to find new re-
sults for the above proposition indicates that all true facts following from a
set of premises must be effectively enumerable. So, what this result indicates
is that if a proof is to be found from a set of assumptions, it can be found.
If a statement does not follow from our premises or axioms, then we may be
able to show that it does not follow or we may not.
For instance, Goldbach’s Conjecture in number theory states that ev-
ery even integer greater than 2 is the sum of two primes. This conjecture,
although it has great concrete number evidence to support it, remains un-
proven. Suppose Σ is the set of all statements true in number theory. Now, if
Goldbach’s Conjecture is a true statement of number theory, then our results
above indicate that there must be a deduction which shows it to be true i.e.
we can say that Σf  τ where Σf is a finite subset of Σ and τ is Goldbach’s
Conjecture. We can think of Σf as a set of axioms we might be assuming. As
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long as we are assuming the right axioms Σf , then we ought to be answer “yes”
to Goldbach’s Conjecture being a consequence of Σf if Goldbach’s Conjecture
is true of number theory. However, if Goldbach’s Conjecture is not provable
from a given Σf , we may not be able to say so i.e. we may not be able to
answer “No” to its being a consequence of our current set of axioms that we
are operating under. We have no idea of whether we should stop searching for
a proof for Goldbach’s Conjecture given our current set of axioms. It could
be (as with another famous number theoretic result that was unproven for
hundreds of years, Fermat’s Last Theorem) that a couple more years of re-
search will yield exactly the sort of proof that we seek. So, we may soldier on
with the mathematical project encouraged to think that we can prove all true
mathematical results that are true given our current set of axioms. We just
may be unable to know if some statement is not a consequence of our current
set of axioms.
3.4 Shortcomings of Sentential Logic
Having examined some of the nice results and properties that the
sentential model of logic has and that we would like to see for a model of
humanity’s deductive thought processes, we now consider where our model
falls short.
A severe limitation of our model was hinted at above when we discussed
one of the axioms of Peano arithmetic: “If n ∈ N, then S(n) ∈ N.” We saw that
we could translate this axiom into infinitely many statements in the sentential
language. Such a translation is awkward to work with however. On the other
hand, we saw that if we attempt to translate the statement as a single sentence
symbol, we lose the deductive power that the axiom is intended to express. Of
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course, we could rephrase the axiom as, “For all n ∈ N, S(n) ∈ N”. The idea
of the axiom is that if we range over the set that is the natural numbers, the
successor of any one number will also be a natural number. It is the inability
to express this idea of ranging over a set that leads us to our dilemma in
expressing the Peano axiom in the sentential language and is a significant
shortfall in our language. We do not have sufficient structure in our language
to compactly describe what we feel to be an intuitive notion. The sentence
symbols used as our “core” or “atomic” symbols of expressing statements
are clunky when we attempt to express connections between them when those
connections consist of properties of sets. Our sentential model has a significant
shortcoming. However, Sentential Logic is just that: a mathematical model
for humanity’s deductive thought processes. With it we have proved some
interesting and useful results that indicate limits to our deductive endeavors.
It has served as an excellent foundation and prototype for our next and more
refined model, First-Order Logic.
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Chapter 4
First-Order Languages and
Structures
In the last two chapters, we developed the structure of sentential logic
and examined some of its nice properties as a model for human deduction. We
also saw its limitations when we attempted to describe properties of sets. In
this chapter, we begin the development of a new and richer model of logic for
which sentential logic will serve as the prototype–first-order logic.
Since we are attempting to present a mathematical model of deduction,
we will develop first-order logic in a rigorously mathematical fashion. However,
many of the results and processes developed in sentential logic carry over to
the development of first-order logic, so some discussion of similar results will
be suppressed in the first-order setting.
Since Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is stated in terms of first-order
logical statements, we are moving one step closer to the main result of this
thesis. In this chapter, we first develop first-order languages and then discuss
what truth and falsity mean within our new system.
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4.1 First-Order Languages
For a first-order language, we assume that we have an infinite, but
countable, alphabet in which we have two types of symbols: logical symbols
and parameters. We catagorize these in the chart below.
Symbol Type
( Logical Grouping
) Logical Grouping
¬ Logical Connective
→ Logical Connective
vn for every n ∈ N Logical Variable Symbols
≈ Logical Equality (optional)
∀ Parameter; Quantifier
P ni for at least one n and one i in Z
+ n-place Predicate Parameter(s)
an for n ∈ Z+ Constant Parameter(s) (optional)
fni for n, i ∈ Z+ n-place Function Parameter(s)
(optional)
Note: even though we have termed the equality symbol as a logical
symbol, we will also think of it as a 2-place predicate symbol.
To specify a particular language, we say whether we have equality and
what parameters are present. Our language will have an intended interpreta-
tion, but our language by itself is just a formal collection of symbols without
any inherent meaning. The idea behind a first-order language is that it can
support a particular mathematical structure.
Why we are including and catagorizing the specific symbols that we
have in the table bears some comment. The parentheses, “¬,” and “→” sym-
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bols are familiar from sentential logic. We do not include any other logical
connectives because the set {¬,→} is a complete set as mentioned in the last
chapter.
We saw that the major downfall of sentential logic was its inability to
express properties which range across whole sets. This inability came from
the clunkiness of the sentence symbols. To remedy this in first-order logic
we essentially decompose the sentence symbols to be able to express a richer
structure. To this end we introduce a quantifier, variables, constants, predicate
symbols and function symbols.
Variable symbols will be stand-ins for the elements in the set that
our particular language fundamentally deals with. Constants will also come
from this set, but including function symbols allows us to minimize how many
constants we use in our language.
For instance, if we are working with the language for number theory, we
will specify the constant 0 as being in our language. Of course, the intended
translation of 0 is 0. To avoid further constant symbols, we will use the 1-place
function symbol S (where the intended translation is the successor function),
and write S(0) to translate for 1.
The quantifier ∀ is intended to translate “for every member” in the
set that our language fundamentally deals with. This symbol will essentially
encode the idea of ranging over a whole set. We will also want to talk about
the existence of certain elements in a set. For instance, we might want to say,
“There is a least natural number.” We can actually encode this idea using
¬∀¬. “There is a least natural number” is equivalent to “It is not the case
that for every natural number, the natural number is greater than some other
natural number.” In some of our discussion and examples, we replace the ¬∀¬
83
pattern with ∃ as an abbreviation for “there is a member.”
The n-place predicate symbols together with the variables in our lan-
guage essentially take the place of our sentence symbols in sentential logic. The
intended translation of each predicate symbol is some property that elements
of the foundational set may or may not have. For instance in the language of
number theory the 2-place predicate symbol < is intended to translate the less
than property. Thus, S(0) < S(S(0)) will translate the proposition “One is
less than two.” For a unary predicate symbol P , ∃xPx could be used to sup-
port the meaning that there is a member of a set that has property P (or
equivalently, we could write (¬∀x(¬Px))).
Since predicate symbols give the translation of properties, the require-
ment that each particular language should have at least one predicate symbol
makes sense. Without a predicate symbol we cannot translate any properties
and hence no propositions can be translated since each proposition will in-
clude one or more properties that either are or are not fulfilled, determining
the truth value of the proposition.
All of the features of our expanded first-order system interplay to give
us a wider range of expressiveness.
Since we have mentioned the Peano Axioms several times now and will
use them in a few more examples, we list them for the reader’s reference (this
list is adapted from page 1 of [5]).
Peano Axioms of Arithmetic:
N1 0 ∈ N.
N2 If n ∈ N, then its successor is in N.
N3 0 is not the successor of any element of N.
N4 If n and m in N have the same successor, then n = m.
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N5 A subset of N which contains 0, and which contains n + 1 whenever
contains n, must equal N.
Example 4.1 Language of Number Theory:
Equality: Yes
Predicate Symbols: One, 2-place predicate symbol <
Constant Symbols: 0
1-place Function Symbols: S (intended to translate the successor function
2-place Function Symbols: + (for addition), · (for multiplication), and E (for
exponentiation).
Note in the above list that all of these parameters are just symbols.
There is no inherent meaning behind them, but we can think of them as be-
ing sufficient to support a particular meaning. We will make this idea more
rigorous in the discussion to come.
We can use the formal expression
∀v1(¬Sv1 ≈ 0)
to support the logical structure of the Peano Axiom, “0 is not the successor of
any number.”
Example 4.2 Using the same language for number theory, we can translate
the Peano Axiom “The successor of each natural number is itself a natural
number,” with ease into the first-order language for number theory
∀v1(∃v2(S(v1) = v2)).
In English, “For each natural number, there is another natural number equal
to the successor of the first natural number.” In sentential logic, to translate
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this same axiom, we declared that Ai was intended to translate “i ∈ N,” so
that A0 ∼ “0 ∈ N”, A1 ∼ “1 ∈ N”, etc. Similarly, we declared that Ai+1 was
intended to translate S(i) ∈ N. So, A1 ∼ “S(0) ∈ N”, A2 ∼ “S(1) ∈ N”, etc.
Thus, we expressed our axiom of Peano arithmetic as the wffs (Ai → Ai+1)
for each i ∈ N. So, (A0 → A1) ∼ “0 ∈ N implies S(0) ∈ N”.
Example 4.2 demonstrates the strength of first-order logic in expressing
properties that hold for entire sets. Despite the enhanced power of expressive-
ness in our first-order languages, we will not, in general, be able to express
every proposition about a particular theory in the first-order language for that
theory.
Example 4.3 Using the language of number theory, we cannot express the
proposition, “Every non-empty set of natural numbers has a least element.”
The reason for this is that this statement describes a property which ranges
over sets. In our language for number theory, our quantifier ∀ ranges over the
set of natural numbers, not the power set of the natural numbers. When we
have the ability to range over members of a set and also over members of the
power set of that set, we are working with a different mathematical model of
logic called “second-order logic.”
Another example of a second-order logical statement is the Complete-
ness Axiom of the real numbers: “Every bounded above set has a least upper
bound.” Notice that we are ranging over sets, not elements of sets.
We could create a language for which our fundamental class is all sets
(the “set” of all sets is too large to be a set and hence we have to think of this
object as a class, but we may think of our quantifier ∀ as ranging over a class
instead of a set) as follows.
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Example 4.4 Language of Set Theory
Equality: Yes
Predicate Parameters: One 2-place predicate symbol ∈ (intended translation:
“is a member of”)
Constant Symbol: ∅ (intended translation: the set that contains no elements)
Function Symbols: None
With this language, we can write such statements of set theory as
(¬∃v1∀v2v2 ∈ v1)
In English, this says that there is no set of which every set is a member.
In this language for set theory (we may need to add some more predicate
symbols) we could express our proposition that every set of natural numbers
has a least element, but we cannot express this statement about number theory
in the first-order language of number theory.
We give another example of a first-order language for a familiar math-
ematical structure to give the reader a little more intuitive feel for first-order
languages before defining them rigorously.
Example 4.5 First-Order Language for an Arbitrary Group (Lan-
guage for Group Theory)
Equality: Yes
Predicate Parameters: One 1-place predicate symbol ∈ (intended translation:
“is a member of the group”)
Constant Symbols: e (intended translation: the identity element of the group)
Function Symbols: One 2-place function symbole ∗ (intended translation: the
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binary group operation)
We can translate the group axioms into our language (we assume that
our group is non-empty).
∀v1∀v2((∈ v1∧ ∈ v2)→∈ v1 ∗ v2)
∀v1∀v2∀v3(v1 ∗ (v2 ∗ v3) ≈ (v1 ∗ v2) ∗ v3)
∀v1(v1 ∗ e ≈ v1 ∧ e ∗ v1 ≈ v1)
∀v1∃v2(v1 ∗ v2 ≈ e ∧ v2 ∗ v1 ∗ e)
These statements’ English equivalents are as follows:
“If v1 and v2 are members of the group, then v1 ∗ v2 is a member of the group”
(the group is closed under the binary operation).
“For all elements v1, v2, and v3 in the group, v1 ∗ (v2 ∗ v3) = (v1 ∗ v2)∗ v3” (the
binary operation is associative).
“For every element v1 in the group, v1 ∗ e = v1 = e ∗ v2” (the group has an
identity element with respect to the group operation).
“For every element in the group v1, there is an element v2 such that
v1 ∗ v2 = e = v2 ∗ v1” (every element in the group has an inverse).
4.2 Rigorous Development of First-Order Lan-
guages
In our discussion of first order languages above, we were playing fast
and loose with the symbols at our disposal to give the reader some initial feel
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for the differences between first-order languages and the language for sentential
logic. We now develop things more rigorously.
First, an expression in a first-order language will be a finite sequence of
symbols from the first-order language alphabet. For each first order language
and for each n-place function symbol f , we will define a formula-building
operation Ff whose domain is the set of all variables and constant symbols in
the language, and where Ff (ε1, ε2, . . . , εn) = fε1ε2 · · · εn.
Definition 4.6 The set of terms in a first-order language is the set gener-
ated (in the sense of generation discussed in Chapter 2) by the class of formula
building operations F = {Ff : f is a n−place function symbol in the language}
applied to the variables and constant symbols of the language.
Example 4.7 In the language of number-theory discussed above, 0, S0, and
+v2S0 are terms in the language.
Note that the intended meaning of S0 is precisely the same as that for
S(0), and similarly for +v2S0 and v2 + S(0). For the purposes of establish-
ing rigorous results for first-order languages, we have defined terms without
parentheses in a non-intuitive way (so that +v2S0 means the same thing as
v2 + S(0)). This way of representing mathematical expressions is actually
used in practice as an alternative mode of entry into calculators. It is often
referred to as “Polish notation.”
Example 4.8 In the language of set theory discussed above, only the vari-
ables and the constant symbol ∅ are terms since there are no n-place function
symbols.
In the language for an arbitrary group, ∗v1v2 and ∗e ∗ v1v2 are terms.
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Notice that terms assert nothing whatsoever but are merely the objects
about which assertions can be made. In this sense, the terms are the nouns
and pronouns for our particular first-order language.
Definition 4.9 An atomic formula is an expression of the form Pt1t2 · · · tn
where P is an n-place predicate symbol and where ti for 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a term.
Note that terms are not atomic formulas, but atomic formulas are built
from a finite sequence of terms and a predicate symbol. The name “atomic
formulas” is suggestive of their function. Just as the sentence symbols were
the core wffs in the sentential language, the atomic formulas are the core wffs
in each sentential language. Each n-place predicate symbol is intended to
translate a property that the n terms have or do not have. Thus, Pt1t2 · · · tn
asserts that the n terms have property P .
Example 4.10 < 0S0 translates the assertion that 0 is less than 1 in the
language for number theory.
≈ v1v2 translates the assertion that one variable is equal to another
in any first-order language under consideration. This expression is an atomic
formula since we consider ≈ to be a 2-place predicate symbol as well as a
logical symbol.
In the language for an arbitrary group, ∈ ∗v1v2 is an atomic formula.
It asserts that the group operation between v1 and v2 is a member of the group.
Having defined the atomic formulas and made the correlation between
these expressions and the sentence symbols in sentential logic, we are now in
a position to define the wffs for any particular first-order language.
First we define the formula-building operations on the set of expressions
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for a first order language as follows:
F¬(α) = (¬α)
F→(α,β) = (α→ β)
F∀,i(α) = ∀viα for i = 1, 2, . . .
The first two formula building operations are familiar from sentential logic.
The third is new with the introduction of a quantifier symbol into first-order
languages.
Definition 4.11 The set of wffs for a first-order language is the set generated
from the set of atomic formulas by formula-building operations F¬, F→, and
F∀,i for each i = 1, 2, . . ..
Example 4.12 In the language for number theory, < 0v1 and ≈ 0v1 are
atomic formulas and hence wffs in that language. Hence
F¬(< 0v1) = (¬ < 0v1),
F→((¬ < 0v1),≈ 0v1) = ((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1),
and
F∀,1(((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)) = ∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)
are each wffs in that language as well. Note the different use of equality above.
Remember that ≈ is a formal symbol in the language whereas we use “=” above
to say what the output from a formula building operation is. The last wff is
the translation of the Peano axiom “Zero is not the successor of any natural
number.” We translated this axiom earlier in our intuitive initial discussion,
but this is the form in the strict use of our formal language.
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Example 4.13 In the language of set theory, the wff
∀v1(¬∀v2 ∈ v2v1)
is the wff that translates the axiom that there is no set which contains every
set. Compare this with the more informal Example 4.4. Essentially we have
replaced es with ¬∀¬ and simplified double negations.
In the language of an arbitrary group (Group Theory), the wff
∀v1(≈ ∗v1ev1∧ ≈ ∗ev1v1)
This wff translates the group axiom that asserts the existence of inverses.
Like with sentential logic, there is a Unique Readability Theorem for the
wffs in any first-order language. Although the methods are slightly different
for the proof for first-order languages, we skip the development trusting that
the reader will readily accept the fact of unique readability given the rigorous
development for the sentential language.
4.2.1 Free Variables
Unlike sentential logic, not every wff will be able to translate an English
(or other natural language) sentence. For instance, in the language of number
theory, < v2v1 is an atomic formula, hence a wff. However, since v1 and
v2 are each intended to be translated as simple place holders for any natural
numbers, it cannot be said that there is an English statement that can be
translated into this wff. It asserts nothing, but merely provides the structure
necessary to say that one natural number is less than another. Unless specific
natural numbers are specified or the natural numbers which might fill the place
holders are delimited , we have essentially “ < ”.
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On the other hand the wff ∀v1∀v2 < v2v1 has an English equivalent
that is a proposition: “Every natural number is less than every other natural
number.” Now, this proposition is false, but that is beside the point. The
point is that we have delimited both of the variables v1 and v2 so that we
are actually making a claim. Of course such wffs are the most interesting to
us, and so we define these notions more rigorously. We first want to design a
recursively defined function that will mark by the number 1 the occurrence of
a non-delimited (free) variable.
Let A denote the set of all atomic formulas, we define for any first-order
language hv : A −→ {0, 1} by
h(α) =
 1 if v occurs in α0 otherwise
The Unique Readability Theorem (which we assume holds for all first-order
languages) and the Recursion Theorem will guarantee the existence of a unique
extension hv of hv where
hv(α) = hv(α) for atomic formula α,
hv((¬α)) = hv(α),
hv((α→ β)) = max{hv(α), hv(β)}, and
hv(∀viα) =
 hv(α) if v 6= vi0 if v = vi .
Definition 4.14 In a first-order language a variable v occurs free in a wff
α if hv(α) = 1.
Example 4.15 In the language for number theory, for the wff < v2v1,
hv1(< v2v1) = 1
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since < v2v1 is atomic and v1 occurs in < v2v1. Similarly for v2.
In the language of number theory, no variable occurs free in
∀v1(¬∀v2 ∈ v2v1)
since hvi(∀v1(¬∀v2 ∈ v2v1)) = 0 for each i since each variable vi follows
the quantifier it appeared in.
Example 4.16 Consider a first-order language with two 1-place predicate sym-
bols A and C, and one 2-place predicate symbol ♥. In the wff,
∀v1∀v2((¬(Av1 → (¬Cv2)))→ ♥v1v2),
there are no free variables as in the last example. However, in the wff
(∀v1(¬(Av1 → (¬Cv2)))→ ∀v2♥v1v2),
the variable v2 is free since
hv2((∀v1(¬(Av1 → (¬Cv2)))→ ∀v2♥v1v2))
= max{hv2((¬(Av1 → (¬Cv2))), hv2(∀v2♥v1v2)}
= max{hv2((Av1 → (¬Cv2)), 0}
= hv2((Av1 → (¬Cv2))
= max{hv2(Av1), hv2((¬Cv2))}
= max{0, hv2(Cv2)}
= 1
Note that in the first wff, every incidence of v2 appeared after that variable
was quantified whereas in the second case there is an incidence of v2 before it
gets quantified. The variable v1 is also seen to be free applying hv1.
Of course, the wffs that we are most interested in are the wffs with
no free variables because they provide the structure to be able to translate
English propositions into our formal first-order language.
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Definition 4.17 A sentence is a wff in which there are no free variables.
In Example 4.20, ∀v1(¬∀v2 ∈ v2v1) is a sentence since it has no free
variables, and in Example 4.21 ∀v1∀v2((¬(Av1 → (¬Cv2)))→ ♥v1v2) is
a sentence since it has no free variables.
4.2.2 Abbreviations
Having now discussed the creation of wffs in any first-order language
in a rigorous fashion, we will adopt some abbreviating conventions to aid in
the readability of our wffs in the further discussion of first-order logic. It
is important to note that these abbreviations will not change our previous
definitions or results dealing with first-order wffs, but will merely cut down
on excess symbolism. The abbreviations which we make will also make the
discussion of first-order languages closer to that which the reader has already
seen in his or her mathematics foundations course. We abbreviate as follows.
(α ∨ β) abbreviates ((¬α)→ β)
(α ∧ β) abbreviates (¬(α→ (¬β)))
(α↔ β) abbreviates (¬((α→ β)→ (¬(β → α))))
i.e. ((α→ β) ∧ (β → α)) (we used this abbreviation above in our
first informal discussion of first-order formulas)
∃vα abbreviates (¬∀v(¬α)) (we have already discussed this abbreviation)
u ≈ t abbreviates ≈ ut for terms u and t
(similarly for other predicate symbols)
u /≈ t abbreviates (¬ ≈ ut) and similarly for other predicate symbols
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We also allow other parentheses such as [, ], {, and }. Using these
conventions, many of our unwieldy translations become easier to comprehend.
At this point, we have developed what a first-order formal language
will look like. It is essential to note that even though we may have intended
meanings for symbols in a particular first-order language, the symbols have no
inherent meaning behind them. The important thing is that the language will
be able to support a particular meaning.
Example 4.18 Consider the language that we have titled “The Language of
Set Theory.” Since the symbols have no inherent meaning, we could think of
the constant symbol ∅ as having the meaning of the number zero, and we could
think of the predicate symbol ∈ as having the meaning of the less than relation.
Our underlying set could be the natural numbers, the integers, the rational
numbers, or the real numbers. Thus the wff
∃v1∅ ∈ v1
could translate the assertion that there is a natural (or rational or real) number
that zero is less than.
We need to make this notion of the ability of a formal language to
support a particular meaning more precise. The ability of a particular language
to support specific meaning will also play a direct role in what truth and falsity
mean for first-order languages.
4.3 Structures, Truth, and Models
In the sentential language, truth assignments gave us our way of talking
about our model for deductions, tautological implication. We wish to develop
96
the analogous model in first-order languages and thus need something akin
to truth assignments. In the sentential language, truth assignments began
by assigning truth values to the sentence symbols as the core wffs in the
language. In first order languages, atomic formulas (Pt1t2 · · · tn) are our
most fundamental wffs. Intuitively, they are true if property P is true of the
n-terms t1 through tn. Now, each term is either a variable, a constant or
some composition of functions applied to variables and constants. So, if we
specify a specific set that our variables and constants are to come from and also
specify what actual functions the function symbols refer to and what relations
the predicate symbols refer to, we should be able to determine whether each
atomic formula is true or false, and this will be determined by whether the
n-tuple (t1, t2, . . . , tn) (where the ti’s will be assigned specific numbers) is in
the relation that the predicate symbol P refers to. We define things more
formally.
Definition 4.19 A structure for a first-order language is a function S on
the set of parameters of the language where
(i) S(∀) = U where U is a non-empty set called the universe of S.
(ii) S(P ) = PS ⊆ Un for each n-place predicate symbol P i.e. PS is an
n-ary relation.
• S maps ≈ to = if ≈ is a symbol in the language since ≈ is both a
logical symbol and a 2-place predicate symbol if it is in the formal
language.
(iii) S(c) = cS ∈ U for constant symbol c.
(iv) S(f) = fS where fS : Un −→ U for the n-place function symbol f .
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As a technical note, if S is a function, what is its codomain? We can
construct an ad hoc codomain by including in our set the universal set that
we want to translate our formal language into, then including in our codomain
the variety of n-ary relations on the universal set that we want to translate
our predicate symbols to, etc.
Structures are the first-order equivalent to truth assignments in the
sentential language. The idea behind assigning ∀ to a non-empty set is that
now ∀v will mean “for every element in our specific universe”. The assignments
for the other symbols will give us concrete relations, constants, and functions to
work with in our universe. Truth and falsity will be determined by satisfaction
of our relations. Until a structure is specified, our formal language is just
symbology with specific rules for how to combine that symbology.
Example 4.20 We look at structures for the first-order language that we
termed “The Language of Number Theory.” Define a structure N by N(∀) = N,
N(<) = < ⊆ N2 (given its usual interpretation), N(0) = 0, N(S) = S where
S(x) = x+1, N(+) = + (addition), N(·) = · (multiplication), and N(E) = E
(exponentiation). This is of course the actual structure of number theory.
Define another structure B by B(∀) = R, B(<) = < ⊆ R2 (again,
given its normal meaning), B(0) = 0, B(S) = S where S(x) = x+1, B(+) =
+, B(·) = ·, and B(E) = E. We have merely used a larger universe in this
case than in the previous case.
Define yet another structure C by C(∀) = Z, C(<) = D ⊆ Z2 where
D = {(m,n) : m divides n}, C(0) = 1, C(S) = P where P (x) = x − 1,
C(+) = ·, C(·) = +, and C(E) = E.
Each of the structures above are completely valid for the formal lan-
guages we have specified, but some may be non-intuitive given our discussion
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above about “intended interpretations” of our formal symbols. Again, our for-
mal languages are just a collection of symbols with rules how to combine them
without any inherent meaning. We may want our formal language to be able
to support a particular structure, but the language may be able to support
many, many structures. We consider one more example of a structure at this
point.
Example 4.21 For the formal language for an arbitrary group, we can define
the following structures.
A(∀) = Z2 × Z2 = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, A(∈) = Z2 × Z2
(“is a member of Z2 × Z2”), A(e) = (0, 0), A(∗) = + where
(x1, y1) + (x2, y2) = (x1 + x2, y1 + y2)
B(∀) = Aut(Zp) where p is a prime (the set of automorphisms on the group Zp),
B(∈) = Aut(Zp), A(e) = ι where ι(x) = x (the identity map),
B(∗) = ◦ (function composition)
C(∀) = R, C(∈) = R, C(e) = 1, C(∗) = · (multiplication)
Notice that all of the above functions are indeed structures since they
fulfill the definition of a structure. However, even though we are using the
formal language “for group theory,” only the first two structures are bona fide
groups. The third structure is not a group because it fails to fulfill the inverse
axiom for groups. Now, above, in our presentation of the formal language for
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group theory, we claimed that we were able to represent the four group axioms
using the formal language. Of course, we were doing this while implicitly
thinking of our symbols referring to a concrete, but arbitrary group. We would
expect then with the last structure in Example 4.28, that the wff sentence used
to express the existence of inverses would be false in this particular structure
(since R fails to be a group because 0 has no inverse), but all four wff sentences
intended to express the four group axioms would be true in first two structures
of Example 4.21 since they are indeed groups. We thus need to express formally
what it will mean for a wff sentence to be true under a particular structure.
First, given a structure S, we begin with a function that assigns to all
of our variable symbols in our formal language to concrete points in our specific
universe U. So let s : V −→ U where V is the set of variable symbols in the
formal language. Each such function s is like a truth assignment v in sentential
logic. Having specified our variables, we wish to extend to a function s on all
terms. By free generation (unique readability) of the terms from the variables
and constant symbols in our language and by the Recursion Theorem, there
will exist a unique function s : T −→ U where T is the set of all terms in our
first-order language such that
s(v) = s(v) for variable symbol v,
s(c) = cS for a constant symbol c, and
for terms t1, t2, . . . , tn and n-place function symbol f
s(ft1t2 · · · tn) = fS(s(t1), s(t2), . . . , s(tn)).
Thus, s assigns concrete points in the universe U to the terms in our formal
language.
We are now in a position to define what it means for a wff ϕ to be
satisfied in a structure.
100
Definition 4.22 A wff ϕ is satisfied in a structure S by s : V −→ U
and we denote this with |=S ϕ[s] subject to one of the cases for the form of ϕ
described below.
(i) |=S≈ t1t2 if and only if s(t1) = s(t2)
(ii) |=S Pt1t2 · · · tn if and only if (s(t1), s(t2), . . . , s(tn)) ∈ PS
(iii) |=S (¬ψ)[s] if and only if /|=S ψ[s]
(iv) |=S (ψ → χ)[s] if and only if /|=S ψ[s] or |=S χ[s]
(v) |=S ∀xψ[s] if and only if for all u ∈ U, |=S ψ[sx|u] where
sx|u(y) =
 u for y = xs(y) for y 6= x.
Item (v) deserves some consideration. Informally when we say “for all
numbers in a set, ϕ is true,” we mean that if ϕ was said about any specific
element in the universal set, the statement would be true. The idea with the
piecewise function is that whenever the quantified variable symbol is encoun-
tered, it will be replaced with the element u from the universe. If we do this
for every u ∈ U and ϕ is true in every case, then we should say that ∀xϕ is
satisfied with the function s (the function s is given before referring to sx|u).
The function s still matters because the ϕ could have free variables (ones
distinct from x).
Since the wffs are freely generated by the atomic formulas in a particular
language, the definition is valid by the Recursion Theorem. Although most
of our following examples use strict formal languages without the use of the
abbreviations ∧, ∨, ↔, and ∃, it is a simple matter to prove the following
useful facts (we omit the proof).
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Theorem 4.23 The following hold for any structure S and any s : V −→ U.
(i) |=S (ϕ ∧ ψ)[s] if and only if |=S ϕ[s] and |=S ψ[s].
(ii) |=S (ϕ ∨ ψ)[s] if and only if |=S ϕ[s] or |=S ψ[s].
(iii) |=S (ϕ↔ ψ)[s] if and only if |=S ϕ[s] and |=S ψ[s] or /|=S ϕ[s] and
/|=S ψ[s].
(iv) |=S ∃xϕ[s] if and only if there is some u ∈ U such that |=S ϕ[sx|u].
A couple of examples of satisfaction (and non-satisfaction) of a wff by
are in order.
Example 4.24 Consider the first-order language that we developed for num-
ber theory and the wff in the first-order language,
∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)
Let A be the actual structure for number theory as defined above. Let
s : V −→ N where s(v1) = 1 and s(vi) = 0 where i 6= 1. By the definition of
satisfaction in the structure A by the s we have that
|=A ∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)[s] iff
|=A ((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)[sv1|n] for all n ∈ N iff
/|=A (¬ < 0v1)[sv1|n] or |=A≈ 0v1 [sv1|n] for all n ∈ N iff
|=A< 0v1 [sv1|n] or sv1|n(0) = sv1|n(v1) for all n ∈ N iff
(sv1|n(0), sv1|n(v1)) ∈< or 0 = sv1|n(v1) for all n ∈ N iff
0 < sv1|n(v1) or 0 = n for all n ∈ N iff
0 < n or 0 = n for all n ∈ N
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Since this last statement is true for the natural numbers, we may say
that
|=A ∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)[s]
is true, that is, the wff
∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)
is satisfied in the structure A by s. Notice also that nowhere was the fact that
s(v1) = 1 and s(vi) = 0 for i 6= 1 used. Thus, our statements must hold for
any arbitrary s : V −→ N, that is, any assignment of the variable symbols
to the natural numbers (recall that V is the set of variable symbols for a fixed
language under consideration). So,
|=A ∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)[s]
is true for any arbitrary s. Or equivalently,
∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)
is satisfied in the structure A for any s. This fact should make sense since in
this structure our wff essentially asserts that zero is the least natural number,
which is one of the Peano axioms that defines the natural numbers. So, this
wff being satisfied in this structure for every s, indicates the truth of the wff no
matter how the variable v1 is assigned to a natural number. In other words,
the wff is true in this particular structure no matter how the variable involved
is assigned.
Example 4.25 Consider the language that we developed for an arbitrary group
and the wff ∈ ∗v1v2. Consider the structure A of the Klein group as presented
in Example 4.21. Let s : V −→ Z2 × Z2 be defined by s(v1) = (0, 0) and
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s(v2) = (1, 1) (note that it is immaterial where we map all the infinitely many
other variables since only the variables v1 and v2 are involved in the wff at
hand). Then,
|=A∈ ∗v1v2 [s] iff
s(∗v1v2) is a member of the Klein group iff
s(v1) + s(v2) is a member of the Klein group iff
s(v1) + s(v2) is a member of the Klein group iff
(0, 0) + (1, 1) is a member of the Klein group iff
(1, 1) is a member of the Klein group.
Since this is true, A satisfies ∈ ∗v1v2 with s. It is clear because of the closure
of the Klein group that this will be true for every s : V −→ Z2×Z2, but notice
unlike the last example the specific assignments for v1 and v2 are appealed to
in our string of “iff”s. This is so since the variables v1 and v2 appear free in
the wff in question. This fact suggests the next theorem, but first we give one
more example.
Example 4.26 Again, we use the language developed for arbitrary groups and
we consider the structure C defined in Example 4.28. Consider the wff
(¬∀v2(¬ ≈ ∗v1v2e)).
Define s : V −→ R by s(v1) = 0 and s(v2) = 1 (It is immaterial where we map
v2 since it does not occur free in the wff). Now,
|=C (¬∀v2(¬ ≈ ∗v1v2e))[s] iff
/|=C ∀v2(¬ ≈ ∗v1v2e)[s] iff
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/|=C (¬ ≈ ∗v1v2e)[sv2|r] for some r ∈ R
(note that this is so since |=S ∀xϕ[s]⇔|=S ϕ[sx|u] for every u ∈ U
which is equivalent to /|=S ∀xϕ[s]⇔ /|=S ϕ[sx|u] for some u ∈ U) iff
|=C≈ ∗v1v2e [sv2|r] for some r ∈ R iff
sv2|r(∗v1v2) = sv2|r(e) for some r ∈ R iff
sv2|r(v1) · sv2|r(v2) = 1 for some r ∈ R iff
sv2|r(v1) · sv2|r(v2) = 1 for some r ∈ R iff
s(v1) · r = 1 for some r ∈ R iff
0 · r = 1 for some r ∈ R.
This last statement is false since 0 · r = 0 for every r ∈ R, so we see that
/|=C (¬∀v2(¬ ≈ ∗v1v2e))[s].
That is, this wff is not satisfied in the structure C with (the meaning determined
by) s. Of course, if
s(v1) = a 6= 0, the wff would have been satisfied.
We have noted a couple of things in the last several examples. First,
we have noted that the function s : V −→ U plays a role in the question
of satisfaction of a wff only if there are free variables involved in the wff
in question. Second, we have seen that it is immaterial to the question of
satisfaction of a particular wff how s maps any variable that is not involved in
the wff. These facts suggest the following theorem (note that in the theorem
s1
∣∣
Fϕ represents the restriction of s1 to the set Fϕ).
105
Theorem 4.27 Let Fϕ denote the set of all free variables involved in the wff
ϕ. For structure S and any s1, s2 : V −→ U, if s1
∣∣
Fϕ = s2
∣∣
Fϕ , then
|=S ϕ[s1] if and only if |=S ϕ[s2].
Proof: The proof is another induction argument on the set of wffs
I = {ϕ : Such that the theorem holds true for ϕ} .
The first step is to show that all atomic formulas are included in this set and
then show closure under negation, implication, and universal quantification.
We show everything except the case for negation.
Let ϕ be an atomic formula. Then ϕ = Pt1t2 · · · tn where P is a n-
ary predicate symbol and each ti is a term. Take an arbitrary pair of functions
s1 and s2 and suppose that they agree on all of the free variables involved in
ϕ. Since ϕ is atomic, every variable involved in ϕ is free. It is clear then that
s1(ti) = s2(ti). Now,
|=S ϕ[s1] iff (s1(t1), s1(t2), . . . , s1(tn)) ∈ PS iff
(s2(t1), s2(t2), . . . , s2(tn)) ∈ PS iff |=S ϕ[s2].
Since our choice for ϕ as an atomic formula was arbitrary, every atomic formula
must fulfil the theorem and hence is in the set I.
Now suppose that ϕ and ψ are in I. Again, take an arbitrary pair of
functions s1 and s2 and suppose that
s1
∣∣
F(ϕ→ψ) = s2
∣∣
F(ϕ→ψ) .
Note that Fϕ,Fψ ⊆ F(ϕ→ψ). Thus,
s1
∣∣
Fϕ = s2
∣∣
Fϕ and s1
∣∣
Fψ = s2
∣∣
Fψ .
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By assumption of ϕ and ψ being in I, we must have
|=S ϕ[s1] iff |=S ϕ[s2] and |=S ψ[s1] iff |=S ψ[s2].
Equivalently, we must have
|=S ϕ[s1] and |=S ψ[s1] iff |=S ϕ[s2] and |=S ψ[s2].
By Definition 4.22, these are sufficient conditions to guarantee that
|=S (ϕ→ ψ)[s1] iff |=S (ϕ→ ψ)[s2].
Thus, we must have (ϕ→ ψ) ∈ I.
Finally, we demonstrate closure under universal quantification. Sup-
pose for variable symbol vi and an arbitrary pair of variable assignments s1
and s2 that
s1
∣∣
F∀viϕ
= s2
∣∣
F∀viϕ
.
Note that
F∀viϕ ⊆ Fϕ ⊆ F∀viϕ ∪ {vi}.
Also, we have
(s1)vi|u(y) =
 u for y = vis1(y) for y 6= vi. and
(s2)vi|u(y) =
 u for y = vis2(y) for y 6= vi.
These functions are equivalent to the following
(s1)vi|u(y) =

u for y = vi
s1(y) for y ∈ F∀viϕ
s1(y) otherwise
and
107
(s2)vi|u(y) =

u for y = vi
s2(y) for y ∈ F∀viϕ
s2(y) otherwise
Since we have assumed that
s1
∣∣
F∀viϕ
= s2
∣∣
F∀viϕ
and (s1)vi|u and (s2)vi|u agree on all variables in F∀viϕ ∪ {vi} ⊇ Fϕ, we have
(s1)vi|u
∣∣
Fϕ = (s2)vi|u
∣∣
Fϕ .
Since we have assumed that ϕ ∈ I and thus fulfils the theorem, we have that
|=S ϕ[(s1)vi|u] iff |=S ϕ[(s2)vi|u].
Hence,
for all u ∈ U |=S ϕ[(s1)vi|u] iff for all u ∈ U |=S ϕ[(s2)vi|u].
By Definition 4.22, this last statement is so if and only if
|=S ∀viϕ[s1] iff |=S ∀viϕ[s2].
Therefore, ∀viϕ ∈ I for every variable symbol vi. Closure under negation
follows similarly. Hence I is exactly the set of first-order wffs for a given fixed
language.
Note that satisfaction of a wff depends on both the structure S and
s : V −→ U. So, we may state an analogous result to the last theorem. Recall
that a structure is a function on the parameters of a specific language. Thus,
we may write S
∣∣
P to restrict the structure to the parameters present in the
set P .
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Theorem 4.28 Let Pϕ denote the set of all parameters in the wff ϕ. For two
structures A and B if A
∣∣
Pϕ = B
∣∣
Pϕ, then
|=A ϕ[s] if and only if |=B ϕ[s].
Proof: Clear.
Having developed satisfaction in a structure as our analogy to truth
assignments in sentential logic, we are in perfect position to define our model
for implication.
Definition 4.29 Let Σ be a set of wffs in a first-order language, and ϕ a wff.
(i) Σ logically implies ϕ, and we write Σ  ϕ, if for every structure S
for the language and every function s : V −→ U where S satisfies every
member of Σ with s, S satisfies ϕ with s.
(ii) Two wffs ϕ and ψ are said to be logically equivalent (ϕ|==|ψ) if
ϕ  ψ and ψ  ϕ.
(iii) A wff ϕ is said to be valid if ∅  ϕ (abbreviated by  ϕ. (Note that a
wff will be valid by definition if and only if every structure S and every
s : V −→ U satisfies ϕ since |=S χ[s] holds for all χ ∈ ∅.)
We give some examples of logical implication.
Example 4.30 Consider a formal language with a 1-place predicate symbol
Q. We claim that ∀v1Qv1  Qv2. Let S be a structure for the language and
let s : V −→ U be any function such that |=S ∀v1Qv1[s]. We must show that
|=S Qv2[s]. Note that this is so if and only if s(v2) ∈ QS which is true if and
only if s(v2) ∈ QS. Now, sv1|s(v2)(v1) = sv1|s(v2)(v1) = s(v2). So, s(v2) ∈ QS
if and only if sv1|s(v2)(v1) ∈ QS which is so if and only if |=S Qv1[sv1|s(v2)].
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This holds since |=S ∀v1Qv1[s] if and only if |=S Qv1[sv1|u] for all u ∈ U,
and s(v2) ∈ U. So, S satisfies Qv2 with s. Since our choices for S and
s : V −→ U were arbitrary, we may say that ∀v1Qv1  Qv2 by definition.
Intuitively, this logical implication holds since if something holds for the entire
universe, it must hold for each specific element in the universe.
Example 4.31 Consider any formal first-order language with a 1-place pred-
icate symbol Q. We claim that Qv1 2 ∀v1Qv1. Take a structure A such
that A(∀) = N and A(Q) = P = {n : n is prime}. Let s : V −→ N where
s(v1) = 23. Then s(v1) = s(v1) ∈ P . So, |=A Qv1[s] by definition. Now,
|=A ∀v1Qv1[s] if and only if |=A Qv1[sv1|n] for all n ∈ N. This statement holds
if and only if sv1|n(v1) = sv1|n(v1) = n ∈ QA = P for all n ∈ N. Take n = 4
and this statement is false. Thus, /|=A ∀v1Qv1[s], and hence Qv1 2 ∀v1Qv1
by definition. Intuitively, if a property holds for one element of the universe,
then this fact does not imply that same property holds for every element in the
universe.
Notice that our last couple of examples involved wffs in which variables
appeared free. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the wffs that will be of the
most interest to us are the sentence wffs (wffs in which no variables appear
free). The following corollary to Theorem 4.27 will aid in proving results about
logical implications involving sentences.
Corollary 4.31.1 (to Theorem 4.27) For a sentence σ and a structure S,
either
(a) |=S σ[s] for every s : V −→ U, or
(b) /|=S σ[s] for every s : V −→ U.
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Proof: Since no variables occur free in σ, s
∣∣
Fσ = s
′∣∣
Fσ for all
s, s′ : V −→ U. Hence, by Theorem 4.35,
|=S σ[s] if and only if |=S σ[s′].
So, if |=S σ[s] or /|=S σ[s] for one particular function s, then this will be true
for every function s.
Since this corollary shows that the statement |=S σ[s] is independent
of our choice for s for sentence σ, we write either |=S σ or /|=S σ. At long
last, given this corollary we can make sense of a definition of truth and falsity
in first-order languages.
Definition 4.32 We say that a sentence σ is true in S if |=S σ, and we
say that σ is false in S if /|=S σ. In the case that σ is true in S we say
that S models σ. S is said to model a set of sentences Σ if S models every
sentence in Σ.
Example 4.33 Corollary 4.31.1 and Example 4.24 demonstrate that the struc-
ture for number theory models the sentence
∀v1((¬ < 0v1)→≈ 0v1)
since there is no successor to zero (zero is the least natural number).
Corollary 4.33.1 (to Theorem 4.27) For a set Σ∪{τ} of sentences, Σ  τ
if and only if every model of Σ is also a model of τ .
Example 4.34 Again, consider a first-order language with at least a 1-place
predicate symbol Q. Then ∀v1Qv1  ∃v2Qv2. Both wffs involved are sen-
tences. Let S be a structure which models ∀v1Qv1. Thus, there is a function
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s : V −→ U such that |=S ∀v1Qv1[s]. This statement holds if and only if
|=S Qv1[sv1|u] for every u ∈ U. This holds if and only if
sv1|u(v1) = sv1|u(v1) = u ∈ QS
for all u ∈ U. Since U is a non-empty set (by definition), there is u′ ∈ U. So,
sv2|u′(v2) = sv2|u′(v2) = u
′ ∈ QS.
Thus, there is u′ ∈ U such that |=S Qv2[sv2|u′ ], but this is true if and only
if |=S ∃v2Qv2[s]. Since ∃v2Qv2 is a sentence satisfied by one s : V −→ U,
S must model ∃v2Qv2. Since our choice for S was arbitrary, every model
of ∀v1Qv1 is also a model of ∃v2Qv2, and ∀v1Qv1  ∃v2Qv2. Intuitively,
if a property holds for every element in a non-empty set, that property holds
for at least one element in the set. This statement, very easy to express in a
first-order language, was a statement that gave our sentential language a great
deal of trouble.
Example 4.35 Once again, consider a first-order language with at least a
1-place predicate symbol Q. Then,  ∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx). In other words,
∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx) is a valid sentence. Let S be any structure. We must
show that this arbitrary structure models the sentence. Now, either r ∈ QS for
all r ∈ U or there is some u ∈ U for which u /∈ QS (this is a tautology at the
meta-level). Since U is not empty, there is at least one function s : V −→ U.
For this function, the above tautology holds, if and only if
sx|r(x) = sx|r(x) ∈ QS for all r ∈ U or
sx|u(x) = sx|u(x) /∈ QS for some u ∈ U iff
|=S Qx[sx|r] for all r ∈ U or /|=S Qx[sx|u] for some u ∈ U iff
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|=S ∀xQx[s] or /|=S Qx[sx|u] for some u ∈ U
By Corollary 4.31.1, ∀xQx is a sentence satisfied in the structure S by the
function s, if and only if ∀xQx is satisfied in S by the function sx|u, and so
|=S ∀xQx[s] or /|=S Qx[sx|u] for some u ∈ U iff
|=S ∀xQx[sx|u] or /|=S Qx[sx|u] for some u ∈ U iff
|=S (Qx→ ∀xQx)[sx|u] for some u ∈ U iff
|=S ∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx)[s].
Hence S models ∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx), and since our choice for the structure
was arbitrary,  ∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx).
This last example serves to illustrate the relationship between our meta-
logic (the real world) and the mathematical model of logic we have constructed.
Notice that we have used a meta-tautology and the meta-theorems we have
derived concerning the formal mathematical structures of first-order languages
to be able to say that ∃x(Qx→ ∀xQx) is a valid sentence (the formal equiv-
alent of a tautology). What we are doing is creating our formal mathematical
system of logic, embedded within the real world, and we can reason at the
meta-level (in the real world) about this system with meta-logic. Our goal
is that by reasoning about formal logic as a model of our meta (real world)
logic, our model might shed some light about how reasoning in the real world
works and what properties it has. This project is very similar to modeling a
projectile’s path with mathematics. I can make some measurements in the real
world and come up with a formal mathematical model for a projectile using
a quadratic function. I can even reason at the formal level with this model to
able to find nice features of the formal model (the vertex, x-intercepts, etc.).
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The formal features of the model then shed some light on what is going on in
the real world i.e. how high the rocket goes and when it is on the ground. The
quadratic model for the rocket will of course be imperfect since some variables
were unaccounted for, but even as a simplistic model it sheds light on the real
world.
At this point we can shed only minimal light on the meta-world, but
will be able to say more as the we develop more tools in the following chapters.
Before leaving this chapter, however there are two particular topics that we
wish to visit which will be key in the succeeding development of our tools
of Soundness, Completeness, and Compactness and also our ultimate goal of
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
4.4 Definability of Relations Within Structures
We wish to discuss just how much structure our first order languages
can express. Towards that end we develop a new term of measurement. Con-
sider a fixed structure S and a wff ϕ with free variables among v1,v2, . . . ,vk
and u1, u2, . . . , uk ∈ U. We will say,
|=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]
if and only if there is a function s : V −→ U such that s(vi) = ui for each
1 ≤ i ≤ k and S satisfies ϕ with this function. By Theorem 4.27, this
statement holds if and only if |=S ϕ[s] for every such function s. In the
universe U determined by S we may thus define the k-ary relation,
{(u1, u2, . . . , uk) : |=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]}.
Given the structure S, this relation is completely determined by the the wff
ϕ.
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Definition 4.36 Given the structure S and the the wff ϕ, whose free variables
are among v1, v2,. . . , vk,
{(u1, u2, . . . , uk) : |=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]}
is the relation that ϕ defines in S. Given a k-ary relation R in the universe
U determined by S, if there is a ϕ such that
R = {(u1, u2, . . . , uk) : |=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]},
then R is said to be definable in S.
Example 4.37 Take the formal language that we have used to support the
language of number theory and also the actual structure, A, of number theory.
Consider the set {n ∈ N : n is odd }. We claim that
ϕ = ∃v2(S(S(0)) · v2 + S(0) ≈ v1)
defines the set of odd numbers in the structure of number theory. To see this,
notice that
|=A ϕ[[n]] iff
There is s : V −→ N with s(v1) = n such that |=A ϕ[s] iff
There is m ∈ N such that |=A S(S(0)) · v2 + S(0) ≈ v1[sv2|m] iff
There is m ∈ N such that sv2|m(S(S(0)) · v2 + S(0)) = sv2|m(v1) iff
There is m ∈ N such that sv2|m(S(S(0)) · v2) + sv2|m(S(0)) = sv2|m(v1) iff
There is m ∈ N such that sv2|m(S(S(0))) · sv2|m(v2) + S(sv2|m(0)) = s(v1) iff
There is m ∈ N such that S(S(sv2|m(0))) · sv2|m(v2) + S(0) = n iff
There is m ∈ N such that S(S(0)) ·m+ 1 = n iff
115
There is m ∈ N such that 2 ·m+ 1 = n iff
n is odd.
So, {n ∈ N : n is odd } = {n ∈ N : |=A ϕ[[n]]}, and ϕ defines the set of odd
numbers in N.
With this example, we can see how definability gives a measure of
expressibility of a formal language, for, we can always start with some relation
in our concrete structure (number theory for instance) and then “check” to see
whether in our formal language there is a formula that defines that relation.
If a relation is definable in the formal language, then our formal language is
adequate to support that particular meta-structure. If no formula of our formal
language defines a relation, then our language falls short in its expressibility of
the meta-structure that actually exists in a bona fide relation (or we may say
perhaps that our language is “incomplete”...). The question becomes whether
there actually are any such relations that exist and yet are undefinable by a
formal language. This question is the heart of the incompleteness of Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem. In a general sense, we may say that there must
always be relations that are undefinable for a formal language with a countable
alphabet, for, there are only countably many (ℵ0) possible formulas in such a
language, but uncountably many relations on even a countable set. The point
of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is to demonstrate one such relation for a
language that can support number theory.
Definability will clearly be a key tool in what follows. Another necessary
tool we discuss in the next section.
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4.5 Elementary Equivalence and Homomorphisms
Having defined structures, we wish to see when two structures are
similar or the same. One measure of sameness of structure is elementary
equivalence.
Definition 4.38 For a first-order language, two structures of the language, A
and B, are elementary equivalent if for any sentence σ in the language
|=A σ if and only if |=B σ
and we say A ≡ B.
Intuitively, this definition says that every formal sentence has the same
truth value in both structures. Every property that can be expressed by first-
order sentences is shared between the two structures. It is difficult at this
stage with our limited tools to be able to show elementary equivalence, so we
give one example with some hand-wavy justification.
Example 4.39 Consider a first order language with only one 2-place predi-
cate symbol < and equality. Let the structure A be such that A(∀) = Q (the
rational numbers) and A(<) = {(a, b) : a < b}. Let the structure B be such
that B(∀) = R (the real numbers) and B(<) = {(a, b) : a < b}. Then A ≡ B.
We don’t give a fully rigorous justification here, but, roughly, every ordering
statement that can be stated using first-order sentences about the rational num-
bers can also be stated about the real numbers and vice-versa. So, for instance,
take the sentence
∀v1∀v2∃v3(v1 < v2 → (v1 < v3 ∧ v3 < v2)).
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Each structure is a model of this sentence since between each two rational
numbers there is another rational number, and the same holds for the real
numbers.
That each first-order sentence of the language should have the same
truth value in both structures makes sense since the reals are constructed
from the rationals by the Completeness Axiom which states that every sub-
set of the real numbers that has an upper bound has a least upper bound.
This statement is false for the rational numbers. For instance, take the set
{3, 3.1, 3.14, 3.141, 3.1415, . . .}. This is a set of rational approximations to pi.
This set is bounded above and below (by 3 and 4), but there is no least upper
bound for the set since for any proposed upper bound (say, 3.15), a smaller
rational upper bound may be found (3.142). The Completeness Axiom ensures
that there is a least upper bound for this set in the real numbers, and pi is this
least upper bound (of course pi is not a rational number). So, the Completeness
Axiom is the essential difference (in terms of ordering) between the rational
and real numbers and is a statement false in the rational numbers but true in
the real numbers.
However, the Completeness Axiom is not a first-order logical statement
within the formal language that we have at our disposal. Notice that the vari-
able in the statement of the Completeness Axiom are sets whereas for our
structures A and B, our variables are mapped to either rational or real num-
bers. There is nothing that we have developed so far that would allow us to work
in the same universe and yet talk about both ranging over variables and ranging
over sets containing elements within that universe as well. This need is ful-
filled in second-order logic (not treated in this thesis). So, it makes sense that
these two structures should be elementary equivalent since their main difference
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comes from a statement that cannot be expressed in a first-order language.
The above example demonstrates that elementary equivalence gives us
a measure of sameness of structure at the first-order level, but there may be
properties, even significant properties, of universes that cannot be captured
by first-order sentences, and hence our measure of elementary equivalence fails
us at this point.
A more comprehensive and general measure comes with structure pre-
serving maps, or, homomorphisms. Homomorphisms show up during the study
of mid to upper division mathematics in a variety of contexts such as linear
algebra, abstract algebra, ring theory, and field theory. Here, we may state a
more overarching and generic definition of what a homomorphism is.
Definition 4.40 Given a first-order language and structures A and B for
the language, a homomorphism of A into B is a map from A into B (the
universes for A and B respectively) fulfilling the following requirements:
(i) For each n-place predicate symbol P in the formal language,
(a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ PA if and only if (h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)) ∈ PB
(ii) For each n-place function symbol f ,
h(fA(a1, a2, . . . , an)) = f
B(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an))
(iii) For each constant symbol c,
h(cA) = cB
.If h is one-to-one and onto, h is said to be an isomorphism, and A and B
are said to be isomorphic (A ' B). An automorphism is a one-to-one
and onto map of the universe of a structure into itself.
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Example 4.41 Consider a first order language with equality, one 2-place
predicate symbol, P , one-two place function symbol f , and one constant sym-
bol e. Consider the structure A where ∀ 7−→ R, P 7−→<, f 7−→ +, and
e 7−→ 0 and the structure B where ∀ 7−→ R+, P 7−→<, f 7−→ ·, and e 7−→ 1.
Let exp : R −→ R+ be the standard exponential function. The mapping is one-
to-one and onto since ln : R+ −→ R such that exp ◦ ln = I = ln ◦ exp where I
is the identity map. Notice that since exp is an increasing function if a, b ∈ R
with a < b, exp(a) < exp(b) fulfilling property (i) of a homomorphism. Note
that exp(a + b) = exp(a) · exp(b), fulfilling property (ii) of a homomorphism,
and also note that exp(0) = 1 fulfilling property (iii) of a homomorphism. So,
exp is a one-to-one and onto homomorphism, hence an isomorphism for A and
B, and hence the structure A is isomorphic to the structure B. For all intents
and purposes, except for the exterior “skin” of symbology, there is absolutely no
difference between structures A and B. Their universes have the same cardi-
nality (since exp is one-to-one and onto) and functions and relations imposed
by A and B are preserved.
This example is of course a classic example of a group homomorphism
between the groups 〈R,+〉 and 〈R+, ·〉. However, note that our language is
not the language of groups per se since there is not the one-place membership
predicate as we defined the language for groups to include and there is instead
a 2-place predicate symbol. So, the notion of homomorphism can be extended
to the preservation of very generic structures.
Example 4.42 Consider the structures A and B as defined in Example 4.41.
Take the function I : Q −→ R where r 7−→ r (this would be the identity
function apart the mismatch between the domain and the codomain). The
function is of course one-to-one but not onto because the domain is countable
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whereas the codomain is uncountable. Clearly, the ordering between the two
sets will be preserved, and so I is a homomorphism for the two structures.
The last example serves to illustrate a couple of things. The first is
that whereas elementary equivalence could not measure a significant difference
between these two structures, the above homomorphism can via the concept
of onto. So, a homomorphism is a more powerful measure than elementary
equivalence. The second is that since the map is one-to-one and preserves
the ordering and since Q ⊆ R we may think of A as a substructure of B, a
useful concept to play with. To relate the two measures, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.43 (The Homomorphism Theorem) Let h be a homomor-
phism of A into B, and let s map the set of variables of the given first-order
language into A. Then:
(i) For any term t, h(s(t)) = h ◦ s(t) (Note that s(t) is computed in A
whereas h ◦ s(t) is computed in B as shown in the following diagram)
-
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(ii) For any quantifier-free formula ϕ not containing the equality symbol,
|=A ϕ[s] if and only if |=B ϕ[h ◦ s]
(iii) If h is one-to-one, then part (ii) holds even if the equality symbol is
present in ϕ.
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(iv) If h is onto, then part (ii) holds even if ϕ has a quantifier symbol.
Proof: We use an inductive argument with the set
S = {t ∈ T : h ◦ s(t) = h ◦ s(t)}.
For a variable symbol v in the language s(v) = s(v), and h ◦ s(v) = h ◦ s(v),
so that all variables must be in S. For a constant symbol c in the language,
s(c) = cA, and h ◦ s(c) = cB since h ◦ s : V −→ B. Since h(cA) = cB, all
constant symbols in the given first order language will be in the set.
For our induction hypothesis, let us be given an n-place function sym-
bol f , and let us assume that t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ S. Then, s(ft1t2 · · · tn) =
fA(s(t1), s(t2), . . . , s(tn)) So,
h(s(ft1t2 · · · tn)) = fB(h(s(t1)), h(s(t2)), . . . , h(s(tn)))
= fB(h ◦ s(t1), h ◦ s(t2), . . . , h ◦ s(tn))
= h ◦ s(ft1t2 · · · tn)
since h is a homomorphism, t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ S, and by results previously es-
tablished about extensions of variable assignments. Hence ft1t2 · · · tn ∈ S
and S = T by the Induction Principle. This proves part (i).
For part (ii) if ϕ = Pt1t2 · · · tn, then
|=A ϕ[s] if and only if (s(t1), s(t2), . . . , s(tn)) ∈ PA (by definition) iff
(h(s(t1)), h(s(t2)), . . . , h(s(tn))) ∈ PB since h is a homomorphism, iff
(h ◦ s(t1), h ◦ s(t2), . . . , h ◦ s(tn)) ∈ PB (by part (i)) iff
|=B ϕ[h ◦ s].
A simple induction argument suffices to show that the same statement holds
if ϕ involves the logical connectives ¬ or→.
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Now, we may say that
|=A≈ t1t2 [s] if and only if s(t1) = s(t2)
by definition. Of course this statement implies that h(s(t1)) = h(s(t2)), and
the statements are equivalent as long as h is one-to-one. By part (i),
h(s(t1)) = h(s(t2)) if and only if h ◦ s(t1) = h ◦ s(t2) iff
|=B≈ t1t2 [h ◦ s].
For part (iv), we assume that h is onto. Suppose
|=B ϕ[h ◦ s] if and only if |=A ϕ[s]
for every s : V −→ A. We wish to demonstrate that
|=B ∀xϕ[h ◦ s] if and only if |=A ∀xϕ[s]
. Now
|=B ∀xϕ[h ◦ s] iff
For all b ∈ B, |=B ϕ[(h ◦ s)x|b] iff
For all a ∈ A, |=B ϕ[(h ◦ s)x|h(a)] since h is an onto mapping.
Now,
(h ◦ s)x|h(a)(y) =
 h(a) if x = yh(s(y)) if x 6= y
Since
sx|a(y) =
 a if x = ys(y) if x 6= y
it is clear that (h ◦ s)x|h(a) = h ◦ (sx|a) Thus,
For all a ∈ A, |=B ϕ[(h ◦ s)x|h(a)]iff
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For all a ∈ A, |=B ϕ[h ◦ (sx|a)] iff
For all a ∈ A, |=A ϕ[sx|a] (by hypothesis) iff
|=A ∀xϕ[s].
Hence, all four parts of the theorem are proved.
This theorem gives the relationship between our two measures of same-
ness of structure. Note in particular that if h is an isomorphism, that is, A and
B are isomorphic, that sentences have the same truth value in both structures.
That is, isomorphic structures are elementary equivalent.
Also, isomorphisms preserve definable relations. Let A and B be struc-
tures and let R be an n-ary relation in A. Let h be a homomorphism of A into
B. Then denote h(R) = {(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)) : (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ R}.
Corollary 4.43.1 If h is an isomorphism between A and B, and R an n-ary
definable relation in A, then h(R) is a definable relation in B.
Proof: Since R is definable, there is a wff ϕ such that
R = {(a1, a2, . . . , an) : |=A ϕ[[a1, a2, . . . , an]]}.
We will demonstrate that h(R) is definable by the same formula ϕ. Note
that |=A ϕ[[a1, a2, . . . , an]] is true if and only if there is s : V −→ A where
s(vi) = ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (recall that in this scenario vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are
assumed to account for all of the free variables in ϕ) where |=A ϕ[s]. By
the Homomorphism Theorem, this is so if and only if |=B ϕ[h ◦ s] where
h ◦ s : V −→ B such that (h ◦ s)(vi) = h(ai) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By definition, this
is so if and only if |=B ϕ[[h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)]]. Thus,
h(R) = {(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)) : (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ R}
= {(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)) : |=B ϕ[[h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)]]}
.
Thus, h(R) is definable by ϕ by definition.
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Corollary 4.43.2 If h is an automorphism of A and R is a definable relation,
then h(R) = R.
Proof: By the last corollary,
h(R) = {(h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)) : |=A ϕ[[h(a1), h(a2), . . . , h(an)]]}.
The last set is a subset of R by definition, and since h is one-to-one and onto,
we see at once that h(R) = R.
Example 4.44 Take the first-order language used in Example 4.41. Let
h : R −→ R with h(x) = x3. This mapping is one-to-one and onto and pre-
serves the standard ordering of the real numbers and is hence an automorphism
for the ordering structure under consideration. If Q is definable in this order-
ing structure, then h(Q) = Q. Of course h(Q) ⊆ Q. Now, take 3 ∈ Q. If
h(Q) = Q, then there is a rational number q such that h(q) = 3. However,
note that h(31/3) = 3 and since h is one-to-one and onto R, 31/3 is the unique
pre-image of 3, and 31/3 is not rational. In fact then h(Q) ⊂ Q, and by the
last corollary Q is not definable in the ordering structure for R.
As mentioned above, our results in this section will be key tools for
what follows in the succeeding chapters.
We have in this chapter developed a new model for humanity’s deduc-
tive thought processes. In the next chapters, we discuss the first-order model
for proofs, we begin analyzing what nice properties our new model has, and
we prepare for the statement and proof of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
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Chapter 5
First-Order Deductions
As with our discussion of Sentential Logic, we want to examine what
proofs, or deductions, look like in our model. After all, this is what our aim
has been. We are mathematizing real-world first-order logic so that we have
all of the rigor and machinery of mathematics to be able to shed light on the
our real-world deductions.
Now, our intuition is that a logical deduction occurs when we start
from statements we already know to be true and then use the rules of logic
finitely many times (being finite creatures)to make new statements, that is,
new facts and theorems. So, we will mathematize our intuition, and then prove
(at the meta-level) facts about our model of provability within our formal first-
order system. To avoid confusion, we will call our formal language “proofs”,
deductions, and we will continue to call our meta-level “proofs”, proofs.
5.1 Formalizing our Intuition
To model deducibility, we will have three components. First we will
have a set Λ of formulas (discussed below), the same for all first-order lan-
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guages. These axioms reflect the logical properties that we assume to be true
when we reason in the real world. Next, we will have a set of formulas Γ where
these formulas are specific to the particular first-order language under consid-
eration. This set mimics our set of statements that we have already shown to
be true or are assuming to be true and is the set of formulas from which we
hope to obtain our new statements (our theorems). Finally, we will have a rule
of inference which will allow us to formally generate our theorems from our
collection of logical axioms and assumed statements Γ∪Λ. LetW be the set of
wffs in our particular language under consideration. Define I :W×W −→W
as follows:
I(α,ϕ) =
 β if ϕ = (α→ β)ϕ otherwise
This function will be our rule of inference and reflects our real-world
inference that if it is true that statement A implies statement B, and if A
is true, then we know that statement B must be true. This inference rule is
known as modus ponens. Notice that if our function is restricted to Γ ∪ Λ, we
will only potentially generate a new formula that we do not already have if we
have a modus ponens pair.
We now have all the basic elements to begin talking about theorems
and deductions. In this context, we will call a set of wffs ∆ inductive (the
same “inductive” as in Chapter 2) if and only if Γ ∪ Λ ⊆ ∆ and ∆ is closed
under I.
Definition 5.1 The set of theorems of Γ is the smallest inductive set ∆
(i.e. the intersection of all inductive sets). A theorem of Γ is an element
τ ∈ ∆, and we write Γ ` τ
Emphasising the constructive nature of proving a theorem, we have the
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following definition for deduction.
Definition 5.2 A deduction of ϕ from Γ is a sequence 〈α0, . . . ,αn〉 of for-
mulas such that αn = ϕ and for each i ≤ n either
(i) αi ∈ Γ ∪ Λ or
(ii) For some j < k < i, αi = I(αj ,αk) (i.e. αk = (αj → αi))
A deduction and a theorem are actually equivalent concepts given the
discussion in Chapter 2 about induction and the sets C∗ and C∗.
Theorem 5.3 Γ ` τ if and only if there is a deduction of τ from Γ.
Proof: This is a specific case of Theorem 2.16.
Example 5.4 Suppose (for the time being) that Λ = {α1,α2, . . .} and that
Γ = {ϕ, (ϕ→ ∀x(¬ψ)), (∀x(¬ψ)→ χ)}. Then,
〈ϕ〉, 〈(ϕ→ ∀x(¬ψ)),ϕ,∀x(¬ψ)〉, and
〈(ϕ→ ∀x(¬ψ)),ϕ,∀x(¬ψ), (∀x(¬ψ)→ χ),χ〉
are all deductions for ϕ, ∀x(¬ψ), and χ respectively. So, ϕ, ∀x(¬ψ), and
χ are all theorems of Γ.
So, now we have a basic description of the formal model for deductions
in first-order logic. However, since the set Λ is a set of logical axioms that
is supposed to be used in deductions for all first-order languages, we must
specify exactly what this set contains. We catagorize the members of this set
into 6 main groups.
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5.1.1 Tautologies
For this group, which we will sometimes refer to as (logical) axiom
group 1, we will essentially be replacing the sentence symbols in sentential
tautologies with first-order wffs. First, call atomic formulas and formulas of
the form ∀xα prime formulas. All other formulas are of the form (α→ β)
or (¬α). All first-order formulas are then generated from the prime formulas
by the formula building operations F¬ and F→. So, returning to the ideas
of sentential logic, if we let our sentence symbols be the prime formulas, the
entire development of sentential logic is the same just with prime formulas
treated like indecomposable chunks (as far as the sentential development is
concerned). We will call these tautologies in this sentential rehash, first-order
tautologies.
Example 5.5 Consider the formula ((Px→ Qy)→ ((¬Qy)→ (¬Px))).
This is a tautology in the first-order sense, for
Px Qy (¬Px) (¬Qy) (Px→ Qy) ((¬Qy)→ (¬Px)) ((Px→ Qy)→
((¬Qy)→ (¬Px)))
T T F F T T T
T F F T F F T
F T T F T T T
F F T T T T T
This connection of sentential logic with first-order logic leads to a useful
theorem relating our sentential model of deduction and our first-order model
of deduction.
Theorem 5.6 Γ ` τ if and only if Γ ∪ Λ tautologically implies τ .
Proof: In any case, it is clear that {α, (α→ β)} tautologically
implies β. Suppose that Γ ` τ and let v be a truth assignment satisfying
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all of the formulas of Γ ∪ Λ where satisfaction is the satisfaction of sentential
logic (illustrated in the last example). Since Γ ` τ , there is a deduction of
τ from Γ, and by induction, all components of the deduction will be satisfied
by v given the tautological implication that we noted at the beginning of the
proof. Hence, τ will be satisfied by v, and Γ ∪ Λ tautologically implies τ by
definition.
Now suppose that Γ∪Λ tautologically implies τ . By Corollary 3.2.1 ( a
corollary to the Compactness Theorem for sentential logic), there exists a finite
subset of Γ∪Λ such that this finite subset, say, {γ1,γ2, . . . ,γm,λ1,λ2, . . . ,λn}
tautologically implies τ . By repeated application of Corollary 2.46.1 (and
suppressing the use of some parentheses), we have that
γ1 → γ2 → · · · → γm → λ1 → λ2 → · · · → λn → τ
is a tautology and is thus by definition in Λ. So, applying our rule of inference,
I, m + n times to the appropriate elements in Γ ∪ Λ, we see that there must
be a deduction of τ from Γ. Hence, the theorem holds.
This theorem gives us a powerful tool in our arsenal for showing when
a formula is a theorem of a particular set.
5.1.2 Substitution
We wish to add a new type of rule to our set of logical axioms Λ,
and we will call this group axiom group 2. First, we will say that ϕx|t is the
formula ϕ where the variable x is replaced with the term t wherever x occurs
in ϕ. The rules for each type of formula are as follows
(i) For atomic ϕ, ϕx|t is the formula obtained by replacing x with the term
t.
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(ii) (¬ϕ)x|t = (¬(ϕx|t))
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)x|t = (ϕx|t → ψx|t)
(iv) (∀yϕ)x|t =
 ∀yϕ if x = y∀y(ϕx|t) if x 6= y
(the first rule in the piecewise function is the case when x does not occur
free in ∀yϕ).
This definition is valid by recursion. The type of formula we wish to
add to Λ is one of the form (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t). Each term is either a variable
symbol, constant symbol, or function symbol applied to variable and constant
symbols. In a structure, the variables and constants will be mapped to ele-
ments in the universe (or stand-ins for elements in the universe) determined
by the structure, and the function symbols will be mapped to functions on
the universe. So, every term will be mapped to some element in the universe.
Essentially then, this axiom says that if a statement holds for every element
in the universe, then it holds for any particular element in the universe. But,
as it stands, we need to make some adjustment.
Consider the wff (¬∀y(x ≈ y)). Then the wff
(∀x(¬∀y(x ≈ y))→ (¬∀y(x ≈ y))x|y)
(which is of the form (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t) where ϕ = (¬∀y(x ≈ y))) is the for-
mula
(∀x(¬∀y(x ≈ y))→ (¬∀y(y ≈ y))).
The antecedent of this wff will be true in any structure with more than one
element, but the consequent is always false, so that this formula will be false in
almost every structure. It would be very ill-advised to add a formula that could
be false to our set of logical axioms for axioms by their nature are statements
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that are assumed to be true. We must therefore restrict the terms that can
actually replace free variables in a formula so that the above disaster does not
happen.
Definition 5.7 A term is substitutable for a variable x occurring in a for-
mula subject to the following conditions.
(i) For an atomic formula ϕ, any term t is substitutable for any variable x
that occurs in ϕ.
(ii) For the formula (¬ϕ), term t is substitutable for the variable x if and
only if it is substitutable for x in ϕ.
(iii) For the formula (ϕ→ ψ), term t is substitutable for variable x if and
only if it is substitutable for x in both ϕ and ψ.
(iv) For the formula ∀yϕ, term t is substitutable for variable x if and only
if y does not occur in t and t is substitutable for x in in ϕ.
The definition is valid by the recursion. If term t is substitutable for
variable x in ϕ, then there will be no “disasters” in ϕx|t like in the example
above with the wff (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t). The variable symbol y was not substi-
tutable for the variable x in the example preceding the definition because the
quanifier “captured” the variable y once x was replaced with y. So, we add
to Λ formulas of the form (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t) where t is substitutable for x in ϕ.
Example 5.8 (∀v1∀v2(Pv1v2)→ ∀v2(Pcv2)) is in Λ for constant symbol
c since v2 is distinct from c and c is substitutable for v1 in Pv1v2. However,
(∀v1∀v2(Pv1v2)→ ∀v2(P (fv1v2)v2)) is not in Λ for function symbol f
since v2 occurs in f(v1v2).
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5.1.3 Other Formulas
We also wish to include a couple other types of formulas. First, the
formula
(∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ))
ought to be included in the logical axioms Λ. This group of axioms will be
called group 3. Intuitively, if an implication holds true for the entire universe,
then if the antecedent is true for the entire universe then the consequent ought
to be true for the entire universe.
Next we include formulas in Λ of the form (ϕ→ ∀xϕ) where x does
not occur free in ϕ. This group is axiom group 4. Intuitively, if a variable
doesn’t exist in a formula or is already bound by a quantifier, then quantifying
that variable will add no expressiveness (no stronger claim when interpreted
into by a structure).
We will include the following two formulas that involve equality even if
our language under consideration does not include equality (we will choose to
ignore them when making deductions in our language if the language does not
include equality). Of course we should include as a logical axiom the formula
x ≈ x (axiom group 5). Also, the formula ((x ≈ y)→ (ϕ→ ϕ′)) where ϕ′
is ϕ with x replaced with y in no, some, or all occurrences of x in ϕ, ought
to be included in Λ (axiom group 6). Intuitively, if two variables represent
the same value and if a statement holds true for the first variable, then the
statement will also hold true for the second variable. As is clear, the inclusion
of these types of formulas requires no special explanation.
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5.1.4 Generalizations
Although all of the types of formulas discussed in the last three sub-
sections will be included in Λ, we will actually wish to include more formulas
that are related to these basic types.
Definition 5.9 Formula ψ is said to be a generalization of formula ϕ if
for some n ≥ 0, ψ = ∀x1∀x2 · · · ∀xnϕ (any formula will be a generalization
of itself (n = 0)).
For Λ, we will include all generalizations of the formulas discussed in the
last three subsections. The idea behind a generalization is that it will express
the structure of the formula for more elements in the universe. So, having
agreed on the base type of formulas in the last three subsections that should be
logical axioms, we wish to express that same logical structure for more elements
in the universe. (Note: there is a potential problem with substitutability, but
such a problem is addressed by alphabetic variants (discussed later).)
Example 5.10 In Example 5.5 we had the tautology
((Px→ Qy)→ ((¬Qy)→ (¬Px)))
. Two generalizations of this formula are
∀x((Px→ Qy)→ ((¬Qy)→ (¬Px))) and
∀y∀x((Px→ Qy)→ ((¬Qy)→ (¬Px)))
and hence all three of these formulas are in Λ.
134
5.2 Theorems About Deductions
Having specified exactly what Λ contains, we have completely formal-
ized by what we mean by a deduction (proof) in a first-order setting (refer
back to Definition 5.2). By Theorem 5.3, there is a deduction of a formula if
and only if that formula is a theorem (a formal theorem, not the numbered
meta-theorems such as “Theorem 5.3”) of our set of formulas which represents
a set of assumptions, or givens, Γ. So, to know that a formula is a theorem of
a set of formulas it suffices to know that there is a deduction of the formulas
from the set of assumptions. It is not even necessary to demonstrate what the
deduction actually is; it just suffices to know that a deduction exists. As such
it will be useful to prove several metatheorems about deducibility. These rules
will be useful to us as tools in the ensuing development.
Theorem 5.11 (Generalization Theorem) If Γ ` ϕ and x does not occur
free in any formula in Γ, then Γ ` ∀xϕ.
Proof: We show that ∀xϕ is a theorem of Γ by an induction argument
since the set of theorems of Γ are generated by the rule of inference I from
the set Γ ∪ Λ. We start with the set of theorems of Γ,
S = {ϕ : Γ ` ∀xϕ}.
If ϕ ∈ Λ, then ∀xϕ ∈ Λ since this latter formula is a generalization of the
former. If ϕ ∈ Γ, then x does not occur free in ϕ by assumption. So, the
formula (ϕ→ ∀xϕ) is a logical axiom, and since I(ϕ, (ϕ→ ∀xϕ)) = ∀xϕ,
Γ ` ∀xϕ. Thus, Γ ∪ Λ ⊆ S. All that remains is to show that S is closed
under the rule of inference. Let ϕ,χ ∈ S. Either χ = (ϕ→ ψ) for some
formula ψ or this is not the case. If it is not the case, then I(ϕ,χ) = χ ∈ S.
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If χ = (ϕ→ ψ) for some formula ψ, then, I(ϕ,χ) = ψ. So, ψ is a theorem
of Γ since ϕ and χ are. Now,
τ = (∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ))
is a logical axiom as discussed above. Since χ = (ϕ→ ψ), and χ ∈ S, then
Γ ` ∀x(ϕ→ ψ). Now, I(∀x(ϕ→ ψ), τ ) = (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ). Since ϕ ∈ S
and hence Γ ` ∀xϕ, we have that
I(∀xϕ, (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ)) = ∀xψ.
Therefore, Γ ` ∀xψ, and ψ ∈ S. Thus, I(ϕ,χ) ∈ S in any case, and S is
closed under the rule of inference. Thus, S is in fact the entire set of theorems
of Γ, and our meta-theorem holds.
Notice that the variable x can occur free in ϕ as long as ϕ is not
an element of Γ. The idea behind the theorem is that if we can show that
a statement ϕ holds for an arbitrary element, x, of the universe, then the
statement should hold for every element in the universe.
Theorem 5.12 [Rule T] If Γ ` γ1,Γ ` γ2, . . . ,Γ ` γn and {γ1, . . . ,γn}
tautologically implies τ , then Γ ` τ .
Proof: Since {γ1, . . . ,γn} tautologically implies τ ,
(γ1 → γ2 → · · · → γn → τ )
is a tautology in the sentential sense by Corollary 2.46.1. Hence, this formula
is a logical axiom, and since Γ ` γ1, . . . ,Γ ` γn, we may apply the rule of
inference I n-times to obtain Γ ` τ .
Theorem 5.13 (The Deduction Theorem) Γ ∪ {γ} ` ϕ if and only if
Γ ` (γ → ϕ)
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Proof: Suppose Γ ∪ {γ} ` ϕ. Then by Theorem 5.6, (Γ ∪ {γ}) ∪ Λ
tautologically implies ϕ. By Theorem 2.44, Γ ∪ Λ tautologically implies
(γ → ϕ). By Theorem 5.6, Γ ` (γ → ϕ)
Conversely, suppose Γ ` (γ → ϕ). Since I(γ, (γ → ϕ)) = ϕ, it is
clear that Γ ∪ {γ} ` ϕ.
This theorem reflects the fact that if we assume that a statement γ is
true and are able to deduce ϕ from our assumption, this will be equivalent to
showing that the implication “If γ, then ϕ” is true.
Theorem 5.14 (Contraposition) Γ ` (ϕ→ ψ) if and only if
Γ ` ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ)).
Proof: The formula ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ))) is a tautology.
Hence it must be in Λ. Assuming Γ ` (ϕ→ ψ) and since
I((ϕ→ ψ), ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ)))) = ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ)),
we can see that Γ ` ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ)). So if Γ ` (ϕ→ ψ), then
Γ ` ((¬ψ)→ (¬ϕ)). By symmetry, the converse will be true.
These last two theorems indicate that rules of deduction that we know
to be true in the real world (such as contraposition) hold true in our formal
model for logic. What about proof by contradiction?
Definition 5.15 A set of formulas Γ is inconsistent if for some formula ϕ
both Γ ` ϕ and Γ ` (¬ϕ).
Theorem 5.16 (Proof by Contradiction) If the set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}
is inconsistent, then Γ ` (¬ϕ).
Proof: Since Γ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent, there is a formula β such that
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ` β and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ` (¬β). By the Deduction Theorem, we have
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Γ ` (ϕ→ β) and Γ ` (ϕ→ (¬β)). Notice that the two formulas (ϕ→ β)
and (ϕ→ (¬β)) can only both be true for the same truth assignment if
and only if ϕ is false. Hence, the set {(ϕ→ β), (ϕ→ (¬β))} tautologically
implies (¬ϕ). By Rule T, Γ ` (¬ϕ)
This theorem reflects our proof by contradiction procedure. We assume
the opposite of what we are trying to show, we demonstrate an inconsistency
with our set of assumptions, Γ, and we may then conclude that what we
wanted to show is in fact true. Another theorem dealing with inconsistent sets
of formulas is of note.
Theorem 5.17 If Γ is inconsistent, then for any formula α, Γ ` α.
Proof: The following table demonstrates that for any formulas α and
ϕ, (ϕ→ ((¬ϕ)→ α)) is a tautology.
ϕ α (¬ϕ) ((¬ϕ)→ α) (ϕ→ ((¬ϕ)→ α))
T T F T T
T F F T T
F T T T T
F F T F T
Since Γ is inconsistent, by definition, there is a formula ϕ such that both
Γ ` ϕ, and Γ ` (¬ϕ). Now, I(ϕ, (ϕ→ ((¬ϕ)→ α))) = ((¬ϕ)→ α)),
and I((¬ϕ), ((¬ϕ)→ α))) = α. Hence, Γ ` α.
This theorem reflects the fact that any statement follows from a con-
tradiction and so reasoning from a contradiction is unhelpful.
In our discussion about substitutability of terms for variables, it is clear
that we may extend the substitutability idea of a variable for a constant symbol
c we are thus justified in stating the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.18 (Generalization on Constants) Assume that Γ ` ϕ and
that c is a constant symbol which does not occur in Γ. Then there is a variable
y (which does not occur in ϕ) such that Γ ` ∀yϕc|y. Furthermore, there is a
deduction of ∀yϕc|y from Γ in which c does not occur.
The intuition behind this theorem is that if a statement holds for a
particular constant in the universe, but our list of assumptions stated nothing
about the constant, then essentially our constant behaves as an arbitrary el-
ement in the universe. We may thus generalize the statement to hold for the
whole universe. Before proving the theorem, we will need a couple of lemmas.
Lemma 5.2.1 Let t be a term substitutable for x in β. If x 6= y, y does not
occur in β, and c does not occur in t, then t is substitutable for x in βc|y and
(βx|t)c|y = (βc|y)x|t
Proof: Since x is a variable symbol and c is a constant symbol, no
incidences of x in β, including quantification of x will be replaced by y in
βc|y. Furthermore, since y 6= x, there will be no more incidences of x in βc|y
than there are in β. Clearly then, since t is substitutable for x in β, t will be
substitutable for x in βc|y.
Since c does not occur in t, there will be no more incidences of c in
βx|t than in β. In fact both of these formulas will have exactly the same
incidences of c since c 6= x. These statements together with those made in
the first paragraph indicate that
(βx|t)c|y = (βc|y)x|t.
Let tc|y designate the term t where every incidence of c is replaced with y.
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Lemma 5.2.2 Let t be a term substitutable for x in β. If x 6= y, y does not
occur in β, and c does occur in t, then tc|y is substitutable for x in βc|y and
(βx|t)c|y = (βc|y)x|tc|y
Proof: We may use all of the same reasoning as in the last lemma.
Substitutability will follow since x 6= y. It is seen that the equality holds after
a moments reflection
The reader may wish to examine formulas ((Pxc)x|c)c|y and
((Pxc)c|y)x|c to see the nuances in the lemmas discussed above. We are now
going to prove the theorem for Generalization on Constants.
Proof: (Generalization on Constants) Let 〈α0,α1, . . . ,αn〉 be a
deduction of ϕ from Γ (hence αn = ϕ). Choose i to be the smallest natural
number such that vi does not occur in any of the αj ’s in the deduction given
for ϕ, and let y = vi. We claim that
〈(α0)c|y, (α1)c|y, . . . , (αn)c|y〉
is a deduction of ϕc|y from Γ (note that (αn)c|y = ϕc|y). We examine each
component in the potential deduction by cases.
Case 1: αj ∈ Γ. By assumption, since c does not occur in any formula
in Γ, then c does not occur in αj , so then (αj)c|y = αj ∈ Γ.
Case 2: αj ∈ Λ. If αj is a tautology, then (αj)c|y will be a tautology as
well as is clear from the discussion in subsection 5.1.1 since tautologies do not
depend on the specific variables and constants involved in first-order formulas
but merely the logical connectives involved in the tautology.
If αj = (∀xβ → βx|t) where t is substitutable for x in β. Then,
(∀xβ → βx|t)c|y = ((∀xβ)c|y→ (βx|t)c|y).
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Since x 6= y (y does not occur in αj), y is substitutable for c in ∀xβ, and
((∀xβ)c|y→ (βx|t)c|y) = ( ∀xβc|y → (βx|t)c|y).
Applying Lemmas 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, t and tc|y are both substitutable for x in
βc|y, and either (βx|t)c|y = (βc|y)x|t or (βx|t)c|y = (βc|y)x|tc|y depending on
whether c occurs in t. So, we have that either
( ∀xβc|y → (βx|t)c|y) = ( ∀xβc|y → (βc|y)x|t)
or
( ∀xβc|y → (βx|t)c|y) = ( ∀xβc|y → (βc|y)x|tc|y).
In either case, these formulas are logical axioms.
Most of the rest of the cases for αj ∈ Λ follow very easily upon inspec-
tion. Only one other case is of note. Suppose αj = (x ≈ z → (β → β′))
where β′ is β with some of incidences of x replaced by z. So,
(αj)c|y = (x ≈ z → (βc|y → β′c|y)).
Note that β′c|y = (βc|y)
′ since c 6= x and c 6= z so that (αj)c|y will be a logical
axiom of the same type as αj .
We have covered the cases where αj is in Γ or in Λ. Suppose now that
αj = I(αi, (αi → αj)) where i < j. Now,
(αi → αj)c|y = ((αi)c|y→ (αj)c|y), and
I((αi)c|y, ((αi)c|y→ (αj)c|y)) = (αj)c|y,
so that (αj)c|y is generated from our rule of inference. As this is the last case
for αj , we conclude that
〈(α0)c|y, (α1)c|y, . . . , (αn)c|y〉
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is a deduction of ϕc|y from Γ.
Now let Φ be the finite set of formulas from Γ used in our deduction of
ϕc|y. As mentioned above, any such formula (αj)c|y will be equal to αj , and
the variable y will not occur in this formula by assumption. Since Φ ` ϕc|y, by
the Generalization Theorem, Φ ` ∀yϕc|y. Since Φ ⊆ Γ, we have Γ ` ∀yϕc|y.
Of course in our deduction we used to show Φ ` ϕc|y, the symbol c did not
occur (since it had been replaced by y for each αj). Since the proof of the
Generalization Theorem added no new symbols, we may say that there is a
deduction in which c does not occur for Γ ` ∀yϕc|y.
This theorem and the following corollaries will be useful in our ensuing
discussion.
Corollary 5.18.1 Under the same assumptions, there is a deduction of ϕc|y
from Γ in which c does not appear.
Proof: This fact is seen in the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 5.18.2 Assume that Γ ` ϕx|c, where the constant symbol c does
not occur in Γ or in ϕ. Then Γ ` ∀xϕ, and there is a deduction of ∀xϕ from
Γ in which c does not occur.
Proof: By Generalization on Constants, there is a variable y that
does not occur in ϕx|c such that Γ ` ∀y(ϕx|c)c|y and there is a deduction of
∀y(ϕx|c)c|y in which c does not occur. Note that since c does not occur in
ϕ, the only incidences of c in ϕx|c will come from where c was substituted
for x. It is clear then that(ϕx|c)c|y = ϕx|y, and hence ∀y(ϕx|c)c|y = ∀yϕx|y.
We wish to show that x is substitutable for y in ϕx|y and that (ϕx|y)y|x = ϕ
so that we may say that (∀yϕx|y → ϕ) is a logical axiom. Since y does not
appear in ϕx|c, y occurs in ϕ if and only if x occurs in ϕ and x = y. If
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x = y, then Γ ` ∀yϕx|y is the same thing as Γ ` ∀xϕ since ϕx|x = ϕ, and
we are done. So, we suppose that x 6= y. Hence, since there are no incidences
of y in ϕx|c, there will be no incidences of y in ϕ. Hence, x will occur in ϕ
precisely when y occurs in ϕx|y. So, we must have that x is substitutable for
y in ϕx|y and that (ϕx|y)y|x = ϕ. Since (∀yϕx|y → (ϕx|y)y|x) is a logical
axiom (since x is substitutable for y in ϕx|y), we have that (∀yϕx|y → ϕ) is
a logical axiom. Now,
I(∀yϕx|y, (∀yϕx|y → ϕ)) = ϕ.
Now, ∀yϕx|y ` ϕ and x does not occur free in in ∀yϕx|y, so that by General-
ization Theorem ∀yϕx|y ` ∀xϕ. Note that c does not occur in this deduction
since it does not occur in ϕ. Hence, we have a deduction of ∀xϕ from Γ in
which c does not occur.
Corollary 5.18.3 Assume that the constant symbol c does not occur in ϕ,
ψ, or in Γ, and that Γ ∪ {ϕx|c} ` ψ, then Γ ∪ {∃xϕ} ` ψ and there is a
deduction of ψ from Γ ∪ {∃xϕ} in which c does not occur.
Proof: Since Γ ∪ {ϕx|c} ` ψ, by the Deduction Theorem and Con-
traposition, this statement holds if and only if Γ ∪ {(¬ψ)} ` (¬ϕx|c). Since
(¬ϕx|c) = (¬ϕ)x|c, by the proceeding corollary, we have that
Γ ∪ {(¬ψ)} ` ∀x(¬ϕ).
Applying the Deduction Theorem and Contraposition again and using some
appropriate abbreviations, the last statement is equivalent to the desired re-
sult.
Before leaving this chapter, we mention two more topics.
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5.2.1 Theorems of Deduction Involving Equality
Although theorems of deducibility involving the formal language equal-
ity symbol will be important in our discussion in future chapters, we state these
theorems without proof, appealing to the intuitive nature of the results and
trusting that the reader can derive adequate proofs.
Theorem 5.19 (i) ` ∀x(x ≈ x) (formal reflexivity of ≈).
(ii) ` ∀x∀y[(x ≈ y)→ (y ≈ x)] (formal symmetry of ≈).
(iii) ` ∀x∀y∀z[((x ≈ y)→ ((y ≈ z)→ (x ≈ z)))] (formal transitivity
of ≈).
Theorem 5.20 For R a two place predicate symbol,
` ∀x1∀x2∀y1∀y2[(x1 ≈ y1 → (x2 ≈ y2 → Rx1x2 → Ry1y2))].
Similarly for n-place predicate symbols.
Theorem 5.21 For f a two place function symbol,
` ∀x1∀x2∀y1∀y2((x1 ≈ y1 → (x2 ≈ y2 → f(x1x2) ≈ f(y1y2)))).
Similarly for n-place function symbols.
5.2.2 Alphabetic Variants
Suppose we desire to show that ` [(∀x∀y∀zQxyz)→ (∀zQzzz))].
Notice that since z is not substitutable for either x or y in ∀zQxyz, we cannot
use our substitution results very effectively. However we may demonstrate
` [(∀x∀y∀wQxyw)→ (∀zQzzz))] very simply. Note that
(∀x∀y∀wQxyw → ∀y∀wQzyw), (∀y∀wQzyw → ∀wQzzw), and
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(∀wQzzw → Qzzz)
are each substitution logical axioms since z is substitutable for each of x, y,
and w (assuming z is distinct from each of these variables). So,
∀x∀y∀wQxyw ` Qzzz
and by the Generalization Theorem, ∀x∀y∀wQxyw ` ∀zQzzz. By the
Deduction Theorem, ` (∀x∀y∀wQxyw → ∀zQzzz).
Of course, the structure of
(∀x∀y∀zQxyz → ∀zQzzz) and
(∀x∀y∀wQxyw → ∀zQzzz)
appears to be logically identical. In fact, we can demonstrate that
∀x∀y∀zQxyz ` ∀x∀y∀wQxyw and
∀x∀y∀wQxyw ` ∀x∀y∀zQxyz.
For ∀x∀y∀zQxyz ` ∀x∀y∀wQxyw, we have
For ∀x∀y∀wQxyw ` ∀x∀y∀zQxyz, the argument is exactly sym-
metric. Via this method we can show our original desired result
` (∀x∀y∀zQxyz → ∀zQzzz),
but it took a great deal of work because of unhelpful quirk due the definition
of substitutability and the chosen quantified variable, neither of which are
salient features of the result we wish to demonstrate. The whole process
above amounted to changing the variable over which we were quantifying.
The example above is illustrative of a theorem that will allow us to change the
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` (∀zQxyz → Qxyw) w substitutable for z in Qxyz;
Logical Axiom
` (∀zQxyz → ∀wQxyw) Deduction Theorem;
Generalization Theorem;
Deduction Theorem
` ∀y(∀zQxyz → ∀wQxyw) Generalization Theorem
` (∀y∀zQxyz → ∀y∀wQxyw) Logical Axiom of the form
(∀y(α→ β)→ (∀yα→ β));
Rule of Inference
` (∀x∀y∀zQxyz → ∀x∀y∀wQxyw) Similar to the last few steps.
∀x∀y∀zQxyz ` ∀x∀y∀wQxyw Deduction Theorem
variable over which we quantify when we wish to substitute in a term that is
not substitutable under our current quantified variable. We state the theorem
without proof, trusting that the reader has an intuitive grasp of what we are
doing.
Theorem 5.22 (Existence of Alphabetic Variants) Let ϕ be a formula,
t a term, and x a variable. Then we can find a formula ϕ′ (which differs from
ϕ only in the choice of the quantified variables) such that
(i) ϕ ` ϕ′ and ϕ′ ` ϕ
(ii) t is substitutable for x in ϕ′.
Having developed what truth and falsity mean in a first order setting
in the last chapter and having developed our formal model for deductions in
this chapter, we are ready to see how the two interrelate. The interrelationship
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between the two will be at the heart of the statement of Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorem.
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Chapter 6
Soundness, Completeness, and
Compactness
In a first-order setting, we have associated with a set of first-order
formulas Γ two statements:
Γ  ϕ and Γ ` ϕ.
Recall that the statement on the left says that the set of formulas Γ logically
implies ϕ (Definition 4.36). This means that every structure which satisfies
every formula in Γ with s : V −→ U will also satisfy ϕ with s. If Γ ∪ {ϕ}
contains only sentences, then logical implication means that every structure
that models Γ will also model ϕ. In other words, if the sentences of Γ are true
in a structure, the statement ϕ must also be true in that structure.
On the other hand Γ ` ϕ means that ϕ is a theorem of Γ, or equiva-
lently, that there is a formal deduction (our model for a proof) of ϕ from Γ
(i.e. ϕ was generated via our rule of inference from the formulas of Γ). So,
Γ  ϕ is a statement about the truth of ϕ given our set of assumptions Γ
whereas Γ ` ϕ is a statement about the deducibility of ϕ from Γ. In this
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chapter, we will show how these two interrelate, and this interrelationship will
get at many of the core ideas in Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
There are three key questions that we want to answer in this chapter.
(1) If we have a deduction (Γ ` ϕ), does it follow that the formula deduced
will be true in every structure in which the hypotheses (Γ) are satisfied?
(This concept is known as soundness.)
(2) If we know that a formula holds true in every structure that satisfies a
set of hypotheses (Γ  ϕ), is there a deduction of that formula from the
set of hypotheses? (This concept is known as completeness.)
(3) If a statement is deducible, is it always deducible from a finite set of
hypotheses? (This concept is known as compactness.)
We begin with soundness.
6.1 Soundness
An example of soundness is in order to more fully illustrate what our soundness
theorem will say.
Example 6.1 Using the language for number theory, we can easily demon-
strate that ∀x(x < Sx) ` 0 < S0. This follows from our substitution logical
axiom since 0 is substitutable for x in x < Sx. Since there is no inherent
meaning behind any of the symbols, soundness says that since this deduction
exists, in any structure in which ∀x(x < Sx) is true 0 < S0 must also be
true. Of course in the structure of number theory it is true that the successor
of every natural number is greater than that natural number. So soundness
says that the successor of 0 must be greater than 0.
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However if we consider a different structure, say the structure S where
S(∀) = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . .}, S(<) =∈, S(0) = ∅, S(S) = F where
F(A) = {A}, S(+) = ∩, S(·) = ∩, and S(E) = ∩. Our deduction of
course still holds, since the deduction only has to deal strictly with the formal
language and not with any particular structure. Also, since A ∈ {A} = F(A)
for every member of the universe, soundness says that it must also be the case
that ∅ ∈ F(∅). Soundness says that 0 < S0 must be true in every structure
where ∀xx < Sx is true.
Now, for the formal statement of the Soundness Theorem.
Theorem 6.2 (Soundness Theorem) If Γ ` ϕ, then Γ  ϕ.
Before proving the Soundness Theorem, we will need a few lemmas.
Lemma 6.1.1 For a structure S and for s : V −→ U, for any variable x,
and terms u and t, s(ux|t) = sx|s(t)(u).
Before proving the lemma, let us get a grasp on what it says. On the
left side of the equation, we take the term u and substitute every incidence
of the variable x with the term t, we then evaluate s(ux|t) which will be the
image of the term ux|t in the universe of S. Recall that for a ∈ U,
sx|a(y) =
 a for y = xs(y) for y 6= x.
So, for sx|s(t)(u), we first calculate the image of the term t in the universe and
then calculate the image sx|s(t)(u) in the universe where every incidence of x
in u will be mapped to the image of t in the universe. Essentially, the equation
states that it does not matter whether we substitute t for x and then map to
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the universe or whether we map to the universe and then substitute the image
of t when calculating what the image of u is. The associated diagram is as
follows where T is the set of terms for the specific first order language being
used.
-T Tx|t
ssx|s(t)
J
J
J
J
J^









fl
U
Proof: The argument is by induction on the form of the term u. If
u is a constant symbol, then ux|t = u so that s(ux|t) = s(u) = uS. But
sx|s(t)(u) = uS, so that our equality holds.
If u = x, then s(ux|t) = s(t). On the other hand
sx|s(t)(u) = sx|s(t)(x) = sx|s(t)(x) = s(t)
so that our equation holds again. The induction step is hard to write, but by
these last two cases and the discussion involving s on page 100 it is clear that
equality will hold.
This last lemma is useful for the next lemma.
Lemma 6.1.2 (Substitution Lemma) If the term t is substitutable for the
variable x in the wff ϕ, then
|=S ϕx|t[s] if and only if |=S ϕ[sx|s(t)].
Proof: We proceed by induction on the set of wffs for which the
lemma holds. If we have an atomic formula, say, Pu1u2 · · ·un, then
|=S (Pu1u2 · · ·un)x|t[s] if and only if
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(s((u1)x|t), s((u2)x|t), . . . , s((un)x|t)) ∈ PS.
By the preceding lemma, this last statement is true if and only if
(sx|s(t)(u1), sx|s(t)(u2), . . . , sx|s(t)(un)) ∈ PS if and only if
|=S Pu1u2 · · ·un[sx|s(t)].
This concludes the base case of induction since first-order wffs are freely gen-
erated from the set of atomic formulas.
Suppose now that ϕ and ψ are wffs that fulfill the lemma i.e., we
assume that t is substitutable for x in both formulas and that
|=S ϕx|t[s] if and only if |=S ϕ[sx|s(t)] and that
|=S ψx|t[s] if and only if |=S ψ[sx|s(t)].
The lemma will clearly hold for the cases (ϕ→ ψ) and (¬ϕ) by Definition
4.22.
Consider now ∀yϕ. There are two possibilities. Either x occurs free
in ϕ or it does not. If it does not, then ϕx|t = ϕ by the discussion on pages
130-131 and by the definition of free variable. Also, s
∣∣
Fϕ = sx|s(t)
∣∣
Fϕ where Fϕ
is as in Theorem 4.27. By Theorem 4.27 then, we can say that
|=S ∀yϕx|t[s] if and only if |=S ∀yϕ[sx|s(t)]
If x does occur free in ϕ, we first note that we are assuming that t is
substitutable for x in ∀yϕ otherwise the statement of the lemma holds as a
vacuously true statement. Hence, by our discussion of substitutability in the
last chapter y must not occur in the term t. So, s(t) = sy|u(t) for all u ∈ U.
If x = y, then (∀yϕ)x|t = ∀yϕ, and x does not occur free in this formula.
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An application of Theorem 4.27 then guarantees the statement of the lemma.
If x 6= y, then we have that (∀yϕ)x|t = ∀yϕx|t. Notice that
sy|ux|s(t)(v) = sx|s(t)y|u(v) =

u if v = y and v 6= x
s(t) if v 6= y and v = x
s(v) if v 6= y and v 6= x
In the above function, there will of course be no case when y = x since these
are not the same variable by assumption. Now,
|=S (∀yϕ)x|t[s] iff |=S ∀yϕx|t[s] iff
|=S ϕx|t[sy|u] for all u ∈ U iff
|=S ϕ[sy|ux|sy|u(t)] for all u ∈ U.
Since s(t) = sy|u(t) for all u ∈ U, the last statement is equivalent to
|=S ϕ[sy|ux|s(t)] for all u ∈ U iff |=S ϕ[sx|s(t)y|u] for all u ∈ U iff
|=S ∀yϕ[sx|s(t)].
Since then the set of wffs that fulfill the lemma includes the atomic formulas
and is closed under the formula building operations, we conclude that the
lemma holds for all formulas ϕ.
We will need the next lemma to form a link between tautological im-
plication and logical implication.
Lemma 6.1.3 If Γ tautologically implies ϕ, then Γ logically implies ϕ
Proof: Assume that Γ tautologically implies ϕ (recall the discussion
of tautologies in the last chapter). Let a structure S and a mapping
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s : V −→ U be given. Define a truth assignment on the set of prime formulas
by
v(α) = T if and only if |=S α[s].
We seek to show that for any formula ϕ,
v(ϕ) = T if and only if |=S ϕ[s].
Since a wff of the form ∀xψ is a prime formula, it remains to be shown that
the statement holds for formulas of the form (ψ → χ) or (¬ψ). However, if
the statement holds for both ψ and χ, then the statement must hold for each
of (ψ → χ) and (¬ψ) by the recursive construction of v and by Definition
4.29. So, by induction, the statement holds for all formulas.
Thus, if we have a structure S and a mapping s : V −→ U satisfy-
ing (Definition 4.22) every member of Γ, the truth assignment v will satisfy
(Definition 2.35) every member of Γ. So, since Γ tautologically implies ϕ,
v(ϕ) = T , and this is so if and only if |=S ϕ[s]. Hence, Γ logically implies ϕ.
Lemma 6.1.4 The set of logical axioms Λ is valid.
Proof: We prove that each group of logical axioms is valid and then
prove that any generalization of a valid formula will also be valid.
Axiom Group 1 (Tautologies): By definition ∅ tautologically implies a tau-
tology. By the preceding lemma, ∅ logically implies the tautology, and this is
exactly what is meant by a valid formula by definition.
Axiom Group 2 (Substitution): Assume that t is substitutable for x in
the formula ϕ. Let S be an arbitrary structure such that |=S ∀xϕ[s]. This
is so if and only if |=S ϕ[sx|u] for all u ∈ U. Now s(t) ∈ U so that we
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must have |=S ϕ[sx|s(t)]. By the Substitution Lemma, this last statement is
equivalent to |=S ϕx|t[s]. By Definition 4.22, |=S (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t)[s]. Since S
and s : V −→ U were arbitrarily chosen, (∀xϕ→ ϕx|t) is a valid formula.
Axiom Group 3: Note that
|=S (∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ))[s] iff
/|=S ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)[s] or |=S (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ)[s]
But |=S (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ)[s] iff /|=S ∀xϕ[s] or |=S ∀xψ[s].
Now assume that |=S ∀x(ϕ→ ψ)[s] and that |=S ∀ϕ[s]. This statement
holds if and only if
|=S (ϕ→ ψ)[sx|u] and |=S ϕ[sx|u] for every u ∈ U iff
/|=S ϕ[sx|u] for some u ∈ U or |=S ψ[sx|u] for all u ∈ U, and
|=S ϕ[sx|u] for all u ∈ U.
This last statement implies that |=S ψ[sx|u] for all u ∈ U, or equivalently
|=S ∀xψ[s]. Using the equivalence discussed at the beginning of this case, we
can say that
|=S (∀x(ϕ→ ψ)→ (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ))[s].
Thus, axioms of this form are valid.
Axiom Group 4: Suppose that x does not occur free in ϕ. Furthermore,
suppose that |=S ϕ[s]. Now, s and sx|u agree on all free variables in ϕ for all
u ∈ U since x does not occur free in ϕ. Hence by Theorem 4.27,
|=S ϕ[s] iff |=S ϕ[sx|u],
and this statement holds for all u ∈ U. Hence, |=S ϕ[sx|u] for all u ∈ U, and
this statement is equivalent to |=S ∀xϕ[s]. Since |=S (ϕ→ ∀xϕ)[s] holds if
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and only if /|=S ϕ[s] or |=S ∀xϕ[s], our work shows that |=S (ϕ→ ∀ϕ)[s].
Hence, (ϕ→ ∀ϕ) is a valid formula.
Axiom Group 5: This is trivial since |=S x ≈ x[s] if and only if s(x) = s(x),
which is always true.
Axiom Group 6: Similar to axiom group 3, it suffices to show that |=S x ≈ y[s]
and |=S ϕ[s] implies that |=S ϕ′[s] where ϕ′ is obtained from ϕ by replacing
some, but not necessarily all instances of x in ϕ with y. Now, |=S x ≈ y[s]
if and only if s(x) = s(y). So, it is clear that for any term t′ obtained by
replacing instances of x in term t with the variable y, that s(t) = s(t′) (we
could use induction to show this more rigorously). If ϕ = t1 ≈ t2 (for terms
t1 and t2), then
|=S ϕ[s] iff s(t1) = s(t2) iff
s(t′1) = s(t
′
2) iff |=S t′1 ≈ t′2[s]
and our result holds. The case for ϕ = Pt1t2 · · · tn and ϕ′ = Pt′1t′2 · · · t′n is
very similar. We can complete the argument for all remaining cases for ϕ by
a simple induction argument.
Having now shown that all formulas in the various axiom groups are
valid, all that remains is to show that any generalization of any of these formu-
las must also be valid. Begin with the assumption that  ϕ for some formula
ϕ. Assume that S is a structure and s : V −→ U. Then |=S ϕ[sx|u] for all
u ∈ U since  ϕ. Thus, |=S ∀ϕ[s]. By definition of generalization then, and
by induction, any generalization of one of the logical axioms in the six groups
(which are each valid as shown above) will itself be valid. By definition of the
set of logical axioms then, the entire set of logical axioms is valid.
Now, our strategy for proving the Soundness Theorem will be as follows:
the theorems of Γ are generated via our rule of inference I from the set Γ∪Λ
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where Λ is the set of logical axioms. We can thus proceed by induction on the
set of wffs {ϕ|Γ ` ϕ implies Γ  ϕ}.
Proof: (Soundness Theorem for First-Order Logic) If ϕ is a
logical axiom, then  ϕ as shown in the previous lemma. So, of course Γ  ϕ.
If ϕ is in Γ, then of course Γ  ϕ by definition.
Suppose that ϕ = I(ψ, (ψ → ϕ) where we assume that we have al-
ready shown that the theorem holds for ψ and for (ψ → ϕ). So, assume that
S is a structure and s : V −→ U such that every member of Γ is satisfied in
S by s. We wish to show that |=S ϕ[s]. Now, |=S (ψ → ϕ)[s] and |=S ψ[s],
so that as we have argued in many previous results, |=S ϕ[s] as desired.
Recall that a set of formulas Γ is said to be consistent if there is no
formula ϕ such that both ϕ and (¬ϕ) are deducible from Γ.
Definition 6.3 The set of formulas Γ is said to be satisfiable if there is some
structure S and some s : V −→ U such that every member of Γ is satisfied in
S by s.
Corollary 6.3.1 If Γ is satisfiable, then Γ is consistent.
Proof: The proof is accomplished by contraposition. Suppose Γ is
inconsistent. Then by definition there is a formula ϕ such that both Γ ` ϕ
and Γ ` (¬ϕ). By soundness, we have that Γ  ϕ and that Γ  (¬ϕ). So, if
Γ were satisfiable, for some structure S and some s : V −→ U, we would have
every member of Γ satisfied in S by s. But then, we must have
|=S ϕ[s] and |=S (¬ϕ)[s]
. However, this is impossible since
|=S (¬ϕ)[s] iff /|=S ϕ[s].
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So in fact, Γ is not satisfiable, and by contraposition, the corollary holds.
Corollary 6.3.2 There is an alphabetic variant of ϕ , ϕ′ such that ϕ and ϕ′
are logically equivalent.
Proof: By Theorem 5.22, there is an alphabetic variant ϕ′ of ϕ such
that ϕ ` ϕ′ and ϕ′ ` ϕ. By soundness, ϕ  ϕ′ and ϕ′  ϕ.
This corollary reflects are intuition that if a certain set of statements
can be modeled by a real structure (in the real world), then that real structure
must have no contradictions in it.
Having addressed soundness, we now examine its corollary, complete-
ness.
6.2 Completeness
Soundness essentially says that if you have a proof of a statement,
then that statement must be true. On the other hand, completeness says that
any fact that is true given a set of assumptions must have a proof. These
nuances of this theorem may not be readily apparent since the way we know
something is true in mathematics is through a proof (soundness). Examining
a statement that is not known to be true but is believed to be true will clarify
what completeness means.
Example 6.4 Goldbach’s Conjecture is a well-known open question in num-
ber theory. It states that every even integer greater than 2 can be written as the
sum of two prime numbers. Without going into the gory details, this statement
could be expressed in our formal language that we have been using for number
theory. To date, there is no proof for this statement but a great amount of
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empirical evidence indicating that it is probably true (of course one counterex-
ample would show that it is in general, false). So, what soundness says is that
if we let Γ be a set of axioms from which we are attempting to prove statements
of number theory, expressed in the formal language, if Goldbach’s Conjecture
is logically implied by our set of axioms (Γ  ϕ where ϕ is Goldbach’s Con-
jecture expressed in the formal language), then completeness says that there
must be a proof (formally, a deduction) of Goldbach’s Conjecture from our
set of axioms. Thus, since there is a great amount of empirical evidence that
Goldbach’s Conjecture is true, there is hope, given the Completeness Theo-
rem we are about to show, that there is in fact a day when a formal proof for
Goldbach’s conjecture will be found.
We now state two versions of the Completeness Theorem.
Theorem 6.5 (Completeness Theorem (Version 1))
If Γ  ϕ, then Γ ` ϕ.
Theorem 6.6 (Completeness Theorem (Version 2)) Any consistent set
of formulas is satisfiable.
The method of our proof will be to first show that the two versions are
equivalent and then we will give a proof of Version 2.
Theorem 6.7 The two versions of the Completeness Theorem are equivalent.
Proof: Assume Version 1 holds and let Γ be a consistent set of
formulas. Note that the implication “If γ ∈ ∅, then |=S γ[s],” is true for every
structure S and every s : V −→ U. Now, it is not the case that both
|=S ϕ[s] and |=S (¬ϕ)[s]
159
for any formula ϕ by Definition 4.30. By the contrapositive of the soundness
theorem, it is not the case that both ` ϕ and ` (¬ϕ), so that ∅ is a consistent.
However, by the true implication mentioned above, ∅ is satisfiable by every
structure S and every s : V −→ U.
Suppose Γ is a consistent set. We have just taken care of the case when
Γ = ∅. Suppose now that Γ 6= ∅. So, there is γ0 ∈ Γ. Since Γ is consistent,
it is not the case that both Γ ` γ0 and Γ ` (¬γ0). By the contrapositive of
our hypothesis, either Γ 2 γ0 or Γ 2 (¬γ0). The former case is not possible
by soundness and the fact that Γ ` γ0 since γ0 ∈ Γ. So, it must be the case
that Γ 2 (¬γ0). By definition, there is a structure S and a s : V −→ U such
that every member of Γ is satisfied by s in S, but such that /|=S (¬γ0)[s].
The important piece here is that we have found a structure and a function on
the variables within that structure that satisfies Γ, and we have shown that
Version 2 holds if Version 1 holds.
Assume now that Version 2 holds. Assume that Γ  ϕ for a set of
formulas Γ∪{ϕ}. Now either Γ is consistent or Γ is inconsistent. If Γ is incon-
sistent, then by Theorem 5.17, Γ ` ϕ. Suppose now that Γ is consistent. Note
that by Theorem 5.16, if Γ∪{(¬ϕ)} is inconsistent, then Γ ` (¬(¬ϕ)). This
is a proof by contradiction at the formal level. Suppose by way of contradiction
(at the meta-level) that Γ ∪ {(¬ϕ)} is a consistent set of formulas. Then by
our assumption that Version 2 holds, there is a structure S and s : V −→ U
such that S satisfies every member of Γ ∪ {(¬ϕ)} with s. That is, S sat-
isfies every member of Γ with s and |=S (¬ϕ)[s]. However, this situation is
impossible by our assumption that Γ  ϕ which would imply that |=S ϕ[s].
Hence, in fact Γ ∪ {(¬ϕ)} is an inconsistent set, and we can conclude that
Γ ` (¬(¬ϕ)). Since ((¬(¬ϕ))→ ϕ) is a tautology, we may say that Γ ` ϕ
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by our rule of inference. Thus, Version 2 implies Version 1 and the two versions
of completeness are equivalent.
We now prove Version 2 of the Completeness Theorem.
Proof: (Version 2 of the Completeness Theorem) This proof is
involved and so it is organized by headings indicating the purpose behind each
section of the proof.
Let Γ be a consistent set of wffs in the language at hand.
Step 1: Enriching the Language with Constants
Create a new first-order language by using every symbol in the language in
which Γ is consistent and then add to this language a countably infinite number
of new distinct constant symbols. For instance, if c0, c1, . . . is an enumeration
of the countably many constant symbols in the old language, we add the
constant symbols c−1, c−2, . . . to our language recognizing them as all distinct
from our original list of constants and distinct from each other. After this
enrichment, it is clear that Γ is still a set of formulas in this language. We
also wish to show that Γ is still a consistent set in this enriched language.
Suppose Γ is inconsistent in this language. Then there is a formula in
the new language χ such that Γ ` χ and Γ ` (¬χ). Only finitely many of the
new constants are involved in each deduction. So, by repeated application of
5.18.1, we may replace any new constants used in the deductions from Γ of χ
and (¬χ) with variables, and we may do this so that Γ ` χ′ and Γ ` (¬χ′)
where χ′ is χ where any instances of new constants have been replaced by
variables. Since we have the exact same variables as in the original language,
χ′ and (¬χ′) are formulas in our original language. But since Γ is consistent
in the old language, it is impossible that we have Γ ` χ′ and Γ ` (¬χ′). So,
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what we supposed is false and Γ is consistent in the enriched language.
Step 2: Accounting for Counterexamples to All Possible Formulas
Since we are dealing with a countable language, we may enumerate all variables
in the enriched language and also all formulas. Thus, we may form the pairings
(v1,ϕ1), (v2,ϕ2), . . . . We now let
θ1 = ((¬∀v1ϕ1)→ (¬ϕ1v1|d1))
where d1 is the first of the new constant symbols not occurring in ϕ1. By
recursion, we may define
θn = ((¬∀vnϕn)→ (¬ϕnvn|dn))
where dn is the first of the new constant symbols not occurring in ϕn or in
θk for any k < n. The idea behind including all of these formulas is that each
formula provides the structure necessary to account for a counterexample to
ϕi if there is one in some structure S. That is, if /|=S ∀viϕi[s] for some
structure S and some s : V −→ U, then this will be true if and only if there is
u ∈ U such that /|=S ϕi[svi|u]. This is so iff u ∈ U such that |=S (¬ϕi)[svi|u].
As long as s(di) = d
S
i = u, then by the Substitution Lemma,
|=S (¬ϕi)[svi|u] iff |=S (¬ϕivi|ci)[s].
Now, let Θ = {θ1,θ2, . . .}. We want to show that Γ ∪ Θ is consistent.
Suppose not. Then because deductions are finite, for some m ≥ 0, Γ ∪ Θm+1
is inconsistent where Θm+1 = {θ1,θ2, . . . ,θm,θm+1}. Take the least such m.
By Theorem 5.16, Γ ∪ Θm ` (¬θm+1) (if m = 0, we define Θm = ∅). Note
that θm+1 = ((¬∀xϕ)→ (¬ϕx|d)) for some variable x, some formula ϕ in
the enriched language, and some constant d that does not occur in ϕ nor an
any θk for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Now, (¬θm+1) tautologically implies the formulas
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(¬∀xϕ) and ϕx|d since if (¬θm+1) is true, θm+1 is false and this is so if and
only if (¬∀xϕ) and ϕx|d are true. By Rule T, we have that
Γ ∪Θm ` (¬∀xϕ) and
Γ ∪Θm ` ϕx|d.
By Corollary 5.18.2, since d does not occur in ϕ nor in any formula in
Γ ∪ Θm, we have Γ ∪ Θm ` ∀xϕ so that we have both this deduction and
Γ∪Θm ` (¬∀xϕ). But then Γ∪Θm must be an inconsistent set by definition,
which contradicts the leastness of m if m ≥ 1 or the consistency of Γ if m = 0
(Θm = ∅ in this case). Thus, we must have that the set Γ ∪Θ is consistent.
Step 3: Extending Γ ∪Θ to a Maximal Consistent Set
Since Γ ∪ Θ is a consistent set, there is no formula χ such that Γ ∪ Θ ` χ
and Γ ∪ Θ ` (¬χ). So, by Theorem 5.6, there is no formula χ such that
Γ ∪ Θ ∪ Λ tautologically implies both χ and (¬χ). Thus, for every formula
χ in the language, there is a truth assignment v on the set of prime formulas
such that v satisfies every member of Γ∪Θ∪Λ but such that either v(χ) = F
or v((¬χ)) = F . The important piece here is that there is a truth assignment
v that satisfies every member of Γ∪Θ∪Λ. Given this truth assignment, define
the following set:
∆ = {ϕ : v(ϕ) = T}.
Clearly Γ ∪ Θ ∪ Λ ⊆ ∆ since v satisfies every member of Γ ∪ Θ ∪ Λ. Now,
take any formula of the language ψ. Either v(ψ) = T or v(ψ) = F (which is
equivalent to v((¬ψ)) = T ). So, either ψ ∈ ∆ or (¬ψ) ∈ ∆, but not both,
for every formula ψ in our enriched language.
All that remains to be shown for this step is that ∆ is a consistent set of
formulas. Suppose by way of contradiction that ∆ ` χ and ∆ ` (¬χ) for some
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formula χ of the language. Since Λ ⊆ ∆, we may say that by Theorem 5.6
that ∆ tautologically implies both χ and (¬χ). Since the truth assignment v
satisfies every member of ∆, it must satisfy both χ and (¬χ), an impossibility.
Thus, ∆ must be a consistent set.
We can demonstrate as well that ∆ is deductively closed. Suppose
∆ ` ϕ. Then by the consistency of ∆, ∆ 0 (¬ϕ). By Theorem 5.6, ∆ does
not tautologically imply (¬ϕ). Now, the truth assignment v that defines ∆ of
course satisfies ∆. Thus, v((¬ϕ)) = F since ∆ does not tautologically imply
(¬ϕ). Thus, (¬ϕ) /∈ ∆ by the definition of ∆. Since either ϕ or (¬ϕ) is ∆,
we must have ϕ ∈ ∆, and hence, ∆ is deductively closed.
Step 4: Constructing a Preliminary Structure for Satisfaction
Refer the languages we have been discussing as follows: let L0 represent the
original language (in which Γ is consistent) and let L1 represent the enriched
language after adding all of the additional constant symbols. Now, let L′1 be
the language that is the same as L1 but where all instances of ≈ (if there
are any) are replaced by a two place predicate symbol E. We now define a
structure A for L′1 as follows:
A(∀) = TL1 where this is the set of all terms for the language L1,
A(P ) = PA = {(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ T nL1 : Pt1t2 · · · tn ∈ ∆}
where P is an n-place predicate symbol and P 6= E,
A(E) = EA = {(t1, t2) ∈ T 2L1 : t1 ≈ t2 ∈ ∆},
A(f) = fA where fA(t1, t2, . . . , tn) = ft1t2 · · · tn
for each n-place function symbol f , and
cA = c for a constant symbol c.
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Now define s : VL′1 −→ TL1 by s(v) = v. A straightforward induction
argument will show that s(t) = t for any term t since TL′1 = TL1 . This
structure and this function will be our foundation for satisfying the members
of Γ. Denote the formula in L′1 obtained from the formula ϕ in L1 by replacing
all instances of ≈ with E in ϕ∗. We wish to demonstrate that
|=A ϕ∗[s] iff ϕ ∈ ∆.
The argument is by induction, but the induction is standard natural number
induction on the total number of connectives and quantifier symbols occurring
in a formula ϕ in the language L1.
First, we demonstrate that all formulas having no quantifiers and no
connective symbols fulfill the above statement. In L1, the set of all such
formulas is precisely the atomic formulas. For the atomic formula t1 ≈ t2 we
have that (t1 ≈ t2)∗ = t1Et2, and
|=A t1Et2[s] iff (s(t1), s(t2)) = (t1, t2) ∈ EA iff
t1 ≈ t2 ∈ ∆,
and the statement holds. If P is an n-place predicate symbol where P 6= E,
then (Pt1t2 · · · tn)∗ = Pt1t2 · · · tn, and
|=A Pt1t2 · · · tn[s] iff (s(t1), s(t2), . . . , s(tn)) = (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ PA iff
Pt1t2 · · · tn ∈ ∆,
and again, the statement holds.
For our inductive step, we assume that the statement holds for any ϕ
in L1 having a total of N quantifier and connective symbols or less. A formula
with a total number of N + 1 connective and quantifier symbols will take one
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of three forms: (¬ψ), (ψ → χ), or ∀xψ where ψ and χ will have a total
number of N or fewer connective and quantifier symbols. The cases of negation
and implication are fairly straightforward to show and are left to the reader.
We proceed to show that
|=A ∀xϕ∗[s] iff ∀xϕ ∈ ∆
(note that (∀xϕ)∗ = ∀xϕ∗) where ∀xϕ has a total number of N+1 connective
and quantifier symbols.
For the first direction, note that θ = ((¬∀xϕ→ (¬ϕx|c)) for a con-
stant symbol c that does not occur in ϕ. Assume that |=A ∀xϕ∗[s]. This
statement implies that |=A ϕ∗[sx|c] (note that c = cA). Since c does not occur
in ϕ, c is substitutable for x in ϕ∗ and by the Substitution Lemma,
|=A ϕ∗[sx|c] iff |=A (ϕ∗)x|c[s] iff
|=A ϕx|c∗[s]
since in ϕ∗, the only symbol modified is the ≈ symbol and no variables or
constants are modified. Hence, (ϕ∗)x|c = ϕx|c∗. Now, ϕ must have N con-
nective and quantifier symbols occurring in it since ∀xϕ is assumed to have
N + 1 connective and quantifier symbols occurring in it. Thus, ϕx|c also has
N connective and quantifier symbols occurring in it, and by our inductive
hypothesis,
|=A ϕx|c∗[s] iff ϕx|c ∈ ∆.
Thus, (¬ϕx|c) /∈ ∆, by the maximality of ∆. Now if (¬∀xϕ) ∈ ∆, since
θ = ((¬∀xϕ→ (¬ϕx|c)) ∈ ∆, we would have ∆ ` (¬ϕx|c), and since ∆ is
deductively closed, (¬ϕx|c) ∈ ∆, a contradiction. Thus, (¬∀xϕ) /∈ ∆. By
the maximality of ∆, ∀xϕ ∈ ∆. We have thus shown one direction of the
equivalence.
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For the other direction, assume /|=A ∀xϕ∗[s]. Then, there is a term
t in the language L1 such that /|=A ϕ∗[sx|t] (note that a generic element in
the universe of A is a term in L1). Now, we are not guaranteed that t is
substitutable for x in ϕ∗, and so we cannot apply the Substitution Lemma as
we would like. However, by Theorem 6.3.2, there is an alphabetic variant of
ϕ∗, say ψ∗, in L′1 such that the term t is substitutable for x in ψ∗, and the
two formulas are logically equivalent. So, since
/|=A ϕ∗[sx|t], we have that /|=A ψ∗[sx|t].
By the Substitution lemma and since (ϕ∗)x|t = ϕx|t∗, we have /|=A ψx|t∗[s].
Note that ψ will be an alphabetic variant of ϕ where ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` ϕ, and
these formulas will have the same number of quantifier and connective symbols.
Thus, since we have assumed that ∀xϕ has a total of N + 1 quantifier and
connective symbols, bothϕx|t andψx|t will have a total number ofN quantifier
and connective symbols. Thus, by our induction hypothesis since
/|=A ψx|t∗[s],
we have that ψx|t /∈ ∆. Now, (∀xψ → ψx|t) ∈ Λ ⊆ ∆ so that ∀xψ /∈ ∆,
otherwise ∆ ` ψx|t and ψx|t ∈ ∆ since ∆ is deductively closed. Since ϕ `
ψ, by the Deduction Theorem, this is equivalent to ` (ϕ→ ψ). By the
Generalization Theorem, this implies that ` ∀x(ϕ→ ψ), and this implies
` (∀xϕ→ ∀xψ) by axiom group 3. By the Deduction Theorem, this is
equivalent to ∀xϕ ` ∀xψ. Thus, ∀xϕ /∈ ∆, otherwise ∀xψ ∈ ∆. We thus
have
/|=A ∀xϕ∗[s] implies ∀xϕ /∈ ∆
. We have thus proven the equivalence,
|=A ∀xϕ∗[s] iff ∀xϕ ∈ ∆.
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This concludes our induction argument, and we can say that for any wff ϕ in
L1,
|=A ϕ∗[s] iff ϕ ∈ ∆.
Now, if L1 does not include the symbol ≈, then we are done, for then
ϕ∗ = ϕ, and if we restrict ourselves to the language L0, the structure A and
the function s satisfy the set Γ. However, suppose that for constant symbols
c and d that c ≈ d ∈ Γ, then our structure A does not satisfy this wff since
the structure A is a function for L′1 and not L1. However, our work with A
has not been for naught. Given our structure A for L′1, we will create what we
will call the quotient structure A/E, to be defined rigorously in what follows.
Step 5: Constructing the Quotient Structure for Satisfaction
Recall that we obtained the language L′1 from the language L1 by replacing the
symbol≈ with the binary predicate symbol E. Given our structure A, EA will
be a binary relation on the terms of L1 (the universe of A). We demonstrate
that EA is an equivalence relation on TL1 . This should seem intuitively clear
given that t1E
At2 iff t1 ≈ t2 ∈ ∆. Essentially, Theorem 5.19 demonstrates
that EA is an equivalence relation. we demonstrate the reflexivity of EA,
leaving symmetry and transitivity to the reader.
By Theorem 5.19(i), ∆ ` ∀x(x ≈ x). We have the logical axiom
(∀xx ≈ x→ t ≈ t) for any term t since any term t is substitutable for x in
x ≈ x. Hence, ∆ ` t ≈ t for every term t in L1. Hence, t ≈ t ∈ ∆. Hence,
tEAt for every term t in L1. Thus, EA is reflexive. Symmetry and transitivity
follow by similar arguments.
We can say a bit more. For each n-place predicate symbol P , if
(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ PA and tiEAt′i for every i ≤ n, then (t′1, t′2, . . . , t′n) ∈ PA. By
168
Theorem 5.20, and by the use of axiom group 2 (and perhaps some alphabetic
variants), we have that
∆ `
t1 ≈ t′1 → t2 ≈ t′2 → · · · →
tn ≈ t′n → Pt1t2 · · · tn → Pt′1t′2 · · · t′n = δ
.
Since ∆ is deductively closed, we have that δ ∈ ∆. By what we showed in
step 4, our last statement is equivalent to |=A δ∗[s]. By repeated application
of Definition 4.22(iv) and the assumptions that tiE
At′i for every i ≤ n and
(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ PA, we have that |=A Pt′1t′2 · · · t′n[s]. Again by Definition
4.22, we have (t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
n) ∈ PA. By similar reasoning and using Theorem
5.21, we also have for each n-place function symbol f and for tiE
At′i for each
i ≤ n,
fA(t1, t2, . . . , tn)E
AfA(t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
n).
We are now in position to define the structure that we want. Let
[t] designate the equivalence class for t in TL1 determined by EA. We will
designate our structure by the symbol A/E, and the universe of this structure
will be TL1/EA (the universe of A modulo the equivalence relation EA). We
define for each n-place predicate symbol P and each n-place function symbol
f the following:
([t1], [t2], . . . , [tn]) ∈ PA/E iff (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ PA and
fA/E([t1], [t2], . . . , [tn]) = [f
A(t1, t2, . . . , tn)].
These relations and functions are well defined given our results above. Also
for the structure A/E we define cA/E = [cA].
Now let h : TL1 −→ TL1/EA be defined by h(t) = [t]. By our results
above, h will be a homomorphism of A onto A/E. Note that the symbol ≈
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does not occur in any formula in L′1. So, by the Homomorphism Theorem,
|=A ϕ∗[s] iff |=A/E ϕ∗[h ◦ s].
Now, A/E is a structure for the language L′1 not L1. We require a structure
for L1. The structure that we require will be identical to A/E except that our
new structure will assign ≈ to EA/E instead of the symbol E being assigned
to this relation. This assignment is justified since for t1, t2 ∈ TL1 ,
[t1]E
A/E[t2] iff t1E
At2
iff [t1] = [t2].
This says that EA/E is equality in TL1/EA. Call our new structure (A/E)].
We wish to show that
|=A/E ϕ∗[h ◦ s] iff |=(A/E)] ϕ[h ◦ s].
It will be sufficient to demonstrate that for t1, t2 ∈ TL1 ,
|=A/E t1Et2[h ◦ s] iff |=(A/E)] t1 ≈ t2[h ◦ s].
Now,
|=A/E t1Et2[h ◦ s] iff h ◦ s(t1)EA/Eh ◦ s(t2) iff
h ◦ s(t1) = h ◦ s(t2) iff |=(A/E)] t1 ≈ t2[h ◦ s].
Thus, we have
ϕ ∈ ∆ iff |=A ϕ∗[s] iff |=A/E ϕ∗[h ◦ s] iff |=(A/E)] ϕ[h ◦ s].
Hence, (A/E)] is a structure for the language L1 satisfying every member of
∆ with h ◦ s, and hence also satisfying Γ. If we restrict the structure (A/E)]
to be a function on L0, it is clear that this structure will satisfy every member
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of Γ with h ◦ s. Hence, Γ being consistent implies that Γ is satisfiable, and the
Completeness Theorem is proved.
As a historical note, Go¨del, of incompleteness fame, proved a version of
the completeness theorem for his doctoral dissertation in 1930, although the
proof given here is different from Go¨del’s proof.
Having proved soundness and completeness, we now prove one more
powerful result before discussing what we have proved.
6.3 Compactness
Like with our sentential model for logic, we have a compactness theo-
rem for first-order logic.
Theorem 6.8 (Compactness Theorem for First-Order Logic)
(i) If Γ  ϕ, then for some finite set Γf ⊆ Γ, we have Γf  ϕ.
(ii) If every finite subset of Γ is satisfiable, then Γ is satisfiable.
In fact, items (i) and (ii) are equivalent, but we do not prove this here.
We instead prove each version.
Proof: For item (i), by completeness we have that Γ ` ϕ. Since
deductions are finite, we may find Γf , a finite subset of Γ such that Γf ` ϕ.
By Completeness, we have that Γf  ϕ.
For item (ii), suppose by way of contradiction that Γ is not satisfiable.
By the contrapositive of the Completeness Theorem, Γ cannot be a consistent
set, that is, there is a formula ϕ such that Γ ` ϕ and Γ ` (¬ϕ). Since
deductions are finite, we my find finite Γf ⊆ Γ such that Γf ` ϕ and Γf `
(¬ϕ). By soundness, we must have Γf  ϕ and
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Γf  (¬ϕ). Since every finite subset of Γ is assumed to be satisfiable, there is
a structure S and a function s : V −→ U such that S satisfies every member
of Γf with s. Hence we must also have
|=S ϕ[s] and |=S (¬ϕ)[s].
However, this is impossible, and we conclude that Γ must in fact be satisfiable.
Corollary 6.8.1 A set Σ of sentences has a model if and only if every finite
subset has a model.
Proof: It is clear that if Σ has a model, that every finite subset
will have a model. If every finite subset has a model, by the Compactness
Theorem, then Σ itself will have a model.
Much like the Compactness Theorem for sentential logic, this theorem
indicates that if we have a set of formulas that logically implies another for-
mula, we only need finitely many formulas from that set to show this logical
implication. Notice in the proof of the Compactness Theorem that the finite
property came from the finite nature of formal deductions.
The corollary is quite interesting, for it allows us to show some powerful
results about models quite simply.
Corollary 6.8.2 If a set Σ of sentences has arbitrarily large finite models,
then it has an infinite model
Proof: For each integer k ≥ 2, there is a sentence λk that will
translate via any structure that there are at least k things in the universe. For
instance,
λ2 = ∃v1∃v2v1 /≈ v2
λ3 = ∃v1∃v2∃v3(v1 /≈ v2 ∧ v2 /≈ v3 ∧ v1 /≈ v3)
172
Consider now the set Σ ∪ {λ2,λ3, . . .}. Since Σ has arbitrarily large mod-
els, every finite subset of Σ ∪ {λ2,λ3, . . .} will be satisfiable (there will be
arbitrarily large universes available to satisfy the λ’s). So, by compactness,
Σ∪{λ2,λ3, . . .} has a model, and the universe of this model must be infinite.
Example 6.9 Take the set of sentences that formalize the group axioms. This
set has arbitrarily large finite models, since for every positive integer n, Zn is
a group. Hence there must be an infinite model of the group axioms by this last
corollary. This fact we already know,(Z with + is an example), but notice that
our knowledge coming from the perspective of the corollary, comes not from the
demonstration of the existence of such a group directly, but indirectly through
the general property of the Compactness Theorem.
The Compactness Theorem is also a powerful result to show the exis-
tence of “non-standard” models of things like arithmetic and analysis.
Our work in this chapter has given us powerful results and insights
concerning first-order logical statements. Recall that we are using first-order
logic as a model for the deductive thought processes that we reasoners carry
out in the real world. Let us consider what indications about real-world meta-
level reasoning our results have given us. The Soundness Theorem indicates
that if we have a proof of a statement given an assumed set of premises,
then we will be guaranteed the truth of the proven statement as long as the
premises are indeed true. So, for instance, if we formalize the physical laws of
the universe that we believe, given scientific measurement and testing, to be
true and from the formalization of these laws we are able to deduce the formal
statement of the existence of black holes, then by Soundness we should expect
the existence of black holes even if one has never been observed. So, perhaps
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from soundness we should be encouraged to continue scientific observation and
exploration. Of course, if we find data that contradicts or seems to contradict
what we have reasoned through formally, we do not throw out the soundness
theorem since this a logical result of our model of logic. What we would do
as scientists would be to adjust our set of assumed sentences. In other words,
our inherent assumptions are wrong and need to be adjusted.
As indicated with the example of Goldbach’s Conjecture, the Com-
pleteness Theorem indicates that if we have copious amounts of evidence that
in any model of a set of assumed statements, another result also holds, we
would expect that there should be a finite formal proof demonstrating the
result formally from the set of formal statements that represent our set of
assumptions.
Compactness indicates that if a set of statements logically imply a
statement, then we only need finitely many statements to demonstrate that
implication. Understanding these powerful results paves the way to under-
standing Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
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Chapter 7
Models, Theories, and Models
of Theories
Having rigorously developed first-order logic, first-order deductions,
and the powerful results of soundness, completeness, and compactness, we dis-
cuss in more depth first-order models and develop definitions and concepts
dealing with models that will be necessary in the discussion of Go¨del’s Incom-
pleteness Theorem.
7.1 Classes of Models
We begin first with a set of first-order sentences Σ. It is helpful at this
point to recall Definition 4.32, and remember that a sentence σ is said to be
true in a structure S for a particular language if |=S σ (in this case |=S σ[s]
for every s : V → U), and we also say that S models σ.
Definition 7.1 For the set of first-order sentences Σ, Mod Σ is the class of
all models of Σ, that is, the class of all structures for which every member
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of Σ is true.
As long as there is at least one structure in Mod Σ, this collection will
be too large to be a set. The inherent reason for this is that structures are
defined to be functions, and the collection of all functions on a particular set
is too large to be a set.
Example 7.2 Let Σ be the set of first-order sentences that are intended to
translate the group axioms. Then Mod Σ will be the collection of all groups
which is a class.
Definition 7.3 A class K of structures is elementary (EC) if and only if
K =Mod σ for some sentence σ. A class K is elementary in the wider
sense (EC∆) if K =Mod Σ where Σ is a set of sentences.
Of course, any class of structures that is EC must also be EC∆.
Example 7.4 The class of structures for all groups must be EC (an elemen-
tary class) since the group axioms could be represented as a single formula that
is the conjunction of all of the group axiom formulas.
Corollary 7.4.1 (to Corollary 6.8.2) The class of all finite structures for
a fixed language is not EC∆. The class of all infinite structures is not EC.
However, the class of all infinite structures is EC∆.
Proof: Suppose there was a set of sentences Σ such that Mod Σ is
exactly the set of all finite structures for a fixed language. Since there will be
arbitrarily large finite models of the sentence Σ, by Corollary 6.8.2 Σ will also
have an infinite model which will be in Mod Σ by definition, a contradiction.
So, the first statement holds.
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Suppose that there was a sentence σ such that the class of all infinite
models is Mod σ. Essentially, σ has the necessary form to support the state-
ment “This a structure for the particular language at hand, and the structure
is infinite.” (¬σ) will support the statement “This is not a structure for the
particular language at hand or the structure is finite.” Since Mod (¬σ) is by
definition the class of all structures of the language satisfying (¬σ),
Mod (¬σ) must in fact be all finite structures of the language, but as we
showed above, an infinite model would have to be in this class, a contradic-
tion. Hence, the set of all infinite structures of a language is not EC.
That the class of all infinite structures is in fact EC∆ is true because
this will be exactly Mod {λ2,λ3, . . .} where the λi’s are as in Corollary 6.8.2,
expressing that there are at least i elements.
Example 7.5 There is no set of sentences Σ such that Mod Σ is the set of all
finite groups. However, the class of all infinite groups will be Mod {σ,λ2,λ3, . . .}
where σ is the conjunction of all of the group axioms.
Now that we have a way to refer to all of the models of a set of sentences
we are in a position to discuss theories
7.2 Theories
First a definition.
Definition 7.6 For a fixed language, a theory is a set of sentences closed
under logical implication. That is, a set of sentences in the language, T , is a
theory if for any sentence σ in the language T  σ implies that σ ∈ T .
This definition of theory matches our intuition. As mathematicians,
when we talk of the “Theory of Groups,” or the “Theory of Rings,” or “Number
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Theory,” we mean the set of all statements (sentences) true of Groups, Rings,
or Arithmetic. If we are working in the context of a theory, T , and are able to
demonstrate a proof of a statement τ (T ` τ , that is, τ is a theorem of T ),
then we know by soundness that τ is true of our theory (T  τ ), and hence
we can include τ as a part of the theory (τ ∈ T ).
Example 7.7 The set of valid sentences for a fixed language is a theory. Re-
call that a sentence σ will be valid if  σ. Let V be the set of valid sentences,
and suppose that V  σ for some sentence σ. Note that since all of members
of V are valid, every structure S and s : V −→ U for the language, will satisfy
every member of V . Since we are assuming that V  σ every structure S and
function s : V −→ U will also satisfy σ. Hence, σ is also a valid sentence,
and σ ∈ V .
The set of all sentences in a fixed language is a theory. Denote the set
by S. Since σ ∈ S is always true. The implication “S  σ implies σ ∈ S” is
also always true, so that S is a theory. However, there are no models for this
theory since S is unsatisfiable since it contains both σ and (¬σ).
Now, take a class of structures K for a fixed language. Define
Th K = {σ ∈ S : σ is true in every member of K}
Theorem 7.8 Th K is a theory.
Proof: Suppose that Th K  σ for some sentence σ of the language.
Let S be a structure in K. Then since S models Th K by definition, we must
also have |=S σ since Th K  σ. But then, σ is true of S, and since our
choice for S in K was arbitrary, σ will be true for every structure in the class
K. Hence σ ∈ Th K by definition, and Th K is indeed a theory.
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This theorem justifies us referring to the set Th K as the theory of the
class K.
Example 7.9 Let G be the class of all groups, R the class of all rings, and W
the class of all sets. Then Th G, Th R, and Th W are the theories of groups,
rings, and sets respectively. Note that our language might need to change. For
instance for the theory of groups, we could use the parameters ∀, e, ∗, whereas
for the theory of rings we could use a language with parameters ∀, 0, 1, +,
and ·.
Now that we have a way to refer to formal theories, we define another
set.
Definition 7.10 The set of consequences of Σ is the following set of sen-
tences:
Cn Σ = {σ : Σ  σ}.
Of course the set of consequences is the set of all formulas that Σ
logically implies. Also, we have Σ ⊆ Cn Σ. We can say even more.
Theorem 7.11 Cn Σ = Th Mod Σ
Proof: Mod Σ is the class of all models of Σ. So, Th Mod Σ is exactly
the set of sentences true about all models of the set of sentences Σ. Suppose
σ ∈ Cn Σ, then Σ  σ. So every model of Σ must also model σ. Hence,
σ ∈ Th Mod Σ.
Now suppose that σ ∈ Th Mod Σ. Then σ is true of every model of
Σ, that is, if a structure models Σ, it will also model σ as well. Hence, Σ  σ,
and σ ∈ Cn Σ.
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What this theorem says is that the set of consequences of a set of
sentences is exactly the set of sentences true in every model of Σ. This theorem
in fact justifies the axiomatic treatment of mathematical theories. Intuitively,
the axioms (Σ) of a particular mathematical theory are a set of sentences
assumed to be true without proof. Mathematical work within that theory
then entails finding the consequences of the assumed set of axioms. This work
entails demonstrating proofs of new theorems (Σ ` τ ) which by the soundness
and compactness theorems will be equivalent to demonstrating a new truth
of that theory (Σ  τ ). The collection of all such possible truths that are
demonstrable (Cn Σ) is exactly the entire theory that we are working with
(Th Mod Σ). Of course, we want our set of axioms for our theory to have an
important property.
Definition 7.12 A theory T is axiomatizable if there is a decidable (in
the sense of Section 3.3) set of sentences Σ such that T = Cn Σ. A theory
is finitely axiomatizable if there is a finite set of sentences Σ such that
T = Cn Σ (equivalently if there is a single sentence σ such that T = Cn {σ}
since we could take σ to be the conjunction of all the members of Σ).
Theorem 7.13 If the theory Cn Σ is finitely axiomatizable, then there is a
finite Σf ⊆ Σ such that Cn Σf = Cn Σ.
Proof: By definition, there is a sentence σ such that Cn Σ = Cn {σ}.
Now, σ may not be in Σ, but of course Σ  σ. By the Compactness Theorem,
there is finite Σf ⊆ Σ such that Σf  σ. Thus, we have
Cn {σ} ⊆ Cn Σf ⊆ Cn Σ = Cn {σ}
so that “⊆” may be replaced with “=”.
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Example 7.14 Group theory is a finitely axiomatizable theory. Let G be
the set of formal sentences for the group axioms (see Example 4.5). Then
Th G = Cn G. The theory of infinite groups is axiomatizable but not finitely
axiomatizable. Let G∞ be the subclass of G containing only the infinite models
of G. Then Th G∞ = Cn G ∪ {λ2,λ3, . . .} where the λi’s are as in Corollary
6.8.2.
Number theory will of course be axiomatizable since it is built on the
Peano axioms which can be expressed formally as first-order logical statements.
We will discuss this theory in more depth in the next chapter as a set up for
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
We make one more definition before leaving this section.
Definition 7.15 A subtheory of a theory T is a set of sentences S such that
S ⊆ T and S is theory in its own right.
Theorem 7.16 Let K1 and K2 be two classes of structures for the same fixed
language such that K1 is a subclass of K2. Then Th K2 is a subtheory of Th K1.
Proof: Th K2 is already a theory. Let σ ∈ Th K2. By the definition
of Th K2, every member of K2 models σ. Since K1 is a subclass of K2, we must
have that every member of K1 models σ. Hence σ ∈ Th K1 by definition, and
we must have that Th K2 ⊆ Th K1.
Theorem 7.17 Let Σ1 and Σ2 be two sets of sentences in the fixed language
where Σ1 ⊆ Σ2. Then Cn Σ1 is a subtheory of Cn Σ2.
Proof: Cn Σ1 and Cn Σ2 are both theories by Theorem 7.11. Let
σ ∈ Cn Σ1. Then, by definition, Σ1  σ. Clearly then, Σ2 ` σ since Σ1 ⊆ Σ2.
Hence, σ ∈ Cn Σ2, and we have that Cn Σ1 ⊆ Cn Σ2.
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Example 7.18 From the last example, we see that by the two theorems we
have just stated, and proved, Th G = Cn G ⊆ Th G∞ = Cn G ∪ {λ2,λ3, . . .}.
Thus, the theory of groups is a subtheory of the theory of infinite groups. The
idea is that the theory of infinite groups has a richer structure than the theory
of groups.
As above, let F be the class of all fields. Note that the language used
to support field theory will be rich enough to support ring theory and group
theory. So, we can think of G as a subclass of R and of R as a subclass of F.
By Theorem 7.16, we have that Th F ⊆ Th R ⊆ Th G. Thus, the theory of
fields is a subtheory of both the theory of rings and of groups, and the theory
of rings is a subtheory of the theory of groups. These facts make sense since
we can think of a ring as a specific type of group and of a field as a specific
type of ring.
Before leaving this chapter, we discuss a very important concept for
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
7.3 Completeness
To discuss incompleteness, we must know what we mean by complete-
ness.
Definition 7.19 A complete theory T is a theory such that for every sen-
tence σ either σ ∈ T or (¬σ) ∈ T .
Intuitively, what this definition says is that when we have a complete
theory, we will be able to decide exactly what statements belong to T and
which do not. Now it is important at this point to notice that the completeness
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defined here is not the same as the completeness of the Completeness Theorem.
Recall that the Completeness Theorem (Version 1) stated that given a logical
implication of a wff (which may not be a sentence), there is a formal deduction
(proof) of that wff. However, the definition of complete theory discusses, not
the existence of deductions inherently but whether a a certain sentence or its
negation are in that theory.
Suppose we have a complete theory T , and take an arbitrary sentence
σ. By definition, of complete theory, we have that either σ ∈ T or (¬σ) ∈ T .
This implies that either T  σ or T  (¬σ). Since /|=S σ if and only if
|=S (¬σ), our last statement is equivalent to “either T  σ or T 2 σ. By the
Soundness and Completeness Theorems, we have that T ` σ or T 0 σ.
Now we attempt a converse argument to see where the definition of
complete theory will not, in general, be equivalent to the Soundness and Com-
pleteness Theorems. In other words, we use an attempted converse argument
to demonstrate that the definition of complete theory defines a new concept
different from those involved in the Soundness and Completeness Theorems.
Suppose T is a theory (not necessarily complete) and σ is an arbitrary
sentence in the first-order language in which we are dealing. If we can demon-
strate that T is a complete theory, then the completeness of the Completeness
Theorem and the completeness of having a complete theory are equivalent
concepts. “Either T ` σ or T 0 σ” is a tautology by Soundness and Com-
pleteness this implies that either T  σ or T 2 σ. Since T is a theory and
hence closed under logical implication (i.e. T  σ if and only if σ ∈ T ), our
last statement is equivalent to either σ ∈ T or σ /∈ T . However, σ /∈ T does
not necessarily imply that (¬σ) ∈ T . To see the breaking point, back up a
stage to the case when T 2 σ. By definition of logical implication, there is a
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structure S that models the set of sentences T but such that /|=S σ. Now,
/|=S σ is equivalent to |=S (¬σ), but we are only guaranteed that (¬σ) is
modelled by the structure S. To say that T  (¬σ) (and hence (¬σ) ∈ T )
every model of T (not just S) would have to model (¬σ)). However, it may
be the case that there is a model of T say, A such that /|=A (¬σ). This fact
would not contradict that information that we are given.
For instance, in the language that we have been using to support group
theory, the sentence
δ = ∀x∀y x ∗ y ≈ y ∗ x
formalizes the statement that a group is commutative (abelian). Of course we
know that Th G 2 δ since D3, the group of orientation preserving rotations
and flips of an equilateral triangle is a non-abelian group (rotating by 60◦
and then flipping will not be the same as flipping and then rotating by 60◦).
However, we also know that Th G 2 (¬δ) since Z2 × Z2 is a commutative
group. So, δ /∈ Th G and (¬δ) /∈ Th G, and the the theory of groups is
incomplete. We can see that this idea of a complete theory is a different
concept than the Completeness Theorem.
There are also powerful results that are sufficient to show when a model
is complete, but we do not discuss these in this thesis. The interested reader is
encouraged to consult A Mathematical Introduction to Logic by Enderton for a
more complete discussion of this topic. For an example of a complete theory, we
state the following theorem without proof. Recall that an algebraically closed
field is one that contains the roots of any polynomial with coefficients from
the field (e.g. C is an algebraically closed field by the Fundamental Theorem
of Algebra). A ring (of which a field is a special case) is of characteristic 0 if
there is no positive integer n for which n ·a = 0 for every element a in the ring
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([2] page 218).
Theorem 7.20 The theory of algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0 is
complete.
The language for this theory will be the language used to support fields
and will have the parameters ∀, ≈, M (a unary predicate symbol whose in-
tended translation will be “a member of the field”), 0, 1, + (a binary function
symbol), and · (another binary function symbol). Let F0 be the class of al-
gebraically closed fields of characteristic 0. Then for any sentence σ in the
language for fields, either σ ∈ Th F0 or (¬σ) ∈ Th F0. For instance
δn = ∀x(x · x · x · · · · · x ≈ 1→Mx)
where n is a positive integer and there are n copies of the variable symbol x in-
volved in x · x · x · · · · · x, is a sentence in the language such that δn ∈ Th F0
or (¬δn) ∈ Th F0. Essentially, this sentence claims that the nth roots of
unity are in the field which will be true in every structure in F0, and hence
δn ∈ Th F0 for every positive integer n.
Completeness says that we can decide exactly which statements belong
to our theory and which do not. In some sense, it indicates that we have
reached the full range of expressibility with our given language. This claim is
supported by the following theorem.
Theorem 7.21 Let T1 and T2 be theories such that
(i) T1 ⊆ T2
(ii) T1 is complete
(iii) T2 is satisfiable.
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Then T1 = T2.
Proof: We show this fact by contradiction. Suppose T1 ⊂ T2. Then,
there is a sentence σ ∈ T2 such that σ /∈ T1. By the completeness of the theory
T1, (¬σ) ∈ T1. Since T1 ⊂ T2, (¬σ) ∈ T2. So, both σ and (¬σ) are in T2.
It is clear then that T2 cannot be satisfied by any structure for the language
since |=S (¬σ) if and only if /|=S σ for every structure S. This contradicts
our assumption that T2 was satisfiable. So, in fact T1 = T2.
Example 7.22 Consider the chain
Th G ⊂ Th R ⊂ Th F ⊂ Th F0 ⊂ Th F0.
Where F0 is the class of all fields of characteristic 0. We are justified in stop-
ping the chain with Th F0 by Theorem 7.20 and by the last theorem. With
the language that we have at our disposal, and for this chain, we cannot ob-
tain a richer satisfiable theory than the theory of algebraically closed fields of
characteristic 0.
Now that we have the terminology and concepts in this chapter under
our belt, we are finally ready to discuss the main goal of this thesis.
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Chapter 8
Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorem
As the main goal of this thesis, the last several chapters have gathered
many of the main concepts and tools we will need to prove a version of Go¨del’s
famous theorem.
8.1 Overview of the Theorem and Its Proof
In this chapter we will be focusing our attention on one particular
structure for one particular fixed language. The language that we will use will
be the language used thus far to support the structure of number theory, and
it is this structure to which we will direct our focus.
Recall that the language of number theory has the logical equality sym-
bol ≈ and has one, 2-place predicate symbol <. Furthermore, the language
has one 1-place function symbol S, and three 2-place function symbols, +, ·,
and E. Finally, it has one constant symbol, 0.
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Now recall (see Example 4.20) we have defined a structureN byN(∀) =
N, N(<) = < ⊆ N2, N(0) = 0, N(S) = S where S(x) = x + 1, N(+) = +
(addition), N(·) = · (multiplication), and N(E) = E (exponentiation). This
is of course the actual structure of number theory. Using the terminology of
the last chapter, we are studying the theory Th N where we abuse notation
and say that N is the same as {N}, the set/class with the single structure N.
This will indeed be a theory by Theorem 7.8, and is number theory.
In fact, we will not study this full theory but a subtheory of this theory.
Before describing this subtheory, we specify some abbreviations that we will
use with the formal language. First, Sn0 will be shorthand for SSSS · · ·S0
where the function symbol S appears n (a positive integer) number of times.
Let s : V −→ N. Then s(Sn0) = n since SN = S, the successor function, and
0N = 0. Second x ≤ y will be shorthand for x < y ∨ x ≈ y. Third, notice
that we will write function and predicate symbols in a more natural way (e.g.
x < y instead of < xy), and we are including the logical connectives ∃, ∨,
↔, and ∧, even though, officially, the formal language does not contain these
symbols.
We will now create a finitely axiomatizable subtheory of Th N. We
denote the set of our axioms by A, and the sentences (axioms) to be included
in A are specified in the list below
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S1 ∀x Sx /≈ 0
S2 ∀x∀y(Sx ≈ Sy → x ≈ y)
L1 ∀x∀y(x < Sy ↔ x ≤ y)
L2 ∀x x ≮ 0
L3 ∀x∀y(x < y ∨ x ≈ y ∨ y < x)
A1 ∀x x+ 0 ≈ x
A2 ∀x∀y x+ Sy ≈ S(x+ y)
M1 ∀x x · 0 ≈ 0
M2 ∀x∀y x · Sy ≈ x · y + x
E1 ∀x xE0 ≈ S0
E2 ∀x∀y xESy ≈ xEy · x
Now, Cn A is a theory by Theorem 7.11 and is clearly finitely axioma-
tizable. Since a quick examination of the axioms will show that N models all
of these 11 sentences, Cn A ⊆ Th N.
We are almost in position to outline both our main result and our ap-
proach to it. We need to sketch one concept that we will discuss in more depth
later on. It is possible to associate with each formula in the formal language
a natural number. Furthermore it is possible to extend this assignment to
deductions using formulas in such a way that the structure of a deduction will
be reflected in the relationships between the natural numbers assigned to the
formal formulas involved. In this way, “statements” made by formulas can be
translated into statements about natural numbers. This type of numbering is
called Go¨del numbering, and given its existence, for any formula ϕ we have
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the natural number assigned to ϕ, #ϕ. For any set of formulas S then, we
have an associated set of natural numbers #S = {#ϕ : ϕ ∈ S}.
Now we can state a form of Go¨del’s Theorem, but before doing so, it
will be helpful to the reader to briefly review Section 4.4 on the definability of
relations within structures.
Theorem 8.1 (Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem) Let S ⊆ Th N be a
set of sentences true in N, and assume that the set #S of Go¨del numbers of
the members of S is a set definable in N. Then we can find a sentence σ such
that σ is true in N but such that σ is not deducible from S.
For Go¨del’s theorem, we start with a set of true sentences, translate
those numbers into natural numbers via Go¨del numbering. But after using
Go¨del numbering, we are in the universe N determined by the structure N.
We can see if #S is representable in the structure N. If this is the case,
then essentially all the statements that S expresses can be translated into
relationships between natural numbers (this is the definability piece). If this
is so, then Go¨del’s theorem states that we can find a sentence that true in Th N
but not deducible from S. In particular, if we are dealing with a subtheory
S of Th N in which every statement we make about natural numbers can be
represented as a relationship between natural numbers, we will always be able
to find such a sentence, true in Th N, but not deducible in the subtheory. Note
then, that any such subtheory S will be incomplete since for this particular
sentence σ that the theorem speaks of, σ /∈ S, otherwise S  σ, and by
the Completeness Theorem S ` σ. However, neither can we have (¬σ) ∈ S
for then (¬σ) ∈ Th N and σ ∈ Th N (σ is true in Th N). These facts
would imply that Th N is unsatisfiable, but N satisfies this set of sentences
by definition. So, any such subtheory S must be incomplete, and this fact is
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the incompleteness of which the theorem speaks.
Note also that for Th N ⊆ Th N, there must be some sentences in
the theory that cannot be represented as statements between natural num-
bers. That is, there are statements about natural numbers that cannot be
re-represented as statements concerning a relationship between natural num-
bers. Otherwise, the theorem would state contradictory assertions. Perhaps a
more concise way to say what we are getting at is that more can be said about
the natural numbers than can be said with the natural numbers.
Also notice that Th N is a complete theory. Take any sentence in the
language σ. Either |=N σ or /|=N (¬σ). In the former case σ ∈ Th N by
definition. By definition, the latter case is equivalent to |=N (¬σ). In this
case, again by definition, we have that (¬σ) ∈ Th N. So, Th N is complete
since for any sentence σ, either σ or (¬σ) are in Th N.
What exactly will the sentence spoken of in the theorem be? While we
cannot give the full technical details at this moment, we will be able to char-
acterize this sentence. Given the set of sentences S described in the theorem,
our sentence σ will essentially say
“This sentence is not deducible from S”.
The proof that the sentence σ is true in Th N but not deducible from S will
then essentially be by contradiction. We give an informal sketch of it here.
Suppose that the above sentence is false. Then σ is in fact deducible from
S. Then by the Soundness Theorem, S  σ, and since N is a model of S
(S ⊆ Th N), σ is true in N. These next steps are where we will need to fill
in many formal details. Since σ is true in N, then in fact S 0 σ since this
is what the sentence σ asserts. This fact contradicts our original assumption
that σ is false. So, in fact, σ must be true, that is, true in N (σ ∈ Th N).
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Since it is true in N, what it asserts is the case, that is S 0 σ.
The reader may object and claim that the sentence “This sentence is
not deducible from S,” is a meaningless sentence much like the sentence “This
statement is false.” The last sentence is nonsensical since if it is true, then it is
false, and if it is false then it is true. Later in the discussion, we will show that
we can formally and coherently construct such a sentence σ, but even now,
we can informally see that our sentence is not inherently self-contradictory. It
almost is, but not quite.
Consider our discussion of completeness of theories in the last chapter.
We can say that Th G, the theory of groups, was an incomplete theory since the
formal sentence that represents the abelian property, δ = ∀x∀y x ∗ y ≈ y ∗ x,
was true in some groups but not in others. To draw the analogy with the cur-
rent case, note that Th G ⊂ Th F0. The theory of algebraically closed fields of
characteristic 0 is a complete theory as noted in the last chapter, a theory of
which the theory of groups is a subtheory. Also, δ is true in every member of
F0. So, δ is a sentence true in every member of F0 but not deducible from Th G
much as in our present case. The sentence δ might just have easily said “This
sentence is not deducible from Th G,” and the results we have just described
would be the same. So, our sentence σ is not inherently self-contradictory. It
merely asserts that it as a sentence is true in a larger theory but not deducible
from a smaller set of sentences.
The reader may then ask, “If this argument by contradiction is valid,
why does it not work with S replaced with Th N?” If this were possible,
then Go¨del’s Theorem would be nonsense since if a sentence σ were true in
N (σ ∈ Th N) it must also be deducible from Th N by the Completeness
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Theorem (a version of which Go¨del proved!). This time our sentence is
“This sentence is not deducible from Th N”.
Remember that this is only an informal argument. Formally, this will be a
sentence in the first-order language. This sentence is now supposed to be our
sentence σ. Now, the sentence is self-contradictory since Th N is a complete
theory. Either σ ∈ Th N (σ is true in N) or (¬σ) ∈ Th N (σ is false in
N). If σ ∈ Th N, then of course Th N ` σ since any theory is closed under
logical implication and by the Completeness Theorem. But this contradicts
what σ asserts, so we must have (¬σ) ∈ Th N. Thus, (¬σ) is true in N,
or equivalently σ is false in N. But if it is false, σ must in fact be deducible
from Th N, hence also true in Th N by the Soundness Theorem, another
contradiction. In this case, this sentence is meaningless in the informal (and
certainly the formal as well) sense. It cannot be even legitimately stated about
Th N since it is inherently self-contradictory. So, our argument that we used
above will not work if S is replaced with Th N since we will be unable to
construct the necessary formal sentence σ.
Having an intuitive sense for the theorem and a sketch of the proof, we
indicate what pieces we will need to develop in the rest of the chapter before
giving a rigorous proof for Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
The two main pieces that are missing from the proof are Go¨del number-
ing which provides the translation of sentences in the formal language into the
structure N and representability within the theory Cn A. The idea is that we
can translate statements about arithmetic into arithmetic and then reverse the
process to talk within a specific subtheory of number theory which will then
allow us to create the sentence that we need. We start with Go¨del numbering.
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8.2 Go¨del Numbering
We will use this numbering to number every expression in the formal
language. Formally, we begin this numbering with a function on the parame-
ters and logical symbols of the language given in the table below.
( 7−→ 0 ) 7−→ 1
¬ 7−→ 2 →7−→ 3
≈ 7−→ 4 ∀ 7−→ 5
0 7−→ 6 S 7−→ 7
< 7−→ 8 · 7−→ 9
E 7−→ 10 v0 7−→ 11
v1 7−→ 13
vi 7−→ 2i+ 11
Notice that so far, none of the even numbers past 10 are the image
of any expression in the language but that all odd numbers are the image of
either a logical symbol (including all of the variables) or a parameter in the
language.
Recall that an expression in the language will be some finite concate-
nation of the symbols represented in the table above. Now, for a0, . . . , am ∈ N
define the following operation on these numbers:
ba0, . . . , amc =
m∏
i=0
pai+2i if m > 0 and
ba0, . . . , amc = a0 if m = 0.
Note that p0 = 2, p1 = 3, etc. Now take an expression from the first-order lan-
guage ε = s0s2 · · · sm where the si’s are among the indecomposable symbols
coming from the alphabet of our language to which we have already assigned
natural numbers. We will define the Go¨del number for the expression ε as
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follows:
#ε = b#s0,#s1, . . . ,#smc.
Notice that if ε = s where s is an indecomposable symbol in the alphabet of
the language, then #ε = b#sc = #s by how we defined the b. . .c operation.
Thus, this numbering for all of the expressions in the language is well defined.
If Ψ is a set of expressions, then we designate the set of all the Go¨del numbers
of all the expressions in Ψ as
#Ψ = {#ε : ε ∈ Ψ}.
Notice that our Go¨del numbering of all expressions automatically gives
us numbers associated with sequences of expressions (a formal deduction is
such a sequence, and we wish to encode deductions as natural numbers). The
reason for this is that a sequence of expressions will ultimately be an expression
itself.
Now we verify that our numbering is one-to-one. Note that as long
as our expression is made up of more than one indecomposable symbol, the
Go¨del number for that expression will be a positive even number since it will
have at least one power of 2 involved (since 2#s0+2 is a factor of the product).
Hence, we will not assign any expression to an odd number (to which we have
assigned all of the variables and a few other indecomposable symbols) if it
made up of two or more indecomposable symbols. Note also that if we have
an expression built up of more than one indecomposable symbol, the smallest
its Go¨del number could be would be
#(( = b#(,#(c = b0, 0c = 20+230+2 = 36.
Thus, we are assured that the Go¨del number of any expression built up of
more than one indecomposable symbol will be an even number bigger than
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or equal to 36. We are thus assured that there will be no overlap with the
assignments we have already made for the alphabet. The rest of the argument
that the assignment of expressions to natural numbers is one-to-one follows
immediately from the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic which guarantees
a unique prime factorization for every natural number and the fact that a
Go¨del number of an expression must be a product of consecutive primes, all
of which must have a power of at least 2. So, we will have a distinct natural
number assigned to every distinct expression/sequence of expressions.
Example 8.2 Consider the Go¨del number for axiom S1 of the theory Cn A.
#(∀v1 Sv1 /≈ 0) = #(∀v1(¬Sv1 ≈ 0))
= b#(∀),#(v1),#((),#(¬),#(S),#(v1),#(≈),#(0)c
= b5, 11, 0, 2, 7, 11, 4, 6c
= 25+2311+250+277+21111+2134+2176+2
= 2731352791113136178
= 239312311565234769445552086952420825357412092800
.
Designate this number by N1.
Consider the Go¨del number for the deduction
〈∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0, (∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0→ S0 /≈ 0),S0 /≈ 0〉
(this deduction demonstrates that ∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0 ` S0 /≈ 0 since
(∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0→ S0 /≈ 0) is from logical axiom group 2). Note that following
a similar process as above we have
#((∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0→ S0 /≈ 0)) =
2237513721141391713196238293315372414439478536598613673
.
Denote this number by N2. Also,
#(S0 /≈ 0) = 22345978116138173.
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Denote this number by N3.
#(〈∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0, (∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0→ S0 /≈ 0),S0 /≈ 0〉)
= b#(∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0),#((∀v1Sv1 /≈ 0→ S0 /≈ 0)),#(S0 /≈ 0)c
= bN1, N2, N3c
= 2N1+23N2+25N3+2
= 22
731352791113136178+232
237513721141391713196238293315372414439478536598613673+2
·522345978116138173+2
Obviously, the numbers involved in Go¨del numbering are large even for
small expressions, but Go¨del numbering allows us to encode all expressions
of our first-order language into the universe for the structure N. By one-
to-oneness, we can also uniquely decode the images of the expressions and
sequences of expressions back into the original expressions and sequences of
expressions. This will be key to the proof of Go¨del’s Theorem, and we give a
brief example of the decoding process.
Example 8.3 Take the natural number 16, 669, 800. The prime factorization
of this number is
23355273 = 21+233+250+271+2 = b1, 3, 0, 1c.
Looking at the table for the assignments for the alphabet, we have the expression
)→ ().
Note that in general, not every natural number has an expression asso-
ciated with it. For instance, the number 36, 432 factors as 2432 · 11 · 23. Since
we do not have a product of consecutive primes, we know that this is not the
Go¨del number of an expression in the language.
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8.3 Representability in Cn A
In this section we discuss how we can translate numerical relations in N
back into the formal relations. In other words, we discuss how certain relations
are able to be represented in the formal language. This will be the other piece
that we need to formally prove Go¨del’s Theorem.
First, we develop some new notation. For the first-order formula ϕ,
let ϕ(t) = ϕv1|t, ϕ(t1, t2) = (ϕv1|t1)v2|t2 , etc. Now, recall the definition of a
definable relation.
Definition 8.4 Given the structure S and the wff ϕ, whose free variables are
among v1, v2,. . . , vk,
{(u1, u2, . . . , uk) : |=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]}
is the relation that ϕ defines in S. Given a k-ary relation R in the universe
U determined by S, if there is a ϕ such that
R = {(u1, u2, . . . , uk) : |=S ϕ[[u1, u2, . . . , uk]]},
then R is said to be definable in S.
Take as our structure N whose universe is N. Then for a k-ary relation
R in the universe N, this relation is definable in N, if and only if there exists
a formula ϕ such that for all (n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ Nk,
(n1, n2, . . . nk) ∈ R iff |=N ϕ[[n1, n2, . . . , nk]].
Recall that this last statement will be so if and only if there is a function
s : V −→ N such that s(vi) = ni and |=N ϕ[s], and by Theorem 4.27, |=N ϕ[s]
for every function such that s(vi) = ni. Note also that s(vi) = ni = s(S
ni0)
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for any function s : V −→ N. Let
s1≤i≤kvi|ni ≡ (· · · ((sv1|n1)v2|n2) · · · )vk|nk .
Then,
s1≤i≤kvi|ni (x) =
 ni if x = vi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ ks(y) otherwise
Of course, since ni = s(S
ni0), the function above is the same as the following
function:
s1≤i≤kvi|s(Sni0)(x) =
 s(S
ni0) if x = vi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k
s(y) otherwise
Hence,
|=N ϕ[[n1, n2, . . . , nk]] iff there is a function s as described above such that
|=N ϕ[s] iff
|=N ϕ
[
s1≤i≤kvi|s(Sni0)
]
.
Now, since Sni0 involves no variables, it will always be substitutable for any
variable symbol x. Thus, by repeated application of the Substitution Lemma
(Lemma 6.1.2) and by applying the new notation developed above,
|=N ϕ
[
s1≤i≤kvi|s(Sni0)
]
iff |=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)[s].
Since ϕ’s free variables were assumed to be among v1, v2,. . . ,vk,
ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) is in fact a sentence, since it has no free variables,
whence
|=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)[s] iff |=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0).
So, a k-ary relation R on N will be definable if and only if for every
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ Nk,
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R iff |=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0).
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If we split this last statement into two implications we have that
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R implies |=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) and
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) /∈ R implies |=N (¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0))
if and only if R is definable in N.
Now let T be a theory in a language with the symbols 0 and S. We
define the following:
Definition 8.5 The formula ϕ represents the k-ary relation R of the uni-
verse of a model for T if
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R implies ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) ∈ T and
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) /∈ R implies (¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)) ∈ T.
A relation R is said to be representable in theory T if there is a formula
ϕ that represents R in that theory.
Representability is a stronger notion than definability. Suppose S is
a model for the sentences in T (with universe N) and suppose that ϕ rep-
resents the relation R in the theory T . Then, if (n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R, then
ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) ∈ T , and of course |=S ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0),
which, by the previous discussion is so if and only if |=S ϕ[[n1, n2, . . . , nk]]
for any function s : V −→ N such that s(vi) = ni. If on the other hand,
(n1, n2, . . . nk) /∈ R, then (¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)) ∈ T , and
/|=S ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0). Again, by our previous discussion, this means
that /|=S ϕ[[n1, n2, . . . , nk]]. Thus, we have that ϕ defines R in S, a model for
T , if ϕ represents R in T . However, if ϕ defines a relation R in a structure S
for the language, ϕ will only be guaranteed to be representable in the theory
Th S.
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What we will be most concerned about is representability of a relation
of natural numbers in the theory Cn A. Following the definitions of repre-
sentability for the theory Cn A, a relation R will be representable in Cn A if
and only if
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R implies A ` ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) and
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) /∈ R implies A ` (¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)).
Example 8.6 As a simple example, the equality relation is representable in
Cn A. If m = n, then clearly Sm0 = Sn0. Clearly then, by one of the equality
logical axioms, ` Sm0 ≈ Sn0, and A ` Sm0 ≈ Sn0. If m 6= n, then without
loss of generality m > n, and there is k > 0 such that m = n + k. Now, by
logical axioms and axiom S1, S1 ` Sk0 /≈ 0. By n applications of axiom S2,
and formal contraposition, we can obtain that {S1, S2} ` (¬Sm0 ≈ Sn0).
Hence, equality may be represented in Cn A.
We need to demonstrate/claim that several relations are representable
in Cn A leading up to showing that Go¨del numbering is representable in Cn A.
The following definition and theorem is helpful in establishing results of rep-
resentability.
Definition 8.7 Let ϕ be a formula in which only the variables v1,v2, . . . ,vk
occur free. Then ϕ is numeralwise determined by A if for any k-tuple
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) either
A ` ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) or
A ` (¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)).
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Theorem 8.8 A formula ϕ represents a relation R in Cn A if and only if
(i) ϕ is numeralwise determined by A, and
(ii) ϕ defines R in N.
Proof: If ϕ represents a relation R in Cn A, then it is clear by the
definition of representable relation applied to Cn A, that the two items hold
since N is a model of A, and hence all of Cn A (recall the discussion above
about how representability is stronger than definability).
Suppose now that the two items hold for the relation R. If
(n1, n2, . . . , nk) ∈ R, then since ϕ defines R in N, then
|=N ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0). Since N is a model of A, then we must A 0
(¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)), otherwise we have a contradiction. By item (i)
and the definition of “numeralwise determined,” A ` ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0).
The argument if (n1, n2, . . . , nk) /∈ R is completely analogous. We just need
the observation that
(¬(¬ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0)))
is tautologically equivalent to ϕ(Sn10,Sn20, . . . ,Snk0) and Theorem 5.6.
Numeralwise determination has the following closure properties under
the formula building operations indicated in the following theorem (stated
without proof).
Theorem 8.9 (i) Any atomic formula is numeralwise determined by A.
(ii) If ϕ and ψ are numeralwise determined by A, then so are (¬ϕ) and
(ϕ→ ψ).
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(iii) If ϕ is numeralwise determined by A, then so are the following formulas:
∀x(x < y → ϕ)
∃x(x < y ∧ ϕ).
In what follows, we will also need the following notion.
Definition 8.10 A relation R on the natural numbers is recursive if and
only if it is representable in some consistent finitely axiomatizable theory (in
a language with 0 and S).
Hence, if we can show that a relation is representable in Cn A it is re-
cursive by definition. This notion of recursive relation is the precise notion of a
decidable set (relation) discussed in Section 3.3 by what is known as Church’s
Thesis.
Church’s Thesis A relation is decidable if and only if it is recursive.
The idea is that the effective procedure that we use is encoded in the
formal language and vice versa. Intuitively, the “guts” behind a computer
program are arithmetical operations with 1’s and 0’s, or 0’s and the successor
function applied to 0 a finite number of times. Thus, recursiveness is the
formal counterpart to decidability.
We have a definition for what it means to represent a relation in a
theory. From this point forward when we say that a relation R is representable,
we will mean that it is representable in the theory Cn A. We extend the notion
of representability to functions (a specific type of relation).
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Definition 8.11 Let f : Nk −→ N. A formula ϕ in which only v1, . . . ,vk+1
occur free will be said to functionally represent f (in the theory Cn A) if
for any n1, . . . , nk ∈ N,
A ` ∀vk+1[ϕ(Sn10, . . . ,Snk0)↔ vk+1 ≈ Sf(n1,...,nk)0]
The following theorems are intuitively plausible, and so we omit their
proof.
Theorem 8.12 If ϕ functionally represents f in Cn A, then it also represents
f (as a relation) in Cn A.
Theorem 8.13 Let f be a function on N which is (as a relation) representable
in Cn A. Then we can find a formula ϕ which functionally represents f in
Cn A.
Now we move into discussing the representability of functions and rela-
tions. Ultimately, this discussion will lead up to representability dealing with
Go¨del numbering. This representability with Go¨del numbers will be the final
piece required to prove the Incompleteness Theorem. We will state most of
the following theorems without proof. Proofs and further development may be
found in A Mathematical Introduction to Logic by Herbert Enderton on pages
202-227.
Theorem 8.14 The following functions are representable:
(i) The successor function by the formula v2 ≈ Sv1.
(ii) Any m-place constant function whose output is some b is represented by
the formula vm+1 ≈ Sb0.
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(iii) The projection function Imi (a1, a2, . . . , ai, . . . , am) = ai for any m ∈ Z+
and 1 ≤ i ≤ m is represented by vm+1 ≈ vi.
(iv) Addition, multiplication, and exponentiation are represented by the equa-
tions
v3 ≈ v1 + v2
v3 ≈ v1 · v2
v3 ≈ v1Ev2
respectively.
Theorem 8.15 The class of representable functions is closed under composi-
tion.
In what follows, it will be convenient to denote −→a = (a1, a2, . . . , am)
for any given m ∈ Z+.
Theorem 8.16 (i) Any relation which has in N a quantifier-free definition
is representable.
(ii) The class of representable relations is closed under unions, intersections,
and complements.
(iii) If R is representable, then so are
{(−→a , b) : for all c < b (−→a , c) ∈ R} and
{(−→a , b) : for some c < b (−→a , c) ∈ R}.
Recall that for any set S, the characteristic function of S, denoted KS
is the function,
KS(
−→x ) =
 1 if
−→x ∈ S
0 if −→x ∈ S{
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where S{ is the complement of the set S in the specified universe (note that
S could be a set of m-tuples).
Theorem 8.17 A relation R is representable if and only if its characteristic
function KR is.
Theorem 8.18 If R is a representable binary relation and f and g are repre-
sentable functions, then {−→a : (f(−→a ), g(−→a )) ∈ R} is representable. Similarly
for an m-ary relation R and functions f1, . . . , fm.
Theorem 8.19 If R is a representable (m+ 1)-ary relation, then so is
{(−→a , b) : for some c ≤ b, (−→a , c) ∈ R}.
Similarly for {(−→a , b) : for all c ≤ b, (−→a , c) ∈ R}.
Theorem 8.20 The divisibility relation {(a, b) : a divides b in N} is repre-
sentable.
Theorem 8.21 The set of primes is representable.
Theorem 8.22 The set of pairs of adjacent primes is representable.
Theorem 8.23 The mapping a 7−→ pa where a ∈ N, and pa is the (a + 1)st
prime is representable.
Recall from the section on Go¨del numbering that
ba0, . . . , amc =
m∏
i=0
pai+2i if m > 0 and
ba0, . . . , amc = a0 if m = 0.
We may extend this operation even further and say that for m = −1, we define
the operation as bc = 1.
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Theorem 8.24 For each m ∈ N, the mapping
(a0, a1, . . . , am) 7−→ ba0, a1, . . . , amc
is representable.
Theorem 8.25 There is a representable function such that (a, b) 7−→ (a)b
where for b ≤ m,
(ba0, . . . , amc)b = ab
The last function is a decoding function for Go¨del numbering so that
if we had the Go¨del number of an expression in the formal language, we can
decode its Go¨del number into the numbers that we assigned to the alphabet of
the formal language and subsequently retrieve the original formal expression.
Their representability essentially allows us to refer to Go¨del numbering in the
formal language itself. Thus, we have the potential to have formulas in the
language that refer to their own Go¨del number. This self-reference will be key
to proving Go¨del’s Theorem.
Theorem 8.26 Assume that R is a representable relation such that for every
−→a there is some n such that (−→a , n) ∈ R. Then the function defined by f(−→a ) =
min{n : (−→a , n) ∈ R} is representable.
Definition 8.27 Say that b is a sequence number if for some m ≥ −1 and
some a0, . . . , am, b = ba0, . . . , amc.
This definition allows us to distinguish between which natural numbers
are the images of a formal expression under Go¨del numbering and which are
not.
Theorem 8.28 The set of sequence numbers is representable.
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Theorem 8.29 There is a representable function lh : N −→ N such that
lh(ba0, . . . , amc) = m+ 1 (“lh” is intended to stand for “length”).
Definition 8.30 Define a mapping from N×N into N, called the restriction,
where (a, b) 7−→ a  b, and
a  b =

ba0, . . . , ab−1c if a is a sequence number such that a = ba0, . . . , amc
and b ≤ m+ 1
0 otherwise
Theorem 8.31 The restriction function is representable.
Given a (k + 1)-place function f , we design a new function f̂ where
f̂(a, b1, . . . , bk) = bf(0,−→b ), . . . , f(a− 1,−→b )c
. This function f̂ will encode the first a values of f(x,
−→
b ). Suppose now that
we have a (k+ 2)-place function g. Applying the Recursion Theorem, we may
say that there is a unique (k + 1) function f such that
f(a,
−→
b ) = g(f̂(a,
−→
b ), a,
−→
b ).
These preliminary results are necessary to state the following theorem.
Theorem 8.32 Let g be a (k + 2)-place function and let f be the unique
(k + 1)-place function such that for all a and (k-tuples)
−→
b ,
f(a,
−→
b ) = g(f̂(a,
−→
b ), a,
−→
b ).
If g is representable, then so is f .
Theorem 8.33 For a representable function F , the mapping defined by
(a,
−→
b ) 7−→
∏
i<a
F (i,
−→
b )
is also representable. Similarly with Σ in place of
∏
.
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Definition 8.34 If a and b are sequence numbers, define a binary operation
between them, called concatenation, denoted by ⊗ where
a⊗ b = a ·
∏
i<lhb
p
(b)i+2
i+lha
.
Note that
ba0, . . . , amc ⊗ bb0, . . . , bnc = ba0, . . . , am, b0, . . . , anc.
The operation will also be associative.
Theorem 8.35 Concatenation is a representable function.
Let
⊗
i<a
f(i) = f(0)⊗ f(1)⊗ · · · ⊗ f(a− 1).
Theorem 8.36 For a representable F , the mapping defined by
(a,
−→
b ) 7−→
⊗
i<a
F (i,
−→
b )
is representable.
These results about representable functions are more general but they
are necessary to establish results about the representability dealing with Go¨del
numbering which we now state.
Theorem 8.37 The set (unary relation) of Go¨del numbers of variables is rep-
resentable.
Proof: Given our assignment of numbers to the variable symbols, it
is clear that the set of Go¨del numbers of variables is given by
{a : there is b less than a such that a = b11 + 2bc = 11 + 2b}
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(recall that #vi = 11 + 2i and that ba0c = a0). This relation will be repre-
sentable by Theorem 8.16 and the fact that addition, multiplication, and any
constant function are representable.
Theorem 8.38 The set of Go¨del numbers of terms is representable.
Proof: (sketch)
Let T be the set of terms in the formal language and then consider KT , the
characteristic function of the set of terms. The terms were constructed via
induction and so the characteristic function will refer to itself in the condi-
tions for when the characteristic function takes on 1. The idea is to apply
Theorem 8.32, and use a function g which eliminates direct reference to the
characteristic function. The goal will then be to show that the function g will
be representable (the results stated above will guarantee this) in which case
the characteristic function will be representable and hence the set of terms by
Theorem 8.17.
Theorem 8.39 The set of Go¨del numbers of atomic formulas is representable.
Theorem 8.40 The set of Go¨del numbers of wffs is representable.
The proof for wffs is in the same spirit as that used for terms.
Theorem 8.41 There is a representable function Sb (Sb is supposed to ab-
breviate “substitution”) such that for a term or formula α, variable x, and
term t,
Sb(#α,#x,#t) = #αx|t
Proof: (sketch) The function Sb can be defined in cases. That the
function is representable follows the same type of argument as that employed
with the Go¨del numbering for terms.
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Theorem 8.42 The function whose value at n is #(Sn0) is representable
Theorem 8.43 There is a representable relation Fr such that for a term or
formula ϕ and a variable x,
(#ϕ,#x) ∈ Fr iff x occurs free in ϕ.
Theorem 8.44 The set of Go¨del numbers of sentences is representable.
Theorem 8.45 There is a representable relation Sbl such that for a formula
ϕ, variable x, and term t,
(#ϕ,#x,#t) ∈ Sbl iff t is substitutable for x in ϕ.
Theorem 8.46 The relation Gen, where (a, b) ∈ Gen if and only if a is the
Go¨del number of a formula and b is the Go¨del number of a generalization of
that formula, is representable.
Theorem 8.47 The set of Go¨del numbers of logical axioms is representable.
Theorem 8.48 For a finite set of formulas S,
{#D : D is a deduction from S}
is representable.
Theorem 8.49 A relation is recursive if and only if it is representable in the
theory Cn A.
Proof: That a relation representable in the theory Cn A is recursive
follows from the definition of recursive. Suppose now that we have a recursive
relation. A relation is recursive if there is a consistent finite set of sentences S
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such that some formula ϕ represents R in Cn S. Suppose R is a k-ary relation.
Then,
(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ R implies S ` ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0) and
(a1, . . . , ak) /∈ R implies S ` (¬ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0)).
So, if (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ R there is deduction D of ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0) from the
set S. Thus #D is the set in the previous theorem, and the last number
used to encode the deduction is #(ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0)). So, we may define the
mapping
(a1, . . . , ak) 7−→ d where d is the least sequence number d such that the last
number in the sequence is #(ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0)).
We may do similarly for (a1, . . . , ak) /∈ R and #((¬ϕ(Sa10, . . . ,Sak0))). Since
the Go¨del numbers of deductions are representable in Cn A, R will be repre-
sentable in Cn A.
Corollary 8.49.1 Any recursive relation is definable in N.
Proof: This follows immediately from the fact that representability
implies definability.
Theorem 8.50 Let S be a set of sentences. If #S is recursive, and Cn S is
a complete theory, then #Cn S is recursive.
The proof for this theorem follows in the same spirit as the proof for
the last theorem.
At this point, we have all of the representability results that we will
need to prove Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
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8.4 Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem
The linchpin for Go¨del’s Theorem is the following lemma.
Lemma 8.4.1 (Fixed-Point Lemma) Given any formula β in which only
v1 occurs free, we can find a sentence σ such that A ` σ ↔ β(S#σ0)
This lemma says a lot. We are given the formula β which “expresses”
some property. The idea is that we can find a sentence σ and compute its Go¨del
number #σ. Then we can indirectly represent σ in the formal language as
S#σ0. Then β(S#σ0) is true if and only if σ is true. Since S#σ0 indirectly
represents σ, what the lemma indicates is that β is true of σ if and only if σ
is true. So, we can think of σ indirectly asserting that β is true of itself.
Proof: Consider the function Sb as given in Theorem 8.41. For a fixed
variable, this function becomes Sb(#α,#t) = #(α(t)). Taking t = Sn0, we
have Sb(#α,#Sn0) = #(α(Sn0)). Now, we have by Theorem 8.42, that
the mapping n 7−→ #(Sn0) is a representable function. Hence, the function
g(#α, n) = Sb(#α,#(Sn0)) = #(α(Sn0)) is functionally representable since
it is a composition of representable functions. Thus, we are justified by the
definition of functional representation in saying that there is a formula θ in
which v1,v2, and v3 occur free such that θ (or equivalently θ(v1,v2,v3))
functionally represents g.
Consider now the formula
∀v3[θ(v1,v1,v3)→ β (v3)]
which only has the variable v1 free. For shorthand, we will refer to this formula
as δ. We claim that this formula defines a set such that #α (α is a formula)
is in the set if and only if #(α(S#α0)) is in the set defined by β (which only
has the variable v1 free).
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For the details, assume #α ∈ {n :|=N δ(Sn0)} (the set defined by δ).
Thus, |=N δ(S#α0). Now,
δ(S#α0) = ∀v3[θ(S#α0,S#α0,v3)→ β (v3)].
Since θ(v1,v2,v3) functionally represents the function g discussed earlier, by
definition of functional representation (and since N is a model of A), we must
have
|=N ∀v3[θ(S#α0,S#α0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#(α(S#α0))0]
where g(#α,#α) = #(α(S#α0)). It will be clear then that
|=N δ(S#α0) iff |=N ∀v3[v3 ≈ S#(α(S#α0))0→ β(v3)].
This statement implies that |=N β(S#(α(S#α0))0). By definition then,
#(α(S#α0)) ∈ {n : |=N β(Sn0)}. The chain of implications can be reversed
to show the equivalence using the definition of satisfaction of a universal quan-
tifier.
Given this information, we now define σ. Let q be the Go¨del number
of
∀v3[θ(v1,v1,v3)→ β (v3)].
That is #δ = q. Now let σ be the sentence
∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)]
which is δ(Sq0). So,
|=N σ iff |=N δ(Sq0) iff
|=N δ(S#δ0) (since #δ = q) iff
#δ is in the set determined by δ. By the above discussion, this statement is
so if and only if #(δ(S#δ0) is in the set defined by β, or equivalently if
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#(δ(Sq0)) is in the set defined by β. Since δ(Sq0) = σ, our last statement is
equivalent to saying that #σ is in the set defined by β. Hence, |=N σ if and
only if #σ is in the set defined by β. This discussion gives us a notion of what
σ asserts in N, namely, σ asserts that its own Go¨del number is the set defined
by β. Equivalently, |=N [σ ↔ β(S#σ0)]. However, we wish to demonstrate
that
A ` [σ ↔ β(S#σ0)],
and what we have demonstrated thus far is that
Th N ` [σ ↔ β(S#σ0)].
Since θ(v1,v2,v3) functionally represents g, we have by the definition
of functional representation
A ` ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#σ0]
(note that #σ = #(δ(Sq0))). Thus, we must also have
A ` θ(Sq0,Sq0,S#σ0).
It is clear that
σ = ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)] ` θ(Sq0,Sq0,S#σ0)→ β (S#σ0)
by our substitution group of logical axioms. So, A ∪ {σ} ` β(S#σ0). By the
Deduction theorem (Theorem 5.13), this last statement is so if and only if
A `[σ → β(S#σ0)] (∗)
To show the other direction of the formal equivalence, we wish to
demonstrate that
{∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#σ0],β(S#σ0)} ` σ
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(remember that σ = ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)]). We do this by assum-
ing that we have a structure A that satisfies the set
{∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#σ0],β(S#σ0)}
and then showing that |=A ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3) → β (v3)]. Our result will
follow by the Completeness Theorem. Note that
|=A ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)] iff
for each fixed u ∈ A(∀) |=A [θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)][[u]] iff
for each fixed u ∈ A(∀) either /|=A θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)[[u]] or |=A β(v3)[[u]].
There are two possibilities; either u = A(S#σ0) or u 6= A(S#σ0). In the
former case, |=A θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)[[u]] since
|=A ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#σ0]
by assumption. However, in this case |=A β(v3)[[u]] by assumption. In the
latter case
/|=A θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)[[u]] by the same reasoning. Thus, we can say that for each
fixed u ∈ A(∀) either
/|=A θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)[[u]] or |=A β(v3)[[u]].
Therefore,
|=A ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)→ β (v3)],
and our result follows. Thus, since
A ` ∀v3[θ(Sq0,Sq0,v3)↔ v3 ≈ S#σ0],
A ∪ {β(S#σ0)} ` σ.
216
By the Deduction Theorem,
A ` [β(S#σ0)→ σ] (∗∗)
Since we have both (∗) and (∗∗), We have
A ` [σ ↔ β(S#σ0)],
and the lemma is proven.
Theorem 8.51 (Tarski Undefinability Theorem) The set #Th N is not
definable in N.
This theorem will rely on the special argument by contradiction that
we discussed in the overview of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem.
Proof: Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a formula β
that defines the set #Th N. Then β would only have one free variable since
#Th N will be a unary relation (a unary relation is the same as a set). We
can assume without loss of generality that the variable v1 occurs free in β
since if not we can find an alphabetic variant of β in which v1 does occur free
by Theorem 5.22.
Applying the Fixed Point Lemma to the formula (¬β), which also only
has the variable v1 occurring free, there is a sentence σ such that
A ` [σ ↔ (¬β)(S#σ0)].
It is clear that
(¬β)(Sn0) = (¬β(Sn0)),
so that we have
A ` [σ ↔ (¬β(S#σ0))].
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Since N is a model of A, we have
|=N [σ ↔ (¬β(S#σ0))].
Thus,
|=N σ iff /|=N β(S#σ0).
Since β is supposed to define #Th N, then our last statement is equivalent to
|=N σ iff #σ /∈ #Th N.
So, σ asserts in N that its own Go¨del number is not in the set of all Go¨del
numbers for the sentences true in number theory. We can begin to see how
σ is self contradictory. If σ is true in N, then by definition σ ∈ Th N, and
hence #σ ∈ #Th N, a contradiction. However, if σ is false in N, σ /∈ Th N,
and hence #σ /∈ #Th N. This is so if and only if |=N σ, that is, if and only
if σ is true in N, a contradiction. Therefore, what we initially supposed to be
true (that β defines the set #Th N) is false, and there is no such formula β.
Thus, the set #Th N is undefinable in N.
Corollary 8.51.1 #Th N is not recursive.
Proof: By Corollary 8.49.1, if a unary relation (a set) is recursive,
then it is definable in N. However #ThN is not definable in N, so neither can
it be recursive.
Remember that by Church’s Thesis, recursion is the mathematically
precise formulation of decidability. So, the above corollary asserts that number
theory is not a decidable set, for if a sentence is true in N, its Go¨del number
will be in Th N and vice versa. So, there is no effective procedure such that for
every formal sentence σ, the effective procedure will be able to decide whether
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σ or its negation are in Th N. There is no computer program that, given
any formal first-order sentence, will be able to definitely decide whether that
sentence or its negation belongs in number theory.
And now, for the main result of this thesis.
Theorem 8.52 (Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem (Restated)) If
S ⊆ Th N and #S is recursive, then Cn S is not a complete theory.
The reader should at this point re-examine the first statement of Go¨del’s
Theorem to see how the concepts stated there relate to the concepts used in
this restatement.
Proof: Since S ⊆ Th N, then Cn S ⊆ Th N by the definitions of each
of these theories. Suppose by way of contradiction that Cn S is a complete
theory. By Theorem 7.21 (since Th N is satisfied by the structure N), we have
Cn S = Th N. However, if Cn S is complete, then by Theorem 8.50, #Cn S
is recursive. This statement would say that #Th N is recursive, which by
the corallary to the Tarski Undefinability Theorem is not the case. Therefore
Cn S cannot be complete.
Kurt Go¨del proved a version of the incompleteness theorem (different
from the one stated above) in 1931 a year after he proved a version of the
Completeness Theorem for first-order logic for his doctoral dissertation in 1930.
By Church’s Thesis, recursiveness is equivalent to decidability. So, #S being
recursive means that it is decidable. Clearly, if #S is decidable then S itself
will also be decidable since we can decode all of the Go¨del numbers back into
the formulas in S. So, if we have a decidable set of sentences true in number
theory, a set of sentences where a computer program could say “yes” or “no”
to each formal sentence being in the set, the set of all consequences from the
set cannot completely describe all true statements of number theory. There
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will always be a sentence true about numbers that cannot be proven (deduced)
from such a decidable set.
Recall the definition of an axiomatizable theory.
Definition 8.53 A theory T is axiomatizable if there is a decidable set of
sentences Σ such that T = Cn Σ.
By Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, there can be no first-order ax-
iomatization of number theory. For a set of axioms, we as reasoners decide
what axioms to include. There is no set of first-order axioms that we can
develop that can completely describe number theory. That is, there is no set
of first-order axioms such that we could ever prove every statement true of
number theory.
Consider again, Goldbach’s Conjecture: every even integer greater than
2 is the sum of two primes. This statement of number theory is unproven to
date using a “normal” set of first-order axioms. Given a normal set of first-
order axioms one might assume, we know by Go¨del’s theorem that there are
true statements of number theory that are not provable from this assumed set
of axioms. Goldbach’s Conjecture could very well be one of these unprovable
statements. Or, it could be that Goldbach’s Conjecture is false in number
theory, and we have as yet to find a counterexample. We do not know whether
it is true or false because no one has ever supplied a proof for it. There is great
evidence that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true, and so we could certainly add
Goldbach’s Conjecture to our set of axioms. It is then, of course, it is provable.
But since we do not know whether it is in fact true in number theory, our set
of axioms could be inconsistent. Given the modern axiomatic mathematical
method, only if we as reasoners stumble upon a proof or counterexample (a
first-order proof/counterexample or otherwise), will we be able to determine
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whether Goldbach’s Conjecture is in fact true of number theory or not. The
bait that keeps mathematicians fishing for a proof is the tantalizing tautology
that it must be either true or false in first-order number theory (a complete
theory).
Having proved Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem as the main goal of
this thesis, we briefly and incompletely consider some of the philosophical
consequences of the theorem in the next (and concluding) chapter.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
Almost since Go¨del’s announcement of his incompleteness theorem in
Ko¨nigsberg in 1930, the theorem has been used (and abused) to assert astound-
ing things. It is not difficult to see why. The theorem has direct bearing on the
philosophy of mathematics and goes right to the heart of meta-mathematical
questions. How can we know mathematical truth? Is mathematics realism or
formalism? How do we know whether proofs exist or do not exist? Can we
prove every mathematically true statement? All of these questions are at the
heart of the project of mathematics.
Go¨del’s Theorem stretches even beyond mathematics to metaphysics
and deeper human questions. How do we know what we know? What is the
human mind? Is there objective reality? Although, a complete philosophical
discussion of the implications of Go¨del’s Theorem is beyond the scope of this
thesis, we talk briefly about some (possible) derivatives and non-derivatives of
the theorem.
Note in the discussion at the end of the last chapter the careful insertion
of the term first-order. Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is a meta-theorem
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about the formal mathematical structure called “first-order logic.” In this the-
sis, we developed both sentential logic and first-order logic as mathematical
models of humanity’s deductive thought processes. Mathematical models are
powerful because of their ability to compactly describe and indicate structure
in the real world. For example, quadratic functions are useful to model the
physical path of projectiles, and using reasoned results about quadratic func-
tions can give us nice indications about what should happen in the real world.
Thus, if I throw a ball, I can mathematically model its height t seconds after
I throw it with a quadratic function h(t). Given what I know about quadratic
functions, I could make predictions about how high the ball will travel and at
what time into its flight it will attain this height. I can predict when it will
hit the ground again or reach any particular height.
However, if I go and actually measure the quantities after my predic-
tions, I am liable to be close but not exactly in line with my predictions. Why
is this? Because my model makes simplifying assumptions. Reality is complex.
Perhaps I neglected the effect of air resistance when developing my quadratic
function. My model is only as good as its underlying assumptions. If I include
the effect of air resistance, my model will be more complex and more adequate
in its reflection of the structure of the real world, but by no means will it be
perfect.
This situation is analogous to mathematically modelling logic itself.
Our first model was sentential logic, and we were able to prove some nice
results such as Compactness. However, we saw the inadequacy of sentential
logic to express properties of sets. We then developed first-order logic as a more
complex model of logic, able to approximate our deductive thought processes
more adequately. With a more expressive model we were able to prove more
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powerful results such as first-order Soundness (a proved statement will always
be true), Completeness (any statement that is true given a set of assumptions
can be proved from that set of assumptions), and Compactness (a statement
provable from a set of assumptions will always be provable from a finite set of
assumptions). We were also able to prove Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem,
which is a statement about our first-order model of deduction (we were also
able to indicate some incompleteness results for sentential logic as well (see
Section 3.3)).
Now, as any good, consistent, mathematical model will do, Go¨del’s In-
completeness Theorem gives us some indication of what is going on with the
reality of logic. However, we must be careful in drawing conclusions beyond
what the theorem actually states. The theorem is very specific in that it is
a statement about first-order logic and in that it deals with a specific theory
(number-theory). (Go¨del’s Theorem does also have some corollaries that have
implications beyond number theory, but these are beyond the scope of this
thesis.) So, the conclusions that we draw from Go¨del’s Theorem will be accu-
rate in their predictions insofar as they follow the statement of the theorem
with all of its inherent assumptions. Let us start with a very bad application
of Go¨del’s Theorem.
“Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that it is impossible for the
Bible to be both true and complete.”
The author searched on the internet via the Google search engine using
the search phrase “Godel’s incompleteness theorem the bible” and pulled this
phrase from the first result page, [6]. The intent was to pull the phrase from
the website not to either support or rebut the argument present on that page.
There is no intent to create a strawman argument.
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First, Go¨del’s Theorem deals with a formal language that must be able
so support the axioms of A. The Bible does not use such a formal language
nor is its intent to have its language support the structure of number theory.
Go¨del’s theorem talks about the truth about statements of number theory,
and the incompleteness of certain subtheories of number theory. However, the
above statement appears to talk about the truth of the assertions that the Bible
does make and to the Bible having a complete description of reality in some
context. The primary assertions of the Bible are not statements about number
theory at all. Go¨del’s Theorem simply does not apply. There are numerous
examples of such blanket and erroneous applications of Go¨del’s Theorem (see
[3]).
As we have seen, Go¨del’s Theorem does not assert the incompleteness of
everything about which statements of completeness and incompleteness can be
made. It states the incompleteness of a particular mathematical theory. Even
the term “completeness” has a very specific defined mathematical meaning.
As, we have seen, there are examples of complete theories (such as the theory
of algebraically closed fields of characteristic zero).
Now, for a few statements to which Go¨del’s Theorem could be reason-
ably be expected to apply.
“Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem indicates that there are first-order truths
about number theory that computers will never be able to demonstrate to be
true.”
It is reasonable to apply Go¨del’s Theorem in this case. In fact, the per-
son who took the most notice of Go¨del’s announcement at the 1930 Ko¨nigsberg
conference was John von Neumann, one of the fathers of computer science (see
[4] for history; the internal architecture of most computers is known as Von
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Neumann architecture). Fundamentally, computers operate on binary arith-
metic, strings of 1’s and 0’s (or for us strings of 0’s and S(0)’s). A computer
programming language could definitely be considered a formal language that
when compiled gets translated in the actual structure of number theory (the
natural numbers are represented in binary notation). It is fairly clear that
computers can be built that can support the structure of A, and in fact the
logic that computers use is first-order logic. It is then completely valid to apply
Go¨del’s Theorem to computability theory. Now, the arithmetic that the com-
puter is programmed to use will of course involve only finitely many axioms.
So, given the discussion at the end of the last chapter, the subtheory of the
number theory that the computer is capable of expressing given the axioms
programmed into it must be incomplete. That is, there are bona fide state-
ments of number theory that can be expressed in the computer programming
(formal language) such that these statements will be true in number theory
but that the computer cannot determine whether they are true or false in the
subtheory of number theory that it is operating under. The natural extension
to this claim is by replacing the word “computers” with “human minds.”
“Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem indicates that there are first-order truths
about number theory that human minds will never be able to demonstrate to
be true.”
Now, the application of Go¨del’s Theorem is less clear because it is less
clear what the human mind is as opposed to a computer. There is no doubt
that our minds are adequate to support the structure of A and that if we
are operating under a certain set of assumed axioms for number theory, the
subtheory of number theory build off of those axioms will be fundamentally in-
complete in a first-order logical setting, meaning that there will be first-order
226
logical statements that will be true of number theory that human minds can
never prove with first-order logic. However, note the careful insertion of the
word “first-order.” Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem is fundamentally a state-
ment about the mathematical model of first-order logic. Unlike a computer,
however, the mind is capable of logic beyond the first-order.
Refer back to Example 4.39. There, we discussed how every first-order
statement of ordering that can be made about the rational numbers can be
made about the real numbers and vice versa. The ordering structures for Q
and R are elementary equivalent. However, in terms of ordering, the Com-
pleteness Axiom for the real numbers (every bounded above set has a least
upper bound) describes the essential difference between the real numbers and
the rational numbers. However, as noted in Example 4.39, this statement is a
second-order logical statement. In second-order logic, we have the same sym-
bols as in the first-order alphabet, but now we allow variable predicate and
function symbols (Enderton, pp.268-269). This difference between first-order
and second-order languages will allow for the ability to range not only over
elements within a set, but also to range over sets themselves. So, we need a
second-order language to express the Completeness Axiom for the real num-
bers. The point of this example is that we as reasoners have more at our
disposal than just first-order logic. We can demonstrate a fundamental dif-
ference between the ordering structures for Q and R using homomorphisms.
So, even though we as mathematicians working within the axiomatic method
cannot hope to prove, using first-order logic, every statement true of number-
theory by Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, we do have more than first-order
logic at our disposal to attempt to prove such statements, the proof then being
a deduction of a higher-order logic rather than a deduction of first-order logic.
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An example may clarify more fully what we mean.
Take a polynomial with integer coefficients. We know, given the Fun-
damental Theorem of Algebra, that this polynomial will have all of its roots in
C. The idea of this polynomial having a root can be expressed as a first-order
statement. However, knowing that this polynomial will have all of its roots
in C comes from the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, whose proof relies on
results of Complex Analysis, which relies on C being a complete (in the sense
of the Completeness Axiom) space, which is a second-order concept. So, there
are things that we can know at a first-order level which only come from our
knowledge (coming from a proof) at a second-order level.
Does Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem give a statement about our in-
ability as human reasoners to prove things? In a first-order logical way, but
not in a logical way in general. It would indeed be interesting to see if there is
an analogous second-order Incompleteness Theorem and would be an avenue
for further research. One thing is clear from our discussion however. Given
our current understanding of what a computer is, the ability of our minds to
reason is greater than that of a computer. As many have indicated, Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorem indicates that our minds are more than a computer.
Even though Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem does spark many inter-
esting philosophical notions, these cannot be fully explored in this thesis. It
will no doubt be discussed for generations to come even as the average work-
ing mathematician labors in his or her particular field completely unphased by
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem in his or her establishment of mathematical
results. After all, Go¨del’s Theorem does not destroy the possibility of proofs
and may even encourage us to continue to seek for mathematical truth that
exists apart from our current set of assumed axioms.
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